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Abstract
This thesis presents a new approach to modelling the security and integrity
of data in distributed and ad-hoc networks of processes. An annotated type
based analysis is introduced which ensures that no contamination will occur
between data considered trustworthy and data that may have been corrupted.
A method of performing safe run-time coercion of security properties of
data is also presented. This is novel because it enables users to perform
run-time coercions of data in a manner that may be statically proven safe.
Both plain networks and dynamic (agent-based) networks are considered.
These are modelled as systems of first-order and higher-order pi-calculus,
respectively. The higher-order system examined introduces a new notion of
trustworthiness dependent on the context in which it is typed or executed.
This allows programs with malicious intent to be safely executed when it
can be demonstrated that no possibility for interaction with other programs,
including the host, is possible. A concept of execution context is introduced
to perform this analysis.
In addition, annotated type systems with and without sub-typing are
described, and subject reduction is shown to hold for all systems considered.
Implementation of the method is demonstrated via type-inference algo-
rithms, and these are shown to be both sound and complete for all systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis examines the issues of static verification of run-time integrity
checks and of determining the conglomerate trustedness, with respect to a
given policy, of groups of mobile agents with dynamic communication topolo-
gies.
The first-order pi-calculus is used to develop the theory, which is then
also extended to the higher-order pi-calculus. In all cases type systems anno-
tated with a boolean algebra over integrity levels provide static guarantees
of safety and security. Safe run-time coercion of integrity type annotations
is achieved by extending the language with a simple construct that encapsu-
lates a run-time verification check (the details of which are left abstract by
parameterising on an oracle), and branching based on its success or failure.
Thus, one branch can be parameterised on a trusted name or variable, and
the other on an untrusted name or variable. It is thus possible for the type
system to determine if the branches are in the wrong position, for example.
1.1 Motivation
One of the most promising directions in computer utilisation and computing
research is the concurrent and distributed execution of tasks. Some of the
world’s most powerful supercomputers are currently (February 2006) clusters
of cheap “off-the-shelf” components, usually at a cost of orders of magni-
tude less than the traditional specialised hardware. This trend also extends
to distribution on a global scale, most commonly (at the time of writing)
distributed as screensavers that perform CPU-intensive calculations while
their host machine is idle; see the SETI@Home project (SETI@home: Search
for Extraterrestrial Intelligence at home (2003), for analysis of radio sig-
nals from space) and distributed.net (Distributed.net (2003), coordinated
1
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brute-force efforts to crack various encryption schemes) for popular examples
of this approach. Naturally this need not be the only method of distribu-
tion, and research into platforms, languages, network technologies and other
enablers is on-going.
The excitement surrounding this trend however is tempered by the dan-
gers of such an approach: for the result of the computation to be trusted,
generally all the participants must also be trusted. The dangers do not
stop with the direct actors either; the communication networks employed
are themselves vulnerable to attack, perhaps by corrupting data (this may
incidentally be the result of interference from noise for example, rather than
a malicious attack) or even by injecting false data that may be trusted if it
is thought to come from a trusted component.
Research in this area is on-going, and many schemes exist to mitigate the
potential dangers.
Encryption techniques can provide protection from two angles: first by
maintaining data secrecy (which is not a concern of this thesis), and sec-
ondly by verifying the integrity of data from a particular sender using digital
signatures (Schneier 1993). Formal analysis of protocols is a related issue,
assuming the encryption/signature scheme used is unbreakable (or unforge-
able) and attempting to detect any weakness in the protocol used (Abadi
1999, 1997).
Another branch of analysis typically aimed at preserving secrecy of in-
formation is information flow analysis (Denning 1976; Volpano, Smith and
Irvine 1996; Honda, Vasconcelos and Yoshida 2000; Pottier and Conchon
2000; Hennessy and Riely 2000). The general idea is that there are different
levels of classification for data — for example in a military setting there might
be the classifications “civilian” and “senior personnel only” — information
should be allowed to flow from the lower (e.g. “civilian”) level to the higher,
but not in the other direction.
Many methods exist for verification as well; that is, detecting if the code
or data received is trustworthy or not. Digital signatures may establish that
data has not been corrupted in transit (although not whether it was trustwor-
thy in the first place), checksums provide some ability to check data integrity
(against random noise), and so on. In a higher-order context, systems such
as proof-carrying code (for example Necula and Lee 1998) can determine if
the program is trustworthy or not (the burden of proof is on the program’s
author). The Java Virtual Machine (Yellin 1995) also does byte-code verifi-
cation to check the veracity of each instruction.
Broadly, most analyses can be grouped into static (that is, performed
once, typically at compile-time; examples include protocol analysis and most
forms of information flow analysis), and dynamic (performed at run-time;
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for example digital signatures and byte-code verification). The systems pre-
sented in this thesis accommodate both; they are a static analysis, but in a
form that facilitates using different methods of run-time verification as ap-
propriate by acting as a framework. The existence of an ‘oracle’ is assumed;
that is, any procedure that is capable of determining the integrity of a piece
of code or data at run-time — the precise nature of this oracle is unspecified,
and any suitable method would suffice.
An interesting consequence of this approach is that it equips the program-
mer with tools not just to guarantee separation of data of differing integrity,
but also to interact with data of a lower integrity on a controlled and safe
basis.
The following sections outline the motivation and contributions of the
thesis, and review related work.
1.2 The Meta-Language
A meta-language concisely encapsulating the properties of interest is a great
help in a formal analysis. The system properties this thesis concerns itself
with are concurrency and distribution, possibly involving mobile code. The
predominant language in this setting is the pi-calculus (Milner 1993). A few
examples should illustrate the basic concepts and the issues tackled by the
analysis, with a more complete coverage given in Chapter 2.
1.2.1 First-Order pi-calculus
The calculus is built on two primitives, communication and concurrency. The
latter is expressed most concisely; given two separate processes denoted by
P and Q, their concurrent execution is written as P|Q.
The core notion of execution is reduction by communication. Communi-
cation occurs between two processes, one sending a message (which may be
empty, in other words synchronisation) and the other receiving that message
and binding any data that was contained in the message. Communication
occurs along named channels, which may represent for example TCP/IP
sockets.
As an example, process P may synchronise — communication is a blocking
operation — with process Q by sending an empty message on a channel
denoted by x, with the output end specified by a bar over the channel name:
x.P | x.Q (note the use of concurrency as well). On synchronisation, this
program would reduce to P|Q.
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Expanding on this example a little, P may send some additional infor-
mation, say the number 3. The receiving process Q will then bind the input
to a name y. This is also easily expressed in the language: x[3].P | x(y).Q,
which on communication reduces to P|Q{3/y}, where Q{3/y} denotes the
substitution of 3 for all free occurrences of y in Q.
At this point, a little reflection on the safety issues is in order. The
dangers would appear to be that the value 3 may itself not be trustworthy
(its value may have been compromised somehow), but also that the channel
x itself may not be secure. Perhaps it is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle
attack (Schneier 1993), or maybe it is just noisy and frequently corrupts
data in transit. This obviously has implications for values sent along it; if
the channel cannot be trusted, then logically neither can values received from
it.
The problem is potentially complicated further by the fact that channels
are themselves first-class data in the pi-calculus, enabling dynamic topologies.
For example, consider the program
x(z).z.P | x[y].Q | y.R
Note that the process x(z).z.P has no mention of the channel y, and thus
cannot communicate with y.R. However, it can communicate with x[y].Q,
and in doing so obtains the name y which it then binds to the name z to get
y.P. Now it may synchronise with y.R.
A common approach to problems such as this is through a type system,
perhaps decorated with additional information concerning the integrity val-
ues belonging to that type. In the pi-calculus the usual representation of
types is as a list of types that channels belonging to it may carry. So in the
first example, the type of x might be the singleton list (int). If this is an-
notated, where b and c range over annotations say, the extended type might
resemble (int c)b. As mentioned, there is a relationship between b and c that
must be captured.
This thesis chooses to use a boolean algebra for annotations, where trust-
edness (T) or integrity is the 1 element, and untrustedness (U) the 0 element.
The implication that if b is untrusted then so must c be can be concisely ex-
pressed by the requirement that c = b · c (so if b is the zero element then
c = 0 by implication). More complicated dependencies and relationships can
also be expressed in the algebra.
A second way that untrusted channels may adversely affect proceedings is
by blocking communication, altering synchronicity by taking an inadvertently
long time to complete a transmission, and so on. For example, consider the
process x.y.P that synchronises on two channels in succession, then acts like
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P. Assume that x is untrusted and y trusted; then the second synchronisation
on y will not be able to occur until the first has occurred, which means that
it is relying on an untrusted channel.
To prevent this situation in this thesis, an additional annotation is at-
tached to the deduction itself, indicating the lowest integrity level of channels
that it relies on. In the example above this is clearly untrusted, so little guar-
antees can be made about its security (as the example demonstrates).
1.2.2 Higher-Order pi-calculus
There is no support in the plain pi-calculus for transmission of processes,
as might be used to represent mobile code. However, similar effects can
faithfully be achieved through link-activation: that is, instead of sending the
process itself, a private link to the process is sent which may then be used to
synchonise in order to “run” it.
For example, if processes are allowed as channel data, then the scenario
of P sending process R to be executed by Q might be represented as follows:
x[R].P | x(X).(X|Q)→ P | R | Q
(where → denotes reduction). An alternative encoding that only transmits
channel access is just a little more verbose:
x[y].P | y.R | x(z).z.Q → P | y.R | y.Q
→ P | R | Q
Note that there is an extra reduction step, but the end result is the same (a
factor in this is that the language has no concept of locality). In this scenario
it is obviously desirable that the name y be private until transmitted, and the
pi-calculus provides facilities for local name creation. These will be covered
in Chapter 2.
It has in fact been demonstrated that such a higher-order version of the
language may be faithfully encoded (Sangiorgi 1993a) in the first-order sys-
tem considered up to now, but the extra expressivity it provides make it an
attractive meta-language in its own right.
Of course, given that processes may be transmitted on channels, and
some channels may expose their contents to the risk of corruption, it seems a
natural consequence that any type system in a similar vein for a higher-order
pi-calculus must also contain a notion of process integrity, as well as channel
integrity. This in turn implies that just as multiplication of annotations
expresses that the contents must be untrusted if the channel is, a similar
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condition must be imposed so that data coming from an untrusted source is
also untrusted (even if the channel is secure).
This situation is more complicated that it seems though: when two pro-
cesses are running in parallel, each with their own integrity level, how should
they be combined? Multiplication of annotations (as used above to express
dependencies between channels and their contents) in a boolean algebra pro-
duces the lower bound, so if one process is considered untrusted then so is
any parallel combination including that process. If, however, the untrusted
process is incapable for whatever reason of actually inflicting any harm then
this would seem to be over-kill.
A little thought along these lines reveals that a more flexible viewpoint is
“it depends”. In particular it should depend on a process’ ability, particularly
that of an untrusted process, to cause harm. This ability must necessarily
also be dependent on the host running the processes; consider the differ-
ence between a malicious applet running in a sandbox with no access to the
filesystem, network, etc, versus the same applet running in an unfettered
environment. Clearly, the former may be considered trusted and allowed to
execute, while the latter should definitely be considered untrusted.
There are two components to the implementation of this perspective in
this thesis:
• A deduction captures the context that every name is used under. This is
a mapping between the free names of the deduction, and the trustedness
of the process that uses them (not the trustedness of the name itself).
So if an untrusted process performs an input on the channel x, x would
be in an untrusted context in that deduction, irrespective of the type
of x.
• Secondly, every deduction is performed relative to a security policy,
termed the external context (represented as C). This represents the
host’s open ports of access available to the program.
The final step in a deduction is then to combine the contexts of all names
that the host exposes (all those in the external context) to calculate the
possibility of a program harming the host.
An example should help to make these ideas clearer. Assume the follow-
ing malicious (untrusted) process filesystem[junk ].P, where filesystem is the
channel used to read and — in this case — write to the file system. This
simple example represents a malicious process intent on writing junk to the
host file system. Given that P has previously been deduced to be untrusted,
then the channel filesystem appears in an untrusted context in this instance.
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The next step is to examine the contents of the external context. If
the host allows access to the file system, the external context will contain
filesystem, and thus the final deduction should be that the program is un-
trusted. However, if the host runs all programs in a sandbox, with no access
to the file system, then despite the working assumption of untrustedness it is
safe for the host to run with this security policy (that is, the final deduction
will be that the process can be trusted). In the case of multiple names from
the security policy appearing in the context they are combined by taking the
conjunction.
1.3 Coercion Based on Verification
An interesting approach that blends formal static analysis with respect for
the programmer’s knowledge is one which allows the programmer to guide the
analysis by marking parts of the code as safe (or alternatively unsafe). The
most oft-cited example of this is the work of Ørbæk and Palsberg (Ørbæk
1995; Palsberg and Ørbæk 1995), who presented systems of both a functional
and imperative nature along these lines.
Their approach is best illustrated by an example:
Example 1.3.1 The following example is from Palsberg and Ørbæk (1995,
Section 1.2); it represents a simple server processing network requests with an
accompanying digital signature. The server code (using a SML-style syntax)
is:
fun getRequest client =





where the handler code resembles:
fun handleEvent req =
let trustedReq = check req
in ...
The two pertinent syntactical additions are the phrase trust req in the
server, and check req in the handler code. The intention is that the request
req is initially untrusted (and thus will be detected by the static analysis if
improperly used), but if some verification procedure is successful — in this
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case checking the signature — the programmer coerces the data to trusted
using the trust keyword. Where it is essential that data be trusted, the key-
word check is used, which only type-checks if its argument can be statically
determined to be trusted.
This simple combination of three operators (the distrust keyword is also
available to perform the opposite function to trust if necessary) turns out
to be very powerful; the authors claim that only a minimal usage of the ex-
tra operators is typically required, and it provides all the benefits of a static
analysis with the additional flexibility of allowing the programmer to override
(or gently guide) it when necessary.
This is quite a pragmatic approach, and probably appealing to program-
mers frustrated by overly-conservative analyses. While much-cited however,
any further analysis of such systems is rather scant. The reason for this is
likely to be the same reason just quoted as a benefit: while it allows the pro-
grammer to guide the analysis where required, it implicitly puts too much
control in the hands of the programmer, the dangers of which can be seen in
Example 1.3.2:
Example 1.3.2 Revisiting Example 1.3.1, omitting the handler code (which
remains the same), consider what happens if the verifySignature branches






The issues in this example are easily apparent: a simple programmer error
results in code that still type-checks and would be deemed safe according to
the additional annotations, but is obviously seriously flawed — the integrity
check may fail, but the request is still marked as trusted. The primary
concern is that trust is an explicit cast, and its correct usage is not (and
cannot be) checked by the analysis.1 In other words, its results are only useful
modulo correct usage of its facilities by the programmer, which most people
would regard as still too dangerous. Nonetheless, it is a most promising
direction, and will be investigated further in this thesis.
1This also assumes that the programmer is trying to do the right thing; picture a
junior programmer faced with deadlines, inserting trust in numerous places to fix the
safety error the compiler keeps reporting!
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1.3.1 An Alternative Approach
This thesis suggests an alternative approach that encompasses the pragmatic
benefits of programmer-driven coercion, but in a safe manner by making
the coercion itself implicit. It is contended that the structure of the code
in Examples 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 is relatively common: perform some form of
verification procedure, and branch based on the results (typically to the
main code if verification is successful or to error-handling code if it fails, as
in the example). The issues with the trust/check keywords are that they
are disconnected from each other, and importantly they are not related in
any way — trust in particular — to the verification procedure used (if there
even is one).
The solution proposed in this thesis is an addition to the language of
a single construct — called certify — that encompasses all aspects: veri-
fication, branching, and coercion. This instantly removes the issues raised
earlier, whilst retaining the benefits:
• coercion is available to the programmer, but only dependent on some
form of certification;
• the branching performed is now also directly related to the certification
procedure; and
• the coercion is implicit in the branch chosen; for example the first
branch is always parameterised on a trusted variable, the second on
an untrusted variable: if the branches are confused, the static analyser
(the type system) will now detect it.
1.3.2 Implementation
There are two factors to consider when implementing this new idea in the
pi-calculus: how it is incorporated into the language, and the implications for
the type system.
To begin with, as stated, the implementation of the verification procedure
itself are left abstract. The existence of an oracle is assumed, ranged over
by certify, represented as a function. That is, it is assumed that certify(x)
correctly deduces the integrity of the channel x at run-time.
This is then incorporated into the language with a construct modelled on
the input syntax, but with two separate bodies:
x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q
This performs similarly to an input process, receiving a value on the channel
x, and binding the value to y. The difference is that the oracle certify is
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first used to determine its trustedness; if it is found to be trusted it is bound
to y in P, and if untrusted to y in Q. The other branch is discarded. In
this manner it combines the complementary operations of verification and
branching.
Secondly, the incorporation of this new operation into the type system
must be considered. There are several elements that must be combined.
Firstly, in the typing of the certified input construct above, the bound input
name y has a slightly different type in each branch, being trusted in P and
untrusted in Q. This lets the programmer access coercion and verification,
but without the ability to abuse it indiscriminately.
In order to perform coercion, variable annotations must be admitted into
the annotation algebra. This has additional expressive benefits: a channel
or value with a variable annotation represents a trustedness that cannot be
determined at compile-time but can be determined at run-time, for exam-
ple via byte-code or signature verification. At run-time when verification is
performed this variable is coerced to a concrete (trusted or untrusted) value
globally.
This expressiveness can also be applied in other areas, such as in calcu-
lating the combined security level of a certified input construct. Assuming
that annotations are ranged over by b, c and annotations variables by i,
then supposing that process P is typed at level b and Q at level c, where
the input to be verified has a run-time trustedness of i, the combined level
can be elegantly expressed as i · b + i · c. In other words, if i is mapped to
trusted this expression will reduce to b, which is the level of P, the branch
that is executed. Similarly it will evaluate to the level of Q if i is mapped to
untrusted.
Expressing the semantics of this operator is slightly tricky, and is here
accomplished using a typed form of labelled transition semantics. Plain la-
belled transition semantics are a common way of describing the semantics
of process algebra; rules are expressed in the form P
µ−→ P′, to describe that
process P may perform action µ and reduce to P′ in the process. This must
be elaborated on to describe the certify operator. A rule of the form
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
states that process P, when typed under environment Γ, may possibly in-
teract with an anonymous second process typed under environment Θ, to
perform the action µ and transform itself to P′ and the two environments to
Γ′ and Θ′ respectively. Additionally, the reduction generates the function R
which is a substitution from annotation variables to annotations, and which
represents every coercion that occurs due to certify in the reduction. While
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more complicated, this allows a precise specification of the names that are
exchanged between processes, and crucially the coercions that occur on the
type annotations.
1.4 Related Work
This section summarises the existing work in related areas, and makes com-
parisons with the approach of this thesis where warranted; additional com-
parisons are presented at the end of Chapter 3, when they can be discussed
in context.
As noted by Dorothy Denning (Denning 1999) it is impossible to formally
prove any system is secure as by definition this implies secure with respect
to a given model, and attacks typically arise around the model (for instance,
using social engineering to obtain a password, to choose a blunt but salient
example).
None-the-less, this does not detract from the value of formal analysis,
merely suggests that it should be considered as part of a broader context.
It is convenient when examining related approaches to group them roughly
by the topics studied in this thesis. These are, coarsely: information flow
analysis, the use of coercion in integrity or flow analysis, and the analysis of
mobile code (higher-order systems).
1.4.1 Information Flow Analysis
Information flow analysis is the process of protecting the secrecy levels of
information; it is probably also one of the earliest formal security analyses
(Denning 1976).
Such analyses typically assume a range of secrecy levels, often expressed
as a lattice, and seek to assure the user that a program will not leak classified
information to a member (for example; variable) with a lower classification.
The reverse flow, from less secret to more secret, is typically allowed. Security
properties are usually expressed as some form of observability, typically that
an observer at some security level can only observe data at an equivalent
or lower classification. Some examples will help summarise the principles
involved.
Example 1.4.1 Consider the following (imperative) program statement:
x := y
In this case there is a clear flow of information from y to x by direct assign-
ment, hence this statement can only be approved if x has a higher security
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clearance than y. The situation is potentially more complicated however, for
example the following fragment:
if (x < 5) then y := 0 else y := 3
Here there is no explicit assignment from x to y, but a user with access to y
can still glean some information about x: specifically if its value is less than
five or not, and thus there is an implicit flow from x to y which must also
be monitored. A similar situation naturally exists for while–loops and other
related constructs.
In most respects secrecy analysis is in fact the dual of integrity analysis:
secrecy analysis aims to ensure that no data may flow from a higher security
classification to a lower, whilst integrity analysis seeks to ensure that low
integrity data is not written to a high-integrity variable. In other words, a
high integrity level corresponds to a low secrecy level, and vice versa (this
observation is in fact first due to Biba (1977)).
The formal analysis of secrecy flow began with Dorothy Denning (Denning
1976). This research used a lattice model of security levels, and provided a
framework for their implementation and analysis.
This direction was later extended and implemented as a type system for
a sequential imperative language in Volpano et al. (1996). Formalisation as
a type system enabled a demonstration of soundness of the model, in the
form of a non-interference result. These results were extended further still to
examine a multi-threaded imperative language in Smith and Volpano (1998),
where the issue of non-interference is complicated by the possibility of timing
attacks and the like (interestingly, their results depend on the nature of the
thread-scheduling algorithm: a non-deterministic algorithm is preferred, and
a more restrictive type system is required if a deterministic algorithm is
deployed).
Recent results in the area are plentiful.
Pottier and Conchon (2000) describe a method of systematically extend-
ing a functional type system to derive a system of information flow. Bodei,
Degano, Nielson and Nielson (2001) present an analysis for the pi-calculus
capable of determining the subset of channels a name may be bound to at
runtime, and derive several common security properties. By necessity though
this loses alpha-convertibility and requires a minor syntactical adjustment,
although it is unclear if this is really an impediment or not.
Pottier (2001) provides a relatively simple method of reducing a proof
of non-interference to subject reduction, for a non-standard extension of the
pi-calculus.
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Abadi, Banerjee, Heintze and Riecke (1999) reduce several different anal-
yses (security flow, binding-time, slicing, call-tracking) to a common core in
their Dependency Core Calculus. Thus multiple analyses may be derived
by encoding the parent calculus in the core calculus, and using the results
established for the core calculus. They also offer an encoding of the purely-
functional fragment of the SLam calculus (although as with most results
derived from Palsberg and Ørbæk (1995), they do not encode coercion from
untrusted to trusted).
The first-order pi-calculus is also used in both Honda et al. (2000) and
Honda and Yoshida (2002), with a relatively complicated type system an-
notated with both linear/affine input/output properties (in the manner of
Kobayashi, Pierce and Turner (1996)) and secrecy levels. A sound encoding
of the multi-threaded imperative calculus of Smith and Volpano (1998) is
proffered for both; the latter (Honda and Yoshida 2002) is powerful enough
to encode the Dependency Core Calculus (Abadi et al. 1999).
Myers and Liskov (1997) analyse a decentralised system that offers fine-
grained control over data-sharing by allowing the users to specify data-flow
policies as program annotations. In addition, they provided a statement
declassify(e,L) that allowed the user to explicitly control downgrading
of data classification, although the safety of this operator is not established
in this work (this topic will be examined in more detail in Section 1.4.2).
Myers (1999) provided a practical implementation as an extension of the Java
language (Gosling, Joy, Steele and Bracha 2000), although some features were
altered or missing due to unsolved research questions (threads in particular).
This work is on-going at Jif: Java + information flow (2005).
A different approach is taken in Abadi and Gordon (1997) and Abadi
(1997), where a version of the pi-calculus enriched with primitives for describ-
ing encryption is presented, enabling reasoning about the safety of crypto-
graphic protocols by type-checking (rather than, say, theorem-proving). The
security property is an observability result; a well-typed protocol leaks no
information to an outside observer. An implementation of related ideas ex-
ists in the cryptyc tool (Gordon and Jeffrey 2001; Cryptyc: Cryptographic
Protocol Type Checker 2006).
1.4.2 Approaches to Coercion
The SLam calculus (Secure Lambda) (Heintze and Riecke 1998) is a variant
of the lambda calculus that maintains security as well as type information.
It is focused on secrecy preservation (as opposed to integrity protection)
and is thus essentially a form of flow analysis (see Section 1.4.1), however
it also offers a limited form of coercion to the programmer via the protect
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construct. This is, however, a one-way coercion and can only be used to
make the security level of its argument more restrictive (and thus avoids the
pitfalls outlined above).
The ideas in Myers and Liskov (1997) were refined in Zdancewic and My-
ers (2001). This work formalised the extent to which information is leaked
using their declassify operator by defining a notion of robust declassifica-
tion. The analysis is based on an equivalence relation over a state-transition
system, and argues the point that many useful systems must leak informa-
tion as part of their function (the example of a password-checking system
was used; the password must be kept private, but a failed login leaks a small
amount of information about what the password is not). No mechanism
for enforcing a safe policy involving intentional downgrading of information
was offered; this was presented in Myers, Sabelfeld and Zdancewic (2004).
This work provided a more language-based presentation (for an imperative
language), and offered a refined notion of robustness called qualified robust
declassification, which allows an attacker limited ability to control informa-
tion release. A type system was presented, such that well-typed programs
satisfied the robustness condition.
This work is interesting from a second perspective; their implementation
used a lattice incorporating both confidentiality and integrity. Two coercion-
like operators were used; declassify which lowers the confidentiality classi-
fication for a fixed integrity level, and endorse which increases the integrity
classification without affecting the confidentiality. The interaction between
these two operators, which is quite delicate as declassify requires a fixed
integrity level and endorse alters integrity levels, is also carefully studied.
1.4.3 Higher-Order Systems and Mobile Code
While security analyses utilising the first-order pi-calculus or some variant
abound (most a form of flow analysis, see above), there are comparatively
few dealing with the more difficult angle of mobile code, or higher-order
systems.
The work of Myers (1999) has been extended in Zdancewic, Zheng, Nys-
trom and Myers (2001) to automatically partition a program to run in a
distributed system. A prototype implementation as an extension of Java
also exists.
Confined-λ (Kirli 2001) is an elegant combination of the λ-calculus ex-
tended with operators for sending and receiving data along channels (much
like the pi-calculus). Since functions are also data, it is a true higher-order
system.
Their approach is slightly different to most examined in this chapter;
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rather than providing an ordering of security classifications, the concept of
mobility regions is used. These are essentially sets of users (or computation
sites) allowed to view each function. While they suggest that this is more
simplistic than the richer structures of the SLam calculus (with which a
comparison is made), it would appear to be a practical way of enforcing
secrecy in distributed systems (by restricting a computation to only known
sites). Their security property states that well-typed programs restrict values
to their intended region. It is also suggested that it may approximate more
refined notions of secrecy discussed elsewhere by using mobility regions to
represent the differing security classes (since regions may be nested in other
regions).
Yoshida and Hennessy (2000) offer a more fine-grained approach. The
modelling language is the higher-order pi-calculus, and their type system
borrows from the λ-calculus. Processes are typed with an interface, where
an interface associates names with capabilities (input and output usage, and
the types of those names). This enables other processes to decide whether
or not to run processes based on their interface, for example. An interesting
extension of this idea is also included, using a kind of dependent type: these
are used to extend an interface to express process abstractions, for example
(x : σ)→ ρ, where ρ is an interface and x a channel variable with type σ (ρ
is allowed to contain occurrences of x).
An extension to that work is presented in Vivas and Yoshida (2002) where
a dynamic operator is used to preserve many of the properties that were
statically checked in Yoshida and Hennessy (2000). Their new operator is a
screening operator that provides a more powerful notion of restriction than
the regular pi-calculus restriction operator (that is, (νx)P), which loses encap-
sulation due to scope extrusion. The most interesting thing about this work
(from this perspective) is the dynamic nature of their operator, although it
is in other ways analogous to the external context (C) of this system. For
example, the reduction
PdL µ−→ P′dL
is only defined if ‖µ‖ ∈ L where L is the filter, a set of names denoting
allowable actions (for additional granularity, names are also marked by a
directional tag; stating for instance that x may only be used for input across
the filter, see Section 6.1.1 for additional details). A proof is provided that
this adequately encodes the system in Yoshida and Hennessy (2000). Focardi
and Gorrieri (1995) used a similar operator in their Security Process Algebra
(a metalanguage based on CCS) to classify and compare a range of security
properties for non-deterministic systems.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning a most interesting approach to ensuring
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safety of mobile code: proof-carrying code (Necula 1998; Necula and Lee
1998). This is a novel approach in which untrusted code is only allowed to
run if it can prove that it respects certain security properties set by the host.
The security requirements are stated as logical axioms, and the proof of a
program encoded as a binary representation of the proof. The size of the
proof reportedly outweighs that of the program by several factors, and the
proof itself is not easy to construct: the interesting thing however is that
the burden of proof is on the program author, not (as is commonly the case
in most systems examined here) on the host. It is a relatively quick matter
for the host to verify both that the proof is correct and that the program
respects the proof, and if so it may execute the program.
This is clearly unlike most other analyses presented here and has no ana-
logue in this thesis; however it is of interest in that it provides one method
by which certify may verify a piece of code as being safe.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
The remainder of the dissertation is structured along fairly standard lines.
While at least a passing familiarity with the pi-calculus would be advanta-
geous, no previous knowledge is assumed and Chapter 2 provides a summary
overview, including type systems and syntax for both first- and higher-order
versions of the calculus.
The novel work begins in Chapter 3, with a description of the type sys-
tems and a syntactic addition that forms the core of the thesis. Four systems
are presented; three progressively more complicated first-order systems, and
a higher-order system. Safety of the systems follows in Chapter 4, and is
presented as a statement of subject reduction for each system, and a se-
curity property in the form of a strong non-deterministic non-interference
result for the first-order system, and an observability-based property for the
higher-order system. Only three of the four systems are examined from this
perspective, as one is mostly a vehicle to develop a more sophisticated sys-
tem. Chapter 5 describes implementations for each system in the form of
type inference algorithms and proves their correctness, and finally Chapter 6




In this chapter a formal treatment of the topics that form the basis for the
thesis is presented, in particular the pi-calculus and the foundations of its
type system.
The calculus is first introduced via its syntax and semantics, of both the
first and higher-order calculi. The operational semantics are presented in
terms of a reduction relation and also as a labelled transition system.
The type systems are presented separately from the syntax, and both
first and higher-order systems are examined. Sub-typing is not covered: sub-
typing for the pi-calculus typically involves some extra information appended
to the basic type (usually including a notion of input/output usage; see Pierce
and Sangiorgi (1993) for the first work in this area) and this chapter restricts
itself to the fundamental type systems. Sub-typing will be covered in the
context of the novel systems presented here, beginning in Chapter 3.
2.2 The pi-calculus
The pi-calculus was originally proposed by Milner, Parrow andWalker (1992a,b)
based on Milner’s early work on CCS (Milner 1980), as a way of reasoning
about concurrency in a similar way that the λ-calculus enables reasoning
about computation. In keeping with the minimalist nature of the λ-calculus,
the core pi-calculus is very small: the two fundamental concepts are parallel
execution (or concurrency), and communication. Processes may execute in
parallel with one-another, and reduce by communication of data along named
channels. In its purest form, all data is made up of channels, and processes
themselves are constructed simply from channels. This simple core provides
17
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a lot of flexibility: new links can be established by sending the correspond-
ing channel to a process that previously did not possess it. It has previously
been demonstrated (Milner et al. 1992a) that the pi-calculus can encode the
λ-calculus (although note that one must also decide on the reduction scheme
at compilation time), so in theory the pi-calculus offers all the benefits of the
λ-calculus, together with the power of concurrency.
This thesis will use a variant of the polyadic pi-calculus as described in
Milner (1993) (polyadic refers to the ability to send multiple values along a
channel in a single transmission. The original pi-calculus presentations were
monadic; that is, only a single value could be transmitted at a time). There is
no formal reason for this choice, but it would appear to offer greater flexibility
than the monadic calculus and is in keeping with most current research; and
in any case the results extend downwards to the monadic calculus.
Some examples of the calculus in use will be provided first, followed by a
formal presentation of the syntax.
Firstly, consider the case of a process denoted by P, executing in paral-
lel with a second process denoted by Q: in the pi-calculus this situation is
concisely denoted by P|Q.
Secondly, consider an example of communication. For two processes to
communicate it is necessary that they have the same name (channel) at the
outermost level (this situation is analogous to a socket in common network
programming APIs). A name used in an output context is written with a
bar over the top, and the names that are being sent are enclosed in square
brackets immediately afterwards. Thus a process that outputs the single
name y along a channel x, then continues as the process P would be written as
x[y].P. The corresponding input case is written similarly: the channel being
used for input is written followed by the bound variable (formal parameter)
in parentheses; so a process that receives a single name along a channel x
and binds it to a variable z in a process Q is written as x(z).Q. (Note that
in the version of the pi-calculus considered here it is possible to communicate
tuples of names together, although this is not demonstrated in the examples
just given).
Now a brief but instructive example will be examined to demonstrate the
modelling capabilities of these concepts.
Example 2.2.1 Consider the example of a file-sharing program, in which a
central server maintains a list of files stored on each node. When a particular
client wishes to download a file (that it has presumably discovered on the
centrally-stored list), it notifies the server which responds with the address of
the node storing that particular file. The requesting client may now establish
a link with the host node and download the file.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 19
This may be described in the pi-calculus as follows. Let the server process
be represented by server, the client by client, and the host by host. Then a
representation of the above scenario is:
s[req].req(h).h(disk).client | s(c).c[link].server | link[file].host
The client begins by connecting to the server (along channel s) and sending its
request req, which the server binds to the channel c, producing the following:
req(h).h(disk).client | req[link].server | link[file].host
The server then uses the req channel provided by the client to send the address
— called link — of the host possessing the file; leading to:
link(disk).client | server | link[file].host
at which point the client may start downloading file from host (and writing
it to its internal variable disk).
This is a generalisation of a relatively common scenario in peer-to-peer
networks; the main principle though is the expressive power of the pi-calculus.
To begin with, the only process with knowledge of another was the client (that
was aware of the server), and the server that was aware of the host. Yet,
by passing around addresses, the network is able to dynamically reconfigure
itself by creating new links.
2.2.1 First-order pi-calculus
The original and most common versions of the pi-calculus are first order ; that
is, only channels can be transmitted as data and not whole processes. This
may seem overly restrictive, but perhaps surprisingly it is a powerful enough
abstraction that the λ-calculus can be encoded in it (Milner et al. 1992a).
The key to this power is the dynamic topologies of the networks created in
this manner; because new links can be established on the fly, processes can
in effect reconfigure themselves dynamically to provide much the same effect
as transmitting whole processes (see also Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 for further
discussion of this matter).
Syntax
The syntax adopted here is in line with most modern presentations; it is
generally simpler than that presented in Milner (1993). This is for reasons of
clarity; the concise syntax used here is sufficient, and most proofs encountered
are by structural induction and benefit from the smaller number of cases.
The first-order pi-calculus is given by the grammar of Definition 2.2.2:
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Definition 2.2.2 (Terms) Let processes be ranged over by P, Q, and R,
and the set of all processes be represented by P. Let names be ranged over
by x, y, and z, and the set of all names be represented by N (the terms
name, port, and channel will be used interchangeably, with a preference for
“name”).
Terms of the first-order pi-calculus are defined inductively as the least set
containing
P ::= 0 |
∑
i∈I
pii.Pi | P|P | !P | (νx)P
pi ::= x[−→y ] | x(−→y )
Note that summation is only permitted for guarded processes; that is, those
with an outer-most input or output prefix (Milner 1993). Processes of the
form (P|Q) + R are not permitted. This is mainly to simplify the semantics
and some of the proofs that will follow. As a shorthand notation the indexing
set I in the summation term will often be omitted, and such processes will
usually be written as P + Q anyway.
Following convention, terms such as x[−→y ].0 will often be abbreviated to
x[−→y ] (that is, where it is clear the null process “base” may be omitted).
Informally (a more rigorous treatment follows); 0 is the inactive process,
x(−→y ).P inputs names along a channel named x and binds them to −→y , (νx)P
creates a new local name x (and thus binds x), and x[−→y ].P is the (non-
binding) output construct. Summation represents a discriminated choice;
P + Q may reduce as either P or Q, but not both. Summation is also a
non-deterministic choice, although in practice the decision of which executes
is determined by whichever has prior opportunity (for example, summation
is often used when encoding booleans and an “if . . . then . . . else” program-
ming construct). Parallel execution is denoted by P|Q, while replication (!P)
describes an infinite supply of process P; it may be defined as !P , P|!P,
where the reduction rules below will make sure it does not simply replicate
continuously.
In all the work that follows it is assumed that all bound names have
been renamed to be distinct (see Convention 2.2.4). The only two binding
constructs are input, for example x(−→y ).P, which binds −→y ; and restriction,
for example (νx)P, binding x in P. The bound and free names are defined
in the usual way (Definition 2.2.3):
Definition 2.2.3 Let the free names of a term P, written as FN (P) be de-
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fined inductively as follows:
FN (0) , ∅ FN (P|Q) , FN (P) ∪ FN (Q)
FN (!P) , FN (P) FN (x(−→y ).P) , {x} ∪ FN (P)− {−→y }




The bound names of a term (written BN (P)) are defined similarly.
Following Barendregt (Barendregt 1981, Variable Convention 2.1.13), all
bound names are renamed to be distinct (Convention 2.2.4). Note that this
is consistent with the Definition (2.2.5) of structural congruence in which
terms are identified up to alpha-convertibility.
Convention 2.2.4 If P1, . . . ,Pn occur in a certain mathematical context
(for example, definition, proof), then in these terms all bound names are
chosen to be different from the free names.
Structural congruence over processes is defined in Definition 2.2.5:
Definition 2.2.5 Structural congruence, written ≡, is the least transitive
reflexive relation satisfying the following:
• P ≡ Q if P is α-convertible to Q (that is, if they are identical up to
renaming of bound names)
• !P ≡ P | !P
• (νx)0 ≡ 0; (νx)(νy)P ≡ (νy)(νx)P; (νx)P|Q ≡ (νx)(P|Q)
• P|Q ≡ Q|P; (P|Q)|R ≡ P|(Q|R); P|0 ≡ P (that is, Abelian monoid
laws based around |, with 0 as the identity element)
• P+Q ≡ Q+P; (P+Q)+R ≡ P+(Q+R); P+0 ≡ P (that is, Abelian
monoid laws based around +, with 0 as the identity element)
If P is alpha-convertible to Q this will sometimes be written as P ≡α Q,
where ≡α is the least reflexive, transitive, and symmetric relation defined
when its operands are alpha-convertible to each other.
Name substitution on first-order terms is specified in Definition 2.2.6:
Definition 2.2.6 (First-Order Substitutions) For a given term P, write
P{y/x} to denote the same term with all free occurrences of x replaced by y.
Let −→x refer to a sequence of names x1 . . . xn and −→y the (distinct) sequence
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y1 . . . yn (for some finite n); then the definition may be extended to cover
sequences of names, for example P{−→y /−→x } (note that by definition the lengths
of both sequences are identical, and all x ∈ −→x are assumed to be distinct).
More formally, this can be expressed inductively:
0{y/x} , 0
x{y/x} , y







z′ ).P){y/x} , z{y/x}(−→z′ ).(P{y/x})
(z[
−→
z′ ].P){y/x} , z{y/x}[−→z′ {y/x}].(P{y/x})
(In the above, the convention is used that if −→z represents the sequence z1 . . . zn
then −→z {y/x} represents z1{y/x} . . . zn{y/x}).
Reduction Semantics
Reduction semantics are presented as term-rewriting rules; this enables de-
scribing the operation of the language by showing a complete reduction in
the context in which it occurs. The key to describing a reduction seman-
tics in the pi-calculus is structural congruence (see Definition 2.2.5): in the
λ-calculus redexes appear contiguously as sub-terms, whereas in a process
calculus describing mobility (such as the pi-calculus) by definition this is not
necessarily the case. The addition of a congruence rule mitigates this situa-
tion by enabling manipulation of terms so that redexes do in fact appear as
sub-terms for the purposes of presentation (Milner 1993).
There is only a single reduction axiom; one describing communication of
names along named channels. There are three structural rules defining the
circumstances under which reduction can (and, just as importantly, cannot)
occur.
Communication reduction occurs when one process sends some (possibly
zero) names along a channel, where they are bound to names in the receiving
process (note how this rule also expresses the exclusivity of summation):
(. . .+ x[−→y ].P|x(−→z ).Q+ . . .)→ P|Q{−→y /−→z }
To this axiom are then added three inference rules; stating respectively
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• reduction may occur under a restriction (but not under a prefix):
P→ P′
(νx)P→ (νx)P′
• structurally congruent terms have the same reductions:
P ≡ Q Q→ Q′ Q′ ≡ P′
P→ P′
• reduction may occur in parallel:
P→ P′ Q→ Q′
P|Q→ P′|Q′
The Kleene-closure (that is, the reflexive and transitive closure) of the arrow
→ is written as .
It is also necessary to ensure that names under a restriction can be emitted
outside the restriction where necessary and if it doesn’t cause any confusion.
This is known as scope extrusion (Definition 2.2.7):
Definition 2.2.7 (Scope Extrusion) The scope of a restriction binder may
be extended as far as necessary, providing it doesn’t capture other names in
doing so. In particular, the scope may be extended to enable names under the
scope of a restriction to be emitted to processes formerly outside the scope.
For example, assuming that y /∈ BN (Q):
(νy)x[y].P | x(z).Q→ (νy)(P | Q{y/z})
Note that scope extrusion is achieved in the reduction semantics via a clause
in the definition of structural congruence (Definition 2.2.5). Using the pre-
vious example, the reduction would proceed as
(νy)x[y].P | x(z).Q ≡ (νy)(x[y].P | x(z).Q)
→ (νy)(P | Q{y/z})
Labelled Transition Semantics
If the benefits of a reduction semantics are its naturalness, then the advan-
tages of a labelled transition system lie in its ability to express the possible
communications of a sub-term independent of its context. This will prove
especially useful when reasoning about processes (in particular, concerning
security properties), as it enables a precise specification of the property and
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its proof — avoiding confusion about the role of the context. The converse
of this is that the specification of the transition rules themselves are more
complicated than those of a reduction system (where some — in particular
input and output — rules are combined, and structural congruence abstracts
away many of the issues concerning context).
The basic informal concept of the rules is that a process evolves into
another process by performing some (usually observable) action; for example
P
µ−→ P′ indicates that process P reduces to process P′ by performing action
µ as it does so.
Three forms of action are identified (the symbol µ ranges over all three
and denotes the anonymous action, for when the precise form is irrelevant):
• τ , the silent (unobservable) action. This indicates that the reduction
takes place internally; that is without interaction with the environment.
• x(−→y ), an input action. The vector −→y is the sequence of names received
(not instantiated).
• (ν−→z )x[−→y ], an output action. The vector −→y is the sequence of names
emitted during the action; the names −→z are the subset of {x,−→y } that
are bound, to account for scope extrusion.
In the two observable actions (input and output) above, x is referred to as
the subject of the action and −→y as the object. The notation ‖µ‖ returns the
subject of the action µ; that is, ‖(ν−→z )x[−→y ]‖ = x and ‖x(−→y )‖ = x (and ‖τ‖
is undefined).
Definition 2.2.8 Let the free names of an action in the labelled transition
semantics, FN (µ), be defined as follows:
• FN (x(−→y )) = {x,−→y }
• FN ((ν−→z )x[−→y ]) = {x,−→y } − −→z
• FN (τ) = ∅
The bound names BN (µ) are defined similarly.
Definition 2.2.9 (Traces) The multi-step closure of a labelled reduction,




For a given process P, the set of all possible traces is given by Tr (P).
Traces are defined inductively from the single-step relation of Figure 2.1
in Figure 2.2.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 25
P

























(ν−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ P′ w 6= x,w ∈ −→y −−→z
(νw)P
(νw,−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−−−→ P′
(open)
P
(ν−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ P′ Q x(
−→y )−−−→ Q′ −→z /∈ FN (Q)
P|Q τ−→ (ν−→z )(P′|Q′) (comm.)














Figure 2.2: First-Order Traces
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The rules are presented in Figure 2.1; for space and clarity reasons, the
symmetric cases of the rules for summation, composition, and communication
are omitted. An additional complication occurs when considering inadver-
tent capture of names, which was not an issue in the rewrite rules due to
the assumption of Convention 2.2.4. In the labelled transition semantics,
however, by definition the context is unknown and new names may be im-
ported. This requires the addition of a number of side-conditions to prevent
any name capture occurring as the result of a reduction:




where y is also free in Q and is inadvertently captured. See also Con-
vention 2.2.4.
• In the rule (res .), the side-condition prevents a name being captured
in an input action, for example
(νz)x(y).P
x(z)−−→ (νz)P{z/y}
in which z has become bound (note that this can be avoided by re-
naming the restricted variable z before the reduction; see also Conven-
tion 2.2.4).
• In the rule (comm.) the side-condition prevents a name being captured
in a communication such as
(νz)x[y].P | (x(w).Q|z.0) τ−→ (νz)(P | Q{y/w} | z.0)
in which the z in z.0 has become bound after the reduction.
• The side-condition in the rule (open.), together with the conditions on
the rules (comm.) and (comp..), provides the implementation of scope
extrusion in the labelled transition semantics by moving a restriction
on the term to a restriction in the label.
From now on, these side-conditions (and binders) will be assumed to hold,
and will be omitted.
As with the reduction semantics, the Kleene-closure of
µ−→ is written as
−→µ− (where −→µ is a possibly zero-length sequence of labels), and following the
convention regarding the single-step reduction, if −→µ = −→τ (that is, a possibly
zero-length sequence of internal reductions) then  will be used in place of
−→τ−.
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Equivalence of Reduction and Labelled Transition Semantics
Perhaps not surprisingly (since they have a common goal) it has been demon-
strated that there is a strong equivalence between the two forms of opera-
tional semantics (Milner 1992). Informally, and modulo structural congru-
ence, the silent labelled transition
τ−→ corresponds exactly to the unlabeled
arrow → of the reduction semantics. It can also be shown what forms of
process in the reduction semantics correspond to the various actions in the
labelled semantics.
Consequently, where convenient and unambiguous
τ−→ will sometimes be
written just as →.
2.2.2 Higher-order pi-calculus
The growth in distributed computation has seen a natural progression into
mobile code: that is, instead of merely propagating data across the network,
entire processes or code fragments can be moved to execute in different lo-
cations. The advantages of this are manifold; to take a simple example, a
web application must validate all data before processing it: this is usually
done by the server, and if any errors are found they are reported back to
the user for correction. This obviously takes several server transactions to
complete, and relies on the server doing all the work: doing at least some of
the validation client-side both lessens the load on the server (enabling it to
be more efficiently utilised) and speeds the whole transaction for the user,
especially if there is significant lag in the network or load on the server.
The concept can be further elaborated: tasks requiring intensive calcula-
tion may gain a performance increase by distributing code to execute sub-
tasks across multiple machines that would otherwise remain idle. Examples
of this approach already in operation at the time of publication include the
SETI@Home project (SETI@home: Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence at
home 2003) (for analysing radio telescope data) and distributed.net (Dis-
tributed.net 2003) (for number factoring and encryption-cracking); both of
these are highly-popular programs that users around the world can run on
their desktops (typically as a screensaver, executed when there is idle CPU) to
participate in scientific projects requiring massive computational resources.
This is undoubtedly a seductive vision; but also one fraught with danger.
Most people, before allowing code from a remote source to execute on their
personal machines, would like some assurances that the code in question will
do no harm. This combination of both great benefit and risk has naturally
led to a lot of research and implementations seeking to tackle the issue.
It is in this setting that the higher-order pi-calculus is introduced. The
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higher-order pi-calculus is a natural extension of the first-order calculus that
allows processes to be transmitted as well as channels (that is, processes
are first-class data objects). It is thus a natural choice for modelling the
issues described above, and as will become apparent later, it reveals some
fascinating insights and issues.
Syntax
The complete syntax is shown in Definition 2.2.10:
Definition 2.2.10 The higher-order syntax is (naturally) very similar to the
first-order case (Definition 2.2.2); however some new conventions are first
necessitated: The set A contains all agents A; then let K, J range over
the set K = N ∪ A (that is, either an agent or a name); X, Y range over
the set of process variables X (that is, variables that may be instantiated to
processes); and V , W range over the set V = N ∪ X of names and process
variables.
P ::= 0 |
∑
i∈I




A ::= P | F
pi ::= x(
−→
V ) | x[−→V ]
Most of this is familiar from Section 2.2.1 (such as null, composition
and summation, and replication), however the new constructs deserve some
informal coverage. First, note that a process may now also be a variable
(X): this is a natural consequence of the fact that processes may now be
transmitted, so there must be a way to bind them at the receiving end.
Following this observation, note that the output case now specifies
−→
K as
arguments; in other words, either names or processes may be output (as
required). Similarly, the bound parameters in an input construct (
−→
V ) may
be either a name or a variable, in symmetry with the output construct.
What is quite different is the introduction of an abstraction construct
(ranged over by F), and the corresponding application forms (F〈K〉 and
X〈−→K 〉). The introduction of these complementary forms arises from the need
— in a true higher-order context — to be able to parameterise processes re-
ceived with respect to a given name or process.
Agents A, B are either processes or abstractions.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 29
Definition 2.2.11 (Higher-Order Substitutions) Higher order term sub-
stitution is defined similarly as for the first-order calculus (see Definition 2.2.6).
For a given term B, write B{A/X} to denote the same term with all free oc-
currences of X replaced by A. The definition is extended in the usual way to
cover sequences, for example B{−→A/−→X}.
More formally, substitutions may be defined inductively:
0{A/X} , 0
X{A/X} , A
Y {A/X} , Y (Y 6= X)
!P{A/X} , !(P{A/X})





V ).P){A/X} , x(−→V ).(P{A/X})
(x[
−→
K ].P){A/X} , x[−→K{A/X}].(P{A/X})
X〈K〉{A/X} , P{(−→K{A/X})/−→V } (A ≡ (−→V )P)
(Y〈−→K 〉){A/X} , Y〈(−→K{A/X})〉 (Y 6= X)
(F〈−→K 〉){A/X} , (F{A/X})〈−→K{A/X}〉
As before, if
−→
K represents the sequence K1 . . . Kn then
−→
K{A/X} represents
K1{A/X} . . . Kn{A/X}. Convention 2.2.4 applies in the higher-order calcu-
lus as well. Name substitution is handled identically to the first-order case
in Definition 2.2.6 (page 21).
Reduction Semantics
The reduction semantics of the higher-order calculus are in essence no differ-
ent from the first-order case; the communication case is merely changed to
specify process as well as data transmission:
(. . .+ x[
−→
K ].P|x(−→V ).Q+ . . .)→ P|Q{−→K/−→V }
Application of abstractions is handled with addition to the definition of struc-
tural congruence (Definition 2.2.5):
(
−→
V )P〈−→K 〉 ≡ P{−→K/−→V }
The induction rules are unchanged.
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Labelled Transition Semantics
The labelled transition semantics are also largely unchanged; the two observ-
able actions need to be altered to accommodate the possibility of commu-
nication of processes (and instantiation of variables to processes), and the
restriction rule specifies that both a name and a variable may be made lo-
cal. An additional rule is also added to handle reduction of applications.
Therefore letting the input action have the form
x(
−→





K ]−−−−−→ (and µ ranging over the three including the silent action as before),
the complete higher-order rules are presented in Figure 2.3. As before, where
clear the arrows
τ−→ and→ (as well as
−→τ− and) will be used interchangeably.
P




P{−→K/−→V } µ−→ P′
(
−→




















































K ]−−−−−→ P′ Q x(
−→
K)−−−→ Q′ −→V /∈ FN (Q)
P|Q τ−→ P′|Q′ (comm.)
Figure 2.3: Higher-Order Labelled Transition Semantics
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2.2.3 The need for a Higher-order pi-calculus
Davide Sangiorgi (Sangiorgi 1993b) demonstrated a result that is perhaps
surprising at first glance, showing that the higher-order pi-calculus could be
satisfactorily (that is, reduction semantics and congruence relationships are
preserved) encoded in the first-order calculus. The key to understanding why
this should be the case is to realise that the pi-calculus encodes no notion of
physical locality; that is, processes may be situated on the same computer
or on the other side of the world — this detail is abstracted away.1
A process is “located” in some sense by its outer-most prefix — if a
process in parallel does not possess this name it is effectively blind to the
other’s existence (and thus, might as well be in a separate location). It is easy
to see therefore that a higher-order pi-calculus may be simulated by creating
a fresh name and locating the process at this name, then sending the name
instead of the process — the process receiving this name may then activate
the other process at will, now that it is aware of its location (an analogy
may be drawn to pointers in programming languages such as C: sending the
address rather than the object). This turns out to be precisely what happens.
Take for example the case of a process P sending a second process Q, to a
third process R which then executes it in parallel:
x[Q].P|x(X).(R|X) → P|R|Q
The same effect (including reduction, albeit in a few more steps) may be
achieved as follows:
(νy)(x[y].P|y.Q) | x(z).(R|z.0) → (νy)(x[y].P | y.Q | x(z).(R | z.0))
→ (νy)(P | y.Q | R | y.0)
→ (νy)(P | Q | R | 0)
→ (νy)(P | Q | R)
→ P | Q | R
(assuming of course y /∈ FN (P|Q|R)).
The compilation algorithm will not be reproduced here; the interested
reader is referred to Sangiorgi (1993b) for the details. Suffice to say that it
1This is quite a powerful abstraction because it enables a wide range of networks and
programs to be modelled in the same manner; however it is also a “leaky” abstraction
in other senses. For instance, there is little or no concept of the time-lag that may exist
in wide-area networks, and concepts such as failure and process hiding — for example,
behind firewalls — can only be encoded rather unsatisfactorily. For examples of research
into calculi designed to overcome these short-comings, see Cardelli and Gordon (1998) and
Sewell (1998).
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preserves both typing and most useful notions of congruence and bisimula-
tion.
The question may well be asked then: is there any point in examining
a separate higher-order calculus if the same results may be obtained in the
first-order calculus? The author feels that the main reason it is still worthy
of analysis is clarity, after all, it is certainly possible to encode numerals in
the λ-calculus, but very few people program in this manner! None the less,
it is not just a matter of syntactic sugar; it would be reasonable to expect
that many analyses and subtle points may present themselves examining a
higher-order calculus “natively” that would not be readily apparent working
with a first-order encoding. It is even possible that some more sophisti-
cated type systems or analyses not convertible to a first-order equivalent
may present themselves. In fact, Sangiorgi (1993b) notes several examples
that gain considerable elegance (or would possibly have been overlooked had
a first-order calculus been used) due to the use of a higher-order calculus.
Vivas and Yoshida (2002) also notes that in a widely-distributed setting (not
just a local-area network, for example) there are considerable differences be-
tween migrating and merely activating code that may not be satisfactorily
represented with the first-order encoding outlined above.
2.3 Type Systems for the pi-calculus
The focus now shifts on to what will form the core emphasis of this thesis:
type systems for the pi-calculus. Type systems traditionally seek to establish
some kind of “well-formedness” properties, and to guarantee that any pro-
gram that is well-formed with respect to that particular system will never
encounter certain types of run-time errors.
The most immediate (or probable) cause of run-time error in even the
simplest form of the polyadic pi-calculus is arity mismatch, whereby a process
transmits a certain number of names to a process expecting to receive a
different number of names. In an example such as
x[wy].P | x(z).Q







This appears innocuous at first glance, but reduces (assuming z is not free
in Q) to x[wy].0 | x(y′).Q which again has a clear arity mismatch. Any
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type scheme must therefore prevent such errors from occurring. If primitive
data-types are admitted to the calculus it is also reasonable to expect that
constraints on their usage would be enforced; for example channel x may
only be used to carry 〈int , bool〉 pairs; however this angle will not be pursued
any further (it is trivial to add, but the focus here is restricted to the core
calculus).
2.3.1 Types and Judgements
As a notational shorthand, −→x : −→σ will often be written to mean x1 :
σ1, . . . , xn : σn; assuming that
−→x is x1 . . . xn and −→σ is σ1 . . . σn (the sequences
are assumed to be of equal length when this shorthand is used).
Definition 2.3.1 (Type Environments)
1. Type environments, ranged over by Γ and Θ, are partial functions from
names to types. As usual, Γ(x) = σ means that 〈x, σ〉 ∈ Γ.
2. The notation Γ  Θ states that for every name x in the domain of both
Γ and Θ then Γ(x) = Θ(x).
3. Write Γ,Θ for the union (Γ∪Θ) of the two; note that this is only defined
when Γ  Θ. As further shorthand write Γ, x : σ for the function which
is the union of Γ and {〈x, σ〉} (the notation x : σ is used in preference
to x 7→ σ or 〈x, σ〉).
4. The function (referred to as an “environment” from now on) Γx repre-
sents Γ with x removed from its domain.
Definition 2.3.2 (Judgements) Several forms of judgement will be used,
with other forms necessary for some of the more sophisticated type systems
being introduced later, when appropriate.
A well-formed process judgement is an expression of either of the forms
Γ `pi P : Proc
Γ `(pi) P : Proc
The first states that, for a term P with free names mapped to types as spec-
ified by the environment Γ, then P is well-formed under the type system in
question.2 The second form is identical but only used by null and guarded
2It would probably be clearer in this case to simply write Γ ` P and omit the Proc
declaration. The judgement form used here is however retained for consistency with the
higher-order system, where it is necessary to distinguish between judgements involving
well-formed processes and processes abstracted on names or variables, in which case some
notion of a process type is required.
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processes and summations, in order to enforce the syntactical requirement
that only guarded processes may occur in a summation. This is isomorphic
to Milner’s notion of Normal Processes (Milner 1993). As a further nota-
tional shorthand, where convenient write
−→
Γ `pi −→P : Proc for the series of
judgements Γ1 `pi P1 : Proc, . . . , Γn `pi Pn : Proc, where −→Γ represents
Γ1 . . .Γn and
−→
P represents P1 . . .Pn (also assuming where this shorthand is
used that Γ1  . . .  Γn).
A type judgement is an expression of the form Γ `pi x : σ, which states
that Γ(x) = σ. The vector notation may also be used in this case, for example−→
Γ `pi −→x : −→σ or Γ `pi −→x : −→σ .
Where applicable,
⋃−→
Γ represents the union of all elements in the se-
quence
−→
Γ ; that is, if
−→
Γ is the sequence Γ1 . . .Γ2 then
⋃−→
Γ = Γ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Γn
(this notation will be used to refer to the union of any sequence, not just
environments).
In all cases when the vector (−→· ) notation is used, this may also represent
the empty sequence (including a zero-length series of deductions).
2.3.2 First-order Type Systems
So, the type discipline must enforce arity correctness; this perhaps implies
that some numerical component will suffice, however it soon becomes appar-
ent that it must also supply information about each type carried (a kind of
recursive definition). For example, in the process x[yz].P, the type of x must
not only state that it is used to communicate two names, but also that those
names have the types of y and z respectively (and in that order). That is, if y
has type σy and z type σz then a concise way of expressing this information is
to write the type of x as (σyσz). However, the types of y and z will also have
a similar structure; so if it is assumed that y is merely used as a signaling
channel and carries no data itself (that is, σy = ()) and that z is used to
transmit a single channel, also used just for signaling (so σz = (())), then the
complete type of x must be (()(())). (This is not easy to read without some
concentration; the complete structure of types will not normally be exposed
in this manner).
Definition 2.3.3 (Type Syntax) Let σ range over base types, and where
appropriate write examples such as (σ1 . . . σn) to represent the type of a chan-
nel that carries n names, with types σ1 . . . σn respectively. As mentioned in
Section 2.3.1, this may also be written as the more concise (−→σ ). Formally:
σ ::= (−→σ )
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To avoid ambiguity during type reconstruction, it is necessary to incor-
porate information about bound names into the language itself. The typed
language syntax is shown in Definition 2.3.4:
Definition 2.3.4 (Typed First-Order Syntax) The first-order syntax of
Definition 2.2.2 is extended with type information for bound names as shown:
P ::= 0 |
∑
i∈I
pii.Pi | P|P | !P | (νx : σ)P
pi ::= x[−→y ] | x(−→y : −→σ )
All other details concerning meta-variables and so on remain the same, for
example processes are still ranged over by P, Q, and R.
The complete rules for well-formed first-order processes are shown in Fig-
ure 2.4. They are mostly straight-forward, ensuring that only well-formed
processes may be combined (the summation and composition rules), and that
communication constructs (input and output) are only formed with suitably
typed channels. The different judgement forms used (see Definition 2.3.2)
guarantee that only guarded and null processes may be used in a summation,
while the rule conv . ensures that any process may be used in a composition
or as a base for input, output, restriction, or replication. The restriction rule
removes the restricted name from the environment, as it is a binding rule.
The most basic well-formed process is the null, or inactive, process. This is
well-formed under any environment, thus incorporating weakening into the
type system.
Example 2.3.5 The following judgement is derivable:
x : (()(())), y : (), z : (()) `pi x[yz].0 : Proc
First-Order Typed Labelled Transition Semantics
A variant of the labelled transition semantics for the first-order calculus may
be given that incorporates the type system. This offers little additional
insight for the plain calculus, but will prove useful in understanding the
extensions presented later so the basic version is described here.
Definition 2.3.6 A reduction in the typed labelled transition semantics has
the following format:
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
This states that for the judgement Γ `pi P : Proc the process P may communi-
cate with a second anonymous process which is well-typed under environment
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Γ `(pi) 0 : Proc (null .)
Γ `(pi) P : Proc
Γ `pi P : Proc (conv .)
Γx, x : σ `pi P : Proc
Γx `pi (νx : σ)P : Proc (res .)
Γ `pi P : Proc Θ `pi Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `pi P|Q : Proc (comp.)
Γ `pi P : Proc
Γ `pi!P : Proc (rep.)
Γ `(pi) P : Proc Θ `(pi) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `(pi) P + Q : Proc (sum.)
Γ−→y , x : (
−→σ ),−→y : −→σ `pi P : Proc
Γ−→y , x : (
−→σ ) `(pi) x(−→y : −→σ ).P : Proc (inp.)
Γ, x : (−→σ ),−→y : −→σ `pi P : Proc
Γ, x : (−→σ ),−→y : −→σ `(pi) x[−→y ].P : Proc (out .)
Figure 2.4: First-Order pi-calculus Type Rules
Θ, performing the action µ and transforming itself to P′, its environment to
Γ′, and the environment of the second process to Θ′. It is assumed that the
two environments are compatible, that is Γ  Θ.
The complete semantics is presented in Figure 2.5. They are mostly un-
changed from their plain version, but include additional information describ-
ing the names that may be acquired by an environment during an input.
The case for communication is notable as it is the only one that constructs
an internal action. For this reason the environments in the two reductions
in the antecedents are the dual of each other, as the external environment
that one process interacts with is the environment of the other, and in the
consequent the two are merged and an arbitrary external environment ∆ is
used which remains unchanged by the internal action.
2.3.3 Higher-order Type Systems
As may be expected, the type rules for the higher-order calculus differ very
little from the first-order rules, however there is some subtlety that requires
examination. The complicating factor is the need to distinguish between
binding to a name and binding to a variable; a name may only be bound
to another name, and likewise only a process may be bound to a variable.
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〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 P ≡α Q
〈Θ,Γ,Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
(alp.)
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σ }, x[−→y ].P〉 x[
−→y ]−−→ 〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σ },Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σ },P〉
(out .)
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σ },Γ, x(−→z : −→σ ).P〉 x(
−→y )−−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σ },Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σ },P{−→y /−→z }〉
(inp.)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
〈Θ,Γ,P + Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
(sum.)




〈Θ,Γ, !P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′|!P〉
(rep.)
〈Θ,Γx ∪ {x : σ},P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′x ∪ {x : σ},P′〉 x /∈ FN (µ) ∪ BN (µ)
〈Θx,Γx, (νx : σ)P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′x,Γ′x, (νx : σ)P′〉
(res .)
〈Θ,Γw ∪ {w : σ},P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′w ∪ {w : σ},P′〉 w 6= x, w ∈ −→y −−→z
〈Θw,Γw, (νw : σ)P〉 (νw
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−−→ 〈Θ′w,Γ′w, (νw : σ)P′〉
(open)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
〈Γ,Θ,Q〉 x(
−→y )−−−→ 〈Γ′,Θ′,Q〉 −→z /∈ FN (Q)
〈∆,Γ ∪Θ,P|Q〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′ ∪Θ′,P′|Q′〉
(comm.)
Figure 2.5: First-Order Typed Labelled Transition Semantics
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For this reason, the type syntax is expanded slightly in order to be able to
distinguish between a process and a name (Definition 2.3.7):
Definition 2.3.7 (Higher-Order Type Syntax)
σ ::= (−→σ ) | Proc | (−→σ )→ Proc
An ordinary channel type is the same as before. A process type is introduced
to distinguish the type of a variable from the type of a name. As a process
may be paramaterised (abstracted), it is also necessary to specify the types of
names and processes upon which it is parameterised. As before a vector can
include the empty vector (that is, a channel not used for data transmission,
or a thunked process ()→ Proc).
Definition 2.3.8 The higher-order language is also extended in a similar
manner to Definition 2.3.4 to include types on bound names and variables:
P ::= 0 |
∑
i∈I
pii.Pi | !P | P|P | (νx : σ)P | X | X〈−→K 〉 | F〈−→K 〉
F ::= (
−→
V : −→σ )P
A ::= P | F
pi ::= x(
−→
V : −→σ ) | x[−→V ]
The higher-order type rules themselves are equally predictable, and are
presented in Figure 2.6. The null, replication, restriction, composition, and
summation rules are exactly as they appeared before in Figure 2.4. The
input and output rules are also similar; the only difference is they are now
more general and refer to either variables or names as appropriate. There is
a new variable introduction axiom that is largely motivated by the new form
of the output rule: since there is now the ability to transmit processes as well
as names, the operands must be declared on the right-hand side of the turn-
style (since processes cannot be admitted on the left-hand side). It is thus
much more convenient to be able to introduce names as well as variables and
processes on the right-hand side, and exploit the syntactic shorthand form−→
Γ `pi −→K : Proc−→σ .
Higher-Order Typed Labelled-Transition-Semantics
The typed labelled-transition-semantics for the higher-order calculus can be
described in a similar manner to those for the first-order; they are presented in
Figure 2.7. The differences from the first-order labelled-transition-semantics
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Γ `(pi) 0 : Proc (null) Γ, V : σ `pi V : σ (var .)
Γ `(pi) P : Proc
Γ `pi P : Proc (conv .)
Γ `pi P : Proc Θ `pi Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `pi P|Q : Proc (comp.)
Γ `pi P : Proc
Γ `pi!P : Proc (repl .)
Γ `(pi) P : Proc Θ `(pi) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `(pi) P + Q : Proc (sum.)
Γx, x : σ `pi P : Proc





V : −→σ `pi P : Proc
Γ−→
V
`pi (−→V : −→σ )P : (−→σ )→ Proc
(abs .)
Γ `pi A : (−→σ )→ Proc −→Θ `pi −→K : −→σ
Γ,
−→




, x : (−→σ ),−→V : −→σ `pi P : Proc
Γ−→
V
, x : (−→σ ) `(pi) x(−→V : −→σ ).P : Proc
(inp.)
Γ, x : (−→σ ) `pi P : Proc −→Θ `pi −→K : Proc−→σ
Γ, x : (−→σ ),−→Θ `(pi) x[−→K ].P : Proc
(out .)
Figure 2.6: Higher-Order pi-calculus Type Rules
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in Figure 2.5 are slight: there is a case for application (rule app.), and com-
munications can contain agents as well as names. This last difference neces-
sitates a small change in presentation of rules such as those for input and
output as agents cannot be declared on the left side of the turn-style, but
the intentions are the same. Note the strict requirements to ensure that the
environments used in typing the objects of the communication are a subset of
the main environment, and contain exactly the free names of the names and
agents communicated. This ensures that no extraneous names are passed to
the other process environment.
2.3.4 Sortings
It is worth mentioning that the type systems presented here (which form the
basis for the rest of this thesis) are not the only approach to ensuring run-time
safety in the pi-calculus (first- or higher-order); the original presentations (see
Milner et al. 1992a,b; Milner 1993) in fact used a discipline of sortings. The
end result is similar, but the methodology is slightly different: each name
in the calculus is associated (via an environment) with a sort (an atomic
variable), then a separate environment associates each sort with a list of
other sorts (possibly including itself) representing the arity and range of
names that may be transmitted by all names having that sort. Note that
this has two benefits: firstly, it greatly simplifies the treatment of recursive
structures since recursion is inherit in the sorting (rather than the typing
structure), and secondly, it enables a finer-grained distinction between sorts
than allowed by types based on the ability to differentiate based on name as
well as structure.
An example should be sufficient to illustrate these properties (Exam-
ple 2.3.9):
Example 2.3.9 Let sorts be ranged over by ρ; as before Γ is an environment
(function) mapping free names to sorts. An additional environment called Ob
maps sorts to their objects (that is, sorts carried by that sort).
For example, if Γ = {x : ρ1, y : ρ2, z : ρ3} and the program x[yz].0 is to
be well-formed under Γ;Ob, then Ob must contain ρ1 7→ (ρ2ρ3). Note that
as sorts are atomic, with their behaviour/structure determined by Ob, then
it is possible to distinguish ρ1 from ρ4 where ρ4 7→ (ρ2ρ3) ∈ Ob, even though
their structure is identical.
An intuitive treatment of recursion is also possible using sorts, for example
if ρ1 7→ (ρ1ρ2) ∈ Ob then x[xy] is well formed.
No further mention of sortings (or recursion) is made here; the interested
reader is referred to an earlier version of this work that utilised a sorting
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〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 P ≡α Q
〈Θ,Γ,Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
(alp.)
〈Θ,Γ,P{−→K/−→V }〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
〈Θ,Γ, (−→V )P〈−→K 〉〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
(app.)
−→
Γ′ `pi −→K : −→σ
⋃−→
Γ′ ⊆ Γ dom⋃−→Γ′ = FN(−→K)
〈Θ,Γ, x[−→K ].P〉 x[
−→
K ]−−→ 〈Θ ∪ −→Γ′ ,Γ,P〉
(out .)
−→
Θ′ `pi −→K : −→σ
⋃−→
Θ′ ⊆ Θ dom⋃−→Θ′ = FN(−→K)
〈Θ,Γ, x(−→V : −→σ ).P〉 x(
−→
K)−−−→ 〈Θ,Γ ∪ −→Θ′,P{−→K/−→V }〉
(inp.)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
〈Θ,Γ,P + Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
(sum.)




〈Θ,Γ, !P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′|!P〉
(rep.)
〈Θ,Γx ∪ {x : σ},P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′x ∪ {x : σ},P′〉 x /∈ FN (µ) ∪ BN (µ)
〈Θx,Γx, (νx : σ)P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′x,Γ′x, (νx : σ)P′〉
(res .)
〈Θ,Γw ∪ {w : σ},P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→K ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′w ∪ {w : σ},P′〉





〈Θw,Γw, (νw : σ)P〉 (νw
−→z )x[−→K ]−−−−−−→ 〈Θ′w,Γ′w, (νw : σ)P′〉
(open)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→K ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
〈Γ,Θ,Q〉 x(
−→
K)−−−→ 〈Γ′,Θ′,Q〉 −→z /∈ FN (Q)
〈∆,Γ ∪Θ,P|Q〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′ ∪Θ′,P′|Q′〉
(comm.)
Figure 2.7: Typed Labelled-Transition-Semantics for the Higher-order pi-
calculus
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rather than type-based approach to enforce security properties (Hepburn
and Wright 2001).
2.4 Discussion
This Chapter presented the basic — notation, semantics, and basic type
systems — theory of the pi-calculus, for both its first-order and higher-order
versions. An explicitly-typed language was used in each case. The novel work
to follow will all build on the notation and results presented in this chapter.
Chapter 3
Trust Type Systems
This chapter introduces the core novel ideas: the type systems and exten-
sion that implement the security model. There are two components to the
systems: an implicit extension, visible only in the new type rules; and an
explicit extension, a new syntactic construct.
The chapter commences with a presentation of the system of type an-
notations used, then in Section 3.2 the syntactic extension common to all
variants of the system is introduced, with informal justifications and exam-
ples. Section 3.3 introduces the first of the type systems with a discussion
of the first-order system. This serves as a basis for the remaining systems
and is a powerful environment in its own right. In Section 3.4 these ideas
are expanded upon by showing that many programs with strong intuitions
behind them are none-the-less untypeable in the vanilla first-order system,
and present a solution: sub-typing. This system in turn is completed in
Section 3.5, with a minor addition to provide security by guarantees of non-
interference from untrusted channels. A different notion of security is dis-
cussed and implemented for higher-order systems in Section 3.6. The focus
in this system is on restricting the access of certain mobile agents to the host,
according to some pre-determined security policy. This is a non-trivial exten-
sion of the first-order work, as it by necessity introduces some new notions
about trust, and requires some novel approaches in order to accommodate
them.
Note that there is no discussion of type safety, security properties, or
implementations in this chapter; these are examined in Chapters 4 and 5 for
safety/security and implementations respectively.
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3.1 A System Of Type Annotations
Before introducing the systems it is first necessary to cover the form of an-
notations used. The annotations are modelled on a Boolean algebra (Boole
1847); this is not an original idea and follows on from similar work in (Wright
1992) and (Wright 1996). Using an algebra enables a variety of properties,
conditionals and constraints to be encoded quite elegantly, as well as in-
stantly providing a large body of previous results that may be leveraged in
the analysis.
There are two extremes that need to be represented; trustedness (that
is, data whose integrity can be verified), and untrustedness (data that has
become corrupted, whether maliciously or accidentally). It seems natural to
model these as truth and falsehood respectively (usually written as 1 and 0
in a boolean algebra). Rather than adopting these notational conventions,
for clarity (a lower representational gap) in the work here T will represent
trustedness and U untrustedness. Variables are also admitted in annotations;
as well as permitting a smooth transition to type inference (see Chapter 5)
where annotations for which concrete values are unable to be deduced may
be assigned a variable, informally, and just as importantly, in the work that
follows they also represent the situation in which a value is unknown at
compile time. This situation is in fact quite common; any program that deals
with data from an untrusted source which has an associated unforgeable
digital signature is processing a value that may be either trustworthy or
corrupted: the signature provides an avenue to determine this at run-time
but its value at compile time cannot be ascertained with any certainty.
Definition 3.1.1 (Annotations) Let B= {T,U} be the set of constant an-
notations, and BV the set of annotation variables ranged over by i, j, k, and
l. Then 〈B ∪ BV ,+, ·, 〉 forms a boolean algebra. The set BA contains all
terms in the algebra, and is ranged over by b, c, d, and e. With T corre-
sponding to 1 and U to 0, the operations +, · and · are the least operations
satisfying the following:
b · T = b b · U = U
b+ T = T b+U = b
T = U U = T
b+ b = T b · b = U
b = b
In the above, + and · are reflexive, transitive, distributive, and idempotent,
and obey the usual laws of logical equivalence. Where it is clear the · operator
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may be omitted; for example b · c written just as bc to avoid visual clutter
(particularly when used in superscripts).
Now the new type syntax may be presented (Definition 3.1.2).
Definition 3.1.2 (Annotated Type Syntax)
1. The set of all types is denoted by T , and ranged over by σ.
2. The new type syntax is exactly the same as in Definition 2.3.3, with the
addition of an annotation (Definition 3.1.1 above) to each element:
σ ::= (−→σ )b
Since the annotation will usually be of interest, the convention is adopted
that σb may be written where b is the outermost annotation. This con-
vention will in fact be used almost exclusively. It is similar to the
presentation used in Wright (1996).
Note that −→σ refers to the sequence σ1 . . . σn for some finite n, and may
be zero-length.
3. Multiplication of types by variables is defined as a requirement on their
structure: (b ·−→σc)b means that for each σci in the sequence −→σc, ci = b · ci
(that is, if b = T then ci may be any arbitrary annotation; if b = U
then ci must be U).
3.2 A Syntactic Extension For Safe Run-
Time Coercion
The intuition behind the need for a syntactic extension can be seen by once
again considering Examples 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. This example reflects a common
desire in programming such systems; to cast a given input as either trusted
or untrusted and act accordingly, based on the results of a known run-time
verification procedure. This was of course the issue previously established;
not only is this a common operation, but it is also error-prone when using
common programming constructs (such as if . . . then . . . else) as most type-
based safety checks are forced to assume that the programmer has correctly
used such operations (since there is no connection between the verification
results and the subsequent branching).
The novel addition to the pi-calculus combines the operations of certifica-
tion and branching (based on the results of the certification procedure used).
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This simple combination turns out to have profoundly powerful implications:
programmers may now continue programming unrestrained, and subject re-
duction holds so typed programs are guaranteed to be well-formed (including
with respect to the integrity of data). The second consequence is they may
now also use coercion of data integrity, but in an implicit manner: instead
of explicitly casting a variable as either trusted or untrusted (then presum-
ably branching to handle errors or continue with the secure calculation, for
example) they now use a self-contained certify-and-branch construct and are
guaranteed that one branch will be taken if the variable certifies (and hence
may be considered trusted within the branch), and the other if certification
fails (and thus the other branch always deals with an untrusted input).
Definition 3.2.1 (Oracles) The integrity checks present in the system are
represented as oracles. An oracle is a total function computing the integrity
— trusted or untrusted — of channels. The metavariable certify will usually
be used to range over oracles.
The following judgement form specifies that certify is an oracle:
` certify : Oracle
for some certify ∈ N × B. Function application is used to specify the re-
sult of an oracle, for example certify(x) = T means that the oracle certify
determined that the name x was trusted.
The mechanism employed by the oracle is unspecified. The systems pre-
sented here simply assume that it is a function in the form above which is
assumed to be correct. The judgement form used is intended to allow an
extension of the system to use multiple different varieties of oracles, and to
have their usage checked verified by the type-checker (that is, some oracles
may only be partial functions whose usage must be restricted to certain cat-
egories of names). Chapter 6 elaborates slightly on this idea. The work here
however assumes a single all-encompassing oracle, and the judgement form
above is assumed to be implicit.
Following this informal justification, the syntactical and semantic imple-
mentation within the pi-calculus may now be introduced. The syntax chosen
is deliberately modelled on a similar construct in the C language (although
the “:” used to separate the branches is replaced with the symbol ⊕, in
order to avoid confusion with a similar symbol used in typing judgements),
and is shown in Definition 3.2.2. Note that this is for the first-order case
only; the syntax is identical for the higher-order calculus but is repeated for
clarity later.
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Definition 3.2.2 The syntax is identical to that of Definition 2.2.2, with the
addition of the new construct (shown on a new line for clarity):
P ::= 0 | P|P |
∑
i∈I
pii.Pi | !P | (νx : σb)P | x[−→y ].P | x(−→y :
−→
σb).P
| x(y : σi) ?certifyP⊕ P
pi ::= x(−→y :
−→
σb) | x[−→y ]
Note that the new form is also guarded and thus can appear in a summa-
tion. Note also that the annotation must be a variable, as coercion only
applies to variables. The subscript certify specifies the oracle used (see Defi-
nition 3.2.1).
The semantics will be formally specified shortly; informally though it resem-
bles an input operation in that a (single) name is received along the channel x
and bound to the name y; y is bound in both branches (the two processes P).
Inside the first branch y is typed as trusted; inside the second as untrusted.
This is what allows a compile-time guarantee of safety, modulo a sound cer-
tification operator: the compiler is now aware of the consequences of each
branch, even if the programmer confuses the two, so any such (dangerous)
mistake will be detected as a type error.
Definitions of substitution and free and bound names also need to be
extended:
Definition 3.2.3 (Substitution in First-Order Certify Terms) For the
syntax of Definition 3.2.2, extend the definition of substitution of names (Def-
inition 2.2.6, Page 21) to include
(z(z′ : σb) ?certifyP⊕Q){y/x} , z{y/x}(z′ : σb) ?certifyP{y/x} ⊕Q{y/x}
Definition 3.2.4 For the syntax of Definition 3.2.2, extend the definition of
free names (and by extension, bound names) in Definition 2.2.3 to include
FN
(
x(y : σb) ?certifyP⊕Q
)
, ({x} ∪ FN (P) ∪ FN (Q))− {y}
3.2.1 Semantics of Certify
The semantics of the certify construct may also be presented in two fashions:
as a rewriting rule, and as a labelled transition. Both must be parameterised
on the oracle certify. A more precise specification may be defined using the
typed labelled transition rules, and these will be presented next.
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certify(y) = T
x(z : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q x(y)−−→ P{y/z}
certify(y) = T
x(z : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q x(y)−−→ Q{y/z}
Figure 3.1: Certify Semantics; Labelled Transition Rules
Secondly, the reduction semantics (that is, as a rewrite rule) for com-
pleteness are also presented. The new rules here are essentially the same as
the communication rule, however importantly they cannot be presented as
axioms; there is a discriminated choice involved, and the choice depends on
certify:
• Verification as trusted:
certify(y) = T
. . .+ x[y].R|x(z : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q+ . . .→ R|P{y/z}
• Verification as untrusted:
certify(y) = U
. . .+ x[y].R|x(z : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q+ . . .→ R|Q{y/z}
3.3 First-Order Type System
Several strong intuitions are carried into the design of the first-order type
system:
• all data transmitted along an untrusted channel should itself be con-
sidered untrusted (as it may have been tampered with in transit);
• trusted channels however may be used to carry untrusted data (it will
not be tampered with in transit, although it remains untrusted);
• some data effectively has unknown trustedness; there is perhaps po-
tential for it to be corrupted, but this is detectable at run-time (for
example, via secure digital signatures).
The rules implementing these intuitions are referred to collectively as Sys-
tem TFOpi, or occasionally just TFOpi. The key realisation is that the first two
intuitions above can be enforced by imposing a simple constraint on all types
allowed in the system, in the form of a multiplication.
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Both intuitions, that data transmitted on an untrusted channel must be
untrusted but that a trusted channel may carry untrusted data, are enforced
if the types carried by the channel are multiplied by the trustedness of the
channel. For example, if the carrying channel is untrusted and the type of
the data carried has annotation U · b, then for any b the data carried must
also be untrusted due to the rules of Definition 3.1.1. Similarly since T is the
multiplicative identity in the same rules, if the host channel is trusted then
T · b = b for all b, including b = U as required.
The third intuition will be satisfied by the type rules and the use of
the syntactic extension incorporating an oracle defined in Definitions 3.2.1
and 3.2.2.
For differentiation the rules will be presented using different subscripts in
the judgements, as defined in Definition 3.3.1:
Definition 3.3.1 (Judgements for System TFOpi) The judgements in Sys-
tem TFOpi will take the two forms shown below:
Γ `FO P : Proc
Γ `(FO) P : Proc
These are as in Definition 2.3.2, with the use of a different subscript to
differentiate the type rules in operation. As before, the parenthesised subscript
form is only used for null, guarded, or summation processes.
A third judgement form will be used to specify that a particular type is
well-formed under the same rules:
`FO σb
The complete set of rules are shown in Figure 3.2; the pertinent cases and
justification behind them will now be examined. The rules for replication,
restriction, summation, and composition are unchanged from the base case
(barring the addition of annotations to the types where necessary).
The first departure from the unadorned rules is the inclusion of rules for
weakening and well-formed types in System TFOpi. This is to guarantee, via
an antecedent in the weaken rule, that all types be well-formed according
to the rule type. The rule for well-formed types itself enforces the intuitions
discussed early concerning the relationship between the trustedness of data
carried by a channel, and the trustedness of the channel itself. To complement
this strategy, the rule zero states that it is initially well-formed under the
empty environment, instead of an arbitrary environment. Note that there is
no corresponding contraction rule, as the second antecedent to the weaken








Γ `(FO) P : Proc
Γ `FO P : Proc (conv .)
∅ `(FO) 0 : Proc (zero.)
Γ `FO P : Proc x /∈ domΓ ` σb
Γ, x : σb `FO P : Proc (weak .)
Γ `FO P : Proc
Γ `FO !P : Proc (rep.)
Γ `(FO) P : Proc Θ `(FO) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `(FO) P + Q : Proc (sum.)
Γx, x : σ
b `FO P : Proc
Γx `FO (νx : σb)P : Proc (res .)
Γ `FO P : Proc Θ `FO Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `FO P|Q : Proc (comp.)
Γ, x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y : −→σb `FO P : Proc
Γ, x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y : −→σb `(FO) x[−→y ].P : Proc
(out .)
Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y : −→σb `FO P : Proc
Γ−→y , x : (
−→




Γy, x : (σ
i)b, y : σT `FO P : Proc Θy, x : (σi)b, y : σU `FO Q : Proc
Γy,Θy, x : (σi)b `(FO) x(y : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc (cert .)
Figure 3.2: Type Rules Of System TFOpi
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rule requires that the name being introduced does not already exist in the
current environment.
The other interesting cases are those dealing with input/output and cer-
tification; these will now be examined individually.
Input:
Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y : −→σb `FO P : Proc
Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σb)c `(FO) x(−→y :
−→
σb).P : Proc
This rule has many similarities to the base case: the types of the arguments
(−→y ) must match the types carried by the channel x; and it is a binding rule
so the environment in the antecedent has had the names −→y removed from
its domain.
The most significant departure from the base case (see Figure 2.4, Page 36)
is in the annotations and their implications. The well-formed type rule guar-
antees that types of the operands of x are multiplied by the annotation of x.
That is, if
−→
σb represents σb11 . . . σ
bn
n then each bi must be equivalent to c · bi.
This is at once very simple, and very powerful; it concisely encapsulates
the first two intuitions above. To see how, it is worth while to consider a
few examples. If x is a trusted channel, then c = T (in the rule above), and
since T is the multiplicative identity then any annotation is allowed in the
operand of x (since b = T · b for any b). In other words a trusted channel
may be used to carry names of any level of trustedness, including untrusted,
as per the intuitive requirement.
Alternatively, if x is an untrusted channel (that is, in the rule above c = U)
there is a different scenario. Because U is the zero multiplicative element in
the algebra (meaning that for all b then U · b = U) then by definition x may
only carry other untrusted names, since U·σb11 . . .U·σbnn implies that all bi are
identical to U. This too captures the intuition that all data passing through
an untrusted channel must also be considered untrustworthy, due to the risk
of corruption.1
Output: The rule
Γ, x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y : −→σb `FO P : Proc
Γ, x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y : −→σb `(FO) x[−→y ].P : Proc
is similar to the input rule (although more divergences will be noted in the
other systems; see Sections 3.4 and 3.6), with the exception that since it is
1An alternative perspective would be to allow trusted values to sent along untrusted
channels, but be untrusted at the receiving end (thus potentially allowing more programs
to be typed). This avenue is explored in Section 3.4.
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not a binding rule on its operands the environment is unchanged from the
antecedent to the consequent.
Certify: The rule
Γy, x : (σ
i)b, y : σT `FO P : Proc Θy, x : (σi)b, y : σU `FO Q : Proc
Γy,Θy, x : (σi)b `(FO) x(y : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
is the cornerstone of the system. Each antecedent is at first glance much
like the construction of the input rule, and indeed it is a form of input;
the operand is bound and therefore also discharged from the environment in
the consequent. The first differences become apparent when considering the
operand (that is, the variable whose integrity will — usually — be determined
at run-time) in each antecedent: in one branch it is typed as trusted (y : σT),
and in the other as untrusted. The input channel itself is typed as carrying
a single name with a variable annotation (note that this implies i = b · i
due to the well-formed type rule). This is where coercion fits in: a value of
variable trustedness — that is, one whose integrity can only be determined
at run-time — is received, and this variable is then coerced at run-time based
on the results of the certify oracle. This is what gives the rule its power: an
input form is constructed as per normal, but can then safely assume (since
the entire branch, either P or Q, is typed on that assumption) that the name
received is trusted in one branch and untrusted in the other. In other words,
if the programmer now confuses the branches this will be detected by the
type system. For example the second branch must be parameterised on an
untrusted variable so will cause a type-check error if such an input is used in
a trusted context.
3.3.1 Typed Labelled Transition Semantics
The typed semantics provide additional insight in to the nature of the coer-
cion property of certify. They are mostly similar — apart from the addition
of annotations to the types — from those for the plain first-order calculus in
Figure 2.5 (Page 37).
The most obvious change is of course in the addition of rules for certify.
The possibility of coercion during a reduction, due to certify, does change
things slightly however. Because the effect of a coercion should be global,
the structural rules for combining processes need to propagate the possible
coercion to the new processes.
Coercions are represented by substitutions on annotations variables (Def-
inition 3.3.2):
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Definition 3.3.2 (Annotation Substitutions) An annotation substitution
is a function ranged over by R from annotation variables (BV) to annotation
terms (BA). The identity substitution is written as Id, and R[i := b] repre-
sents the substitution identical to R, extended to substitute the term b for the
variable i.
Composition of substitutions is written in-order as R1;R2, in place of the
more familiar R2 ◦ R1, so R1;R2(b) means R2(R1(b)).
Substitutions can be applied to other objects in the logical way:
• R((−→σc)b) , (R(−→σc))R(b)
• R(Γ) , {x : R(σb)|x : σb ∈ Γ}




R((νx : σb)P) , (νx : R(σb))R(P)
R(P|Q) , R(P) | R(Q)
R(P + Q) , R(P) + R(Q)
R(x[−→y ].P) , x[−→y ].R(P)
R(x(−→y : −→σb).P) , x(−→y : R(−→σb)).R(P)
R(x(y : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q) , x(y : R(σi)) ?certifyR(P)⊕ (Q)
As an abbreviation, substitutions will sometimes be applied to entire
judgements as well, for example
R(Γ `FO P : Proc)
being used as a short-hand for
R(Γ) `FO R(P) : Proc
(this becomes a greater convenience for the more heavily adorned judge-
ments encountered later on).
Now, the syntax of the typed labelled transition rules is extended to capture
the coercions that occur:
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
As before, this means that a process P, typed under environment Γ, may
perform the action µ, possibly by interacting with an anonymous process
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typed under environment Θ (where Γ  Θ) to transform itself to P′ and
the two environments to Γ′ and Θ′. Additionally however the substitution
R represents precisely all coercions due to certify that occurred during the
reduction.
There are two new cases in the new rules, presented in Figure 3.3, one
each for coercion as trusted and untrusted. Note the application of the
substitution to the other term in the cases for composition and replication,
as well as of course in the cases for certify. The multi-step closure is written
as
〈Θ,Γ,P〉
−→µ− 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
where
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R1 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉
−→µ− 〈Θ′′,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R2
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ
−→µ− 〈Θ′′,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R1;R2
3.4 First-Order System With Sub-typing
As powerful as the system in the previous section is, there remain many
programs that cannot be typed under it.
Consider the following:
Γ, noise : (σi)i, data : σT `FO
noise[data].0 | noise(y : σi) ?certifyhandleData ⊕ Error
In this situation, trusted data is sent along a noisy channel (that is, it may
become corrupted), and at the receiving end some verification process occurs
— perhaps simply checksum verification — and then either branches to some
error-handling process or proceeds as anticipated. None the less, as the data
is declared as being initially trusted this program would be rejected under
the rules of System TFOpi. This is a particularly egregious situation given that
a verification procedure exists at the receiving end. In addition, given that
there is no loss of safety — the receiver will always treat it as having variable
trustedness i — it would seem a valid program anyway.
As a second example, consider the following conservative program:
Γ, sandbox : σU, x : (σT)T `FO paranoid : Proc
The intent of this particular program is to place all data — no matter what
integrity level — in an untrusted sandbox variable to minimise its danger.
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〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R P ≡α Q
〈Θ,Γ,Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
(alp.)
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σb}, x[−→y ].P〉 x[
−→y ]−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},P〉 certify Id
(out .)
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ, x(−→z : −→σb).P〉 x(
−→y )−−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},P{−→y /−→z }〉 certify Id
(inp.)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ,Γ,P + Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
(sum.)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R BN (µ) ∩ FN (Q) = ∅
〈Θ,Γ,P|Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′|R(Q)〉 certify R
(comp.)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ,Γ, !P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′|R(!P)〉 certify R
(rep.)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R x /∈ FN (µ) ∪ BN (µ)
〈Θx,Γx, (νx)P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′x,Γ′x, (νx)P′〉 certify R
(res .)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify Id w 6= x, w ∈ −→y −−→z
〈Θw,Γw, (νw)P〉 (νw
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−−→ 〈Θ′w,Γ′w, (νw)P′〉 certify Id
(open)
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify Id
〈Γ,Θ,Q〉 x(
−→y )−−−→ 〈Γ′,Θ′,Q〉 certify R −→z /∈ FN (Q)
〈∆,Γ ∪Θ,P|Q〉 τ−→ 〈R(∆),R(Γ′ ∪Θ),R(P′|Q′)〉 certify R
(comm.)
certify(z) = T R = Id[i := T]
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b}, x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q〉 x(z)−−→
〈R(Θ),R(Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b, z : σT}),R(P{z/y})〉
(cert − T )
certify(z) = U R = Id[i := U]
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b}, x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q〉 x(z)−−→
〈R(Θ),R(Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b, z : σT}),R(Q{z/y})〉
(cert − U )
Figure 3.3: First-Order Typed Labelled Transition Semantics
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However, with the rules of System TFOpi it is not possible to construct the
program
x(sandbox : σU).paranoid
because the channel x is typed as carrying a trusted variable.
These examples may essentially be boiled down to another set of intuitions
that a flexible system should allow, but that would not be permitted within
the rules of Figure 3.2.
The primary assumption, or intuition, is that a name that is trusted may
be treated as untrusted (that is, with caution!) with no loss of safety to the
system. This leads to two consequences:
• it should be possible to bind trusted names to untrusted variables (but
not vice versa); and
• it should be possible to send trusted names along an untrusted channel
if so desired, although they will be (rightly) treated as untrusted at the
destination.
An important implication of these points is that they essentially enable local
trustedness; that is the trustedness of a variable may vary in the deduction
tree, being considered trusted locally but untrusted globally for example.
The rules implementing these assumptions — shown in Figure 3.4 — are
collectively referred to as System TFOpi≤ and require a notion of sub-typing.
This concept is examined next in Section 3.4.1, followed by individual exam-
ination of the noteworthy rules. The judgement forms used are described in
Definition
Definition 3.4.1 (Judgements of System TFOpi≤) The judgement forms
of System TFOpi≤ are identical to those of System TFOpi, with the exception of
a different subscript for differentiation:
Γ `FO≤ P : Proc
Γ `(FO≤) P : Proc
have the usual meaning of well-formed process and well-formed null, guarded,
or summation process as before. Also as before, the judgement
`FO≤ σb
means that the type σb is well-formed under the rules of System TFOpi≤.








Γ `(FO≤) P : Proc
Γ `FO≤ P : Proc (conv .)
∅ `(FO≤) 0 : Proc (zero)
Γ `FO≤ P : Proc x /∈ domΓ `FO≤ σb
Γ, x : σb `FO≤ P : Proc (weak .)
Γ `FO≤ P : Proc
Γ `FO≤ !P : Proc (rep.)
Γ `(FO≤) P : Proc Θ `(FO≤) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `(FO≤) P + Q : Proc (sum.)
Γx, x : σ
b `FO≤ P : Proc
Γx `FO≤ (νx : σb)P : Proc (res .)
Γ `FO≤ P : Proc Θ `FO≤ Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `FO≤ P|Q : Proc (comp.)











Γ−→y , x : (
−→


















′ `(FO≤) x[−→y ].P : Proc
(out .)
Γy, x : (σ
i)b, y : σT `FO≤ P : Proc Θy, x : (σi)b, y : σU `FO≤ Q : Proc
Γy,Θy, x : (σc)b `(FO≤) x(y : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc (cert .)
Figure 3.4: Type Rules Of System TFOpi≤
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3.4.1 Subtyping
Informally, a type τ1 is said to be a sub-type of another type τ2 — usually
written as τ1 ≤ τ2 — if and only if in any situation that may be satisfied
with an instance of type τ2 an instance of τ1 may be used instead with no
loss of safety.
For example, a calculation involving real numbers may be satisfied using
an integer value; integers are a sub-type of reals and every integer is also a
real number. Note that the reverse is not true; not every real number is also
an integer so it is not safe to use real numbers in an integer calculation.
In implementing sub-typing for the systems under consideration here an
ordering is first defined on trust annotations (Definition 3.4.2):
Definition 3.4.2 (Trust Annotation Ordering) From the boolean alge-
bra 〈B ∪ BV ,+, ·, 〉 of annotations the corresponding lattice 〈B ∪ BV ,≤B〉 is
generated in the standard way, where T and U are the supremum and infinum
respectively, the meet and join operators are · and +, and the ordering ≤B is
defined as
b ≤B c ⇐⇒ b · c = b
Likewise, define the reverse operation b ≥B c iff c ≤B b.
This definition however runs counter to the desired sub-typing assumption:
a trusted name may be used in place of an untrusted variable, implying that
a trusted type is a sub-type of an untrusted type — the reverse implied by
the ordering of Definition 3.4.2. Accordingly, sub-typing is defined as follows
(Definition 3.4.3):
Definition 3.4.3 The relation ≤ on types is the least transitive and reflexive
relation satisfying the following:
σb11 ≤ σb22 ⇐⇒ ∀c.σc1 ≡ σc2 ∧ b2 ≤B b1
If σb11 ≤ σb22 then σb11 is a sub-type of σb22 (Note the contravariant use of ≤B
on the annotations). Similarly, define the reverse operation ≥ as σb22 ≥ σb11
iff σb11 ≤ σb22 .
There is an important point to note here: the sub-typing is expressed solely
in terms of the outer-most annotations (the base types must be congruent).
This does lead to some loss of flexibility, however if the relation is to ex-
tend any deeper into the type structure it is necessary to include additional
information about input/output usage in the type and thus the rules here
are restricted to the surface case. Section 6.1.1 has more discussion on this
point, with suggestions on how future work in this direction might proceed.
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To understand the reasons behind the need for usage information, con-
sider for a moment the well-known function-subtyping rule (Cardelli 1996).
To review, a function with type ρ1 → τ1 is a sub-type of the function with
type ρ2 → τ2 if τ1 ≤ τ2 and ρ2 ≤ ρ1: that is, if the first function returns
results of type τ1 then logically it must also return results of the supertype
τ2; and similarly if it accepts inputs of type ρ1 it also accepts inputs of the
sub-type ρ2. Thus, the first function may be used in place of the second, and
hence ρ1 → τ1 is a sub-type of ρ2 → τ2.
A similar situation exists with the nested structures of the pi-calculus
types. If a channel outputs an untrusted name, then intuitively one would
expect to also be able to use a variable of a similar type that outputs a
trusted name. The situation is reversed however when considering a name
used for input; a name being used to bind a trusted value should also be able
to bind untrusted values. Thus any sub-typing relation involving deeper con-
sideration than the outer-most annotations also requires information about
input/output usage of the channel (so that a full recursive comparison may
be made), and no such avenues are pursued here. See Pierce and Sangiorgi
(1993) for a complete coverage of input/output types and sub-typing, and
Igarashi and Kobayashi (2000, Section 2.4) for a comparison of the two tech-
niques (outermost annotation only versus a full structural comparison) with
comprehensive discussion of the implications.
Interestingly, due to the fact that the systems here do not contain usage
information, this notion of contravariant annotation orderings is expressed
in the form of the rules themselves (see Figure 3.4)




〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ, x(−→z : −→σc).P〉 x(
−→y )−−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},P{−→y /−→z }〉 certify Id
No other change to the typed semantics from Figures 3.3 is required.
3.4.2 Analysis of the Rules
The rules well-formed types, conversion, zero, weaken, restriction, replica-
tion, summation, composition, and certify are unchanged from those for Sys-
tem TFOpi. Where things become interesting is in the examination of the
interaction rules: input and output (the rule for certify does not change, as
the annotation on the bound name is fixed by the rule).
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Input: The rule











Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σb)c `(FO≤) x(−→y :
−→
σb).P : Proc
retains the expected similarities with the plain first-order system, but also
subtly diverges. The bound names are removed from the environment in the
consequent as would be expected, and the well-formed type rule guarantees
that all types carried by the input channel x are multiplied by the trustedness
of x, however the types of the operands (−→y : σ′b′) are slightly different. They






in the antecedent. That is, the
types x receives are a sub-type of the names being bound.
The implications of this are that while x may input trusted names (im-
plying that x itself is trusted, as a consequence of the multiplication clause
in its type), it may in fact bind these names to untrusted variables (recall
Definition 3.4.3, noting the reverse ordering of the annotations). As was
informally expressed at the beginning of Section 3.4 this is a sound construc-
tion, provided that the reverse situation can never occur, since no safety is
lost: merely a trusted value treated as untrusted. This naturally allows more
programs to be safely typed.
Output: The rule














′ `(FO≤) x[−→y ].P : Proc
is extended similarly. As could be expected the well-formed type rule enforces
the policy that all arguments must be multiplied by the trustedness of x.
Similarly to the input rule the types of the arguments themselves are not
required to perfectly match the type of x, provided that they are related
by the sub-typing clause
−→
σ′b





Observe, however, that the order of the relation is the reverse of that in the
input rule.
This has the natural implication (see Definition 3.4.3 again) that trusted
names may be sent along an untrusted channel, as suggested in the intuitions
at the beginning of Section 3.3. Note however that due to the formation of
the input rule, and the reverse direction of the sub-typing clause in that rule,
any such names on an untrusted channel will be bound to untrusted variables
at their destination.
Note especially that there is no sub-typing clause present in the certify
rule (in fact, it is unchanged from the rule in System TFOpi). This is mostly as
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a result of the definition of sub-typing only involving the outer-most anno-
tations and not a structural component; since the annotation on the bound
variable is determined by the form of the rule (requiring a trusted variable
in one branch and an untrusted variable in the other), a sub-typing clause
does not make sense.
3.5 First-Order Security System With Sub-
Typing
The previous two systems both can provide integrity of data against being
over-written with lower-integrity values, even in the presence of run-time
coercion. They are still susceptible though to an implicit attack, where an
untrusted value can affect the execution of a trusted computation, thus the
security they provide is not total. For example, consider the following pro-
gram:
x.y.0
Assume that x is untrusted and y is trusted. In this case then, the use of the
channel y is dependent on x first being used, and thus a trusted channel relies
on a low integrity value for its correct usage. The untrusted channel may
be used at the wrong time, or take a longer time to execute, thus disrupting
synchronous processes, and so on.
Thus, for a system to be considered secure against low integrity data it
must be shown that untrusted values do not affect the successful execution
of trusted computations. The final step in this presentation of first-order
systems is to include a security level in the deduction, which specifies the
trustedness of channels that may be used. It can then be demonstrated (see
Chapter 4) that values of a lower trustedness than the security level are
unable to disrupt execution.
The rules implementing this system, collectively referred to as System TFO′pi≤,
are presented in Figure 3.5. They make use of a different judgement form
again, described in Definition 3.5.1:
Definition 3.5.1 (Judgements in TFO′pi≤) Judgements in TFO′pi≤ take the
following two forms, with the usual meaning of well-formed process and well-
formed null, sum, or guarded process respectively:
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc
There is now an additional annotation, attached to the turn-style. This rep-
resents the trustedness at which the process is typed under, and plays the
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same role as the “program counter” level (traditionally so-called because it
represents the security level reached by executing the program) in many in-
formation flow systems. It represents the least trustedness level of channels
that may be used by that process, and will be referred to as the security level
or the security level judgement annotation.
`FO′≤ σb
has the usual meaning of a well-formed type under System TFO′pi≤.
The following Lemma states that every judgement in System TFO′pi≤ also
forms a valid judgement in System TFOpi≤ by ignoring the security level:
Lemma 3.5.2 ∀b,Γ,P.
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc =⇒ Γ `FO≤ P : Proc
Proof. By induction on the respective derivations, noting that the rules in
each case are identical, but with stricter requirements in System TFO′pi≤. 2
Note that a similar result can be stated in the opposite direction, for example
for a deduction Γ `FO≤ P : Proc in System TFOpi≤ there is some security level
b such that Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc is a valid deduction in System TFO′pi≤. In the
extreme case this holds by letting b = U, so this result is much less useful
and interesting.
No changes are required for the typed labelled transition semantics.
3.5.1 Analysis of the Rules
The general form, as could be expected, remains more or less unchanged from
the rules of System TFOpi≤. Two categories of change are worth pointing out:
• what happens when processes are combined, and
• the new restriction on channels that may be used.
Combination of separate processes occurs in two rules (certify will be dis-
cussed separately); those for composition and summation. Both require that
the resultant security level is the infinum or meet of the two antecedent levels.
This seems reasonable for composition where the processes are potentially in-
dependent, so the conservative choice is taken for the combination. A more
logical-sounding choice for summation might be to require the security levels
to match, since the summation will act like exactly one of its summand pro-
cesses. However, the presence of a rule to lower the security level (see below)









Γ `b(FO′≤) P : Proc
Γ `b
FO′≤ P : Proc
(conv .)
∅ `b
(FO′≤) 0 : Proc
(zero)
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc c ≤B b
Γ `c
FO′≤ P : Proc
(rel .)
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc
Γ `b
FO′≤ !P : Proc
(rep.)
Γx, x : σ
b `cFO′≤ P : Proc
Γx `cFO′≤ (νx : σb)P : Proc
(res .)
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc x /∈ domΓ `FO′≤ σc
Γ, x : σc `b
FO′≤ P : Proc
(weak .)
Γ `b(FO′≤) P : Proc Θ `c(FO′≤) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `bc
(FO′≤) P + Q : Proc
(sum.)
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc Θ `cFO′≤ Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `bc
FO′≤ P|Q : Proc
(comp.)
















−→y : −→σb).P : Proc
(inp.)





′ `dFO′≤ P : Proc
−→
σ′b
′ ≤ −→σb d ≤B c







−→y ].P : Proc
(out .)
Γy, x : (σ
i)b, y : σT `cFO′≤ P : Proc c ≤B b
Θy, x : (σ
i)b, y : σU `dFO′≤ Q : Proc d ≤B b
Γy,Θy, x : (σ
i)b `ic+id
(FO′≤) x(y : σ
i) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
(cert .)
Figure 3.5: Type Rules Of System TFO′pi≤
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renders this a moot point, as requiring the levels to match then merely has
the effect of adding an extra step to a derivation. Thus, the more pragmatic
meet strategy is chosen instead.
There is a new rule (rel.) to allow the security level to be relaxed. Because
the other restrictions require the name of a guard to be at least as trusted as
the security level, the transitivity of ≤B means this stipulation is not affected
by the relaxation. Note that even in the absence of such a rule its effect could
still be achieved, with the composition rule weakening the combined security
level, to form a behaviourally identical process with a lower security level.
For example P|0 behaves identically to P, and will have a security level which
is the lower of the two.
The main security property is a result of the form of the rules governing
construction of guarded processes, in other words input, output, and certify.
All require that the channel has an integrity level at least as trusted as the
security level of the process they prefix.
The rule for certify is the most interesting. It has the same requirements
that the input channel must be at least as trusted as the process annotations,
but the difference lies in the combination of the two process annotations. Re-
call that both a summation and a composition required that the combined
security level was the meet of those of the antecedents, with the reasoning
being that this was a conservative approach for the composition where the
processes were independent, and allowed more processes to be typed in the
case of the non-deterministic choice present in a summation. Neither situ-
ation is represented in a certify construct: there is a choice involved, but
not a non-deterministic one. Since the reduction implies a coercion and the
direction of the coercion indicates which branch is selected, there is enough
information to create a combined annotation that accurately reflects both
levels in the subsequent reduction. This is achieved by using the variable
annotation — which will be coerced to a concrete value during the reduction
— to select the corresponding security level:
i · c+ i · d
Observe that in the event that i is determined to be trusted by the certify
oracle this expression will reduce to c, the security level of the process that
will concurrently be reduced, and conversely to d if it is found to be untrusted.
3.6 Higher-Order System With Sub-Typing
The previous systems (of Sections 3.3, 3.5, and 3.4) concerned the same core
language, with progressive extensions to the type system to enable more
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programs to be typed. All systems though — since they were based on
the same language — by definition were first-order; they are only useful for
analysing systems involving simple data transmission. This is obviously still
extremely useful, and still very powerful since the networks may dynamically
alter their topologies, but the fact remains that many contemporary systems
are being constructed around the premise of mobile code as well as data.
This is an important field (for reasons outlined in Section 2.2.3), and so this
section introduces a type-based tool for analysing such systems.
New questions not present in the first-order systems immediately arise,
and the type rules must naturally be extended to answer them. Intuitively,
since processes may be transmitted — including along untrusted channels
— they also run a risk of being compromised and thus it seems natural to
associate a trustedness value with processes as well as names. This also
suggests that perhaps code and data arising from such an untrusted process
must also be untrusted, even over a trusted channel of communication (if a
process is for some reason regarded as malicious, it seems natural that all
messages from it should be distrusted).
A far more subtle issue arises however when considering what exactly
it means for a process to be “untrusted”. For example, should a malicious
program, running in isolation from the rest of the system (for example, run-
ning inside a complete sandbox and unable to interact with other programs
or the file system), still be considered “untrusted”? The view held in this
thesis is that it should not; that the final trustedness of a program must be
deduced with consideration given to the communication context in which it
is executed.
The situation is complicated further still by the realisation that processes
which are “trusted” in isolation may none-the-less be used by malicious pro-
cesses to communicate with the host environment, and thus in that setting
should be untrusted.
The following Example (3.6.1) illustrates this point:
Example 3.6.1 Assume process P, Q, and R that are closed with respect to
each other; that is FN (P) ∩ FN (Q) ∩ FN (R) = ∅. Create from P a trusted
agent P′ , x(v).z[v].P. Similarly, assume the following untrusted agent:
Q′ , y[w].Q. With the port of observation (the only channel through which
the external environment is accessible) limited to x, it is easy to informally
verify that no possibility for corruption exists: the two processes are isolated
from each other, sharing no channels of communication, and only the trusted
process communicates with the host system.
If a third agent is introduced into the system the situation may change,
for example as follows: given R′ , z(v).y(w).R then no matter what the
CHAPTER 3. TRUST TYPE SYSTEMS 66
trustedness of the new process, it has introduced an avenue of communica-
tion (between P′ and R′ using z, and between R′ and Q′ via y) between the
(initially trusted) first process P′ (and hence the outside environment) and
the malicious process, so the entire group should be conservatively classified
as untrusted. In other words, from the perspective of the host untrustedness
is transitive across processes sharing names.
Implementing this perspective is not trivial, and the solution, by necessity,
introduces some novel concepts. There are two additional components to the
new system:
• Each deduction in the system is performed in relation to the external
environment : informally, this is a set of names that the process under
scrutiny may use to communicate with the host system if the process
shares any of these names (that is, if the process does not have any
knowledge of any of these names then it must eventually be considered
trusted as it is isolated from the external system). It corresponds to
the security property of the host running the program.
• Additional information is maintained about the context each name ap-
pears in. Informally, this is related to the trustedness of the process
using the name; for example, an untrusted process may still communi-
cate (and potentially with the environment) using a trusted channel,
but that channel is used in an untrusted context. In other words, while
the channel in question preserves the integrity of the data it carries
it may still be used by a malicious program to communicate with the
external system and perhaps inject false data, and thus is considered
to be in an untrusted context. Perhaps a second way of looking at it is
whilst the type annotations track explicit trustedness (that is, whether
a channel corrupts its contents or not), contexts track implicit trust:
essentially, if channels are being used for covert purposes or not.
3.6.1 Preliminaries
Several new concepts need to be introduced before the new system may be
presented; these are considered in this section.
First of all, there is a small change to the syntax, to allow the programmer
to declare the integrity of processes. This is implemented by attaching an
annotation to the null process. See Definition 3.6.2 for the syntax in full.
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Definition 3.6.2 (Annotated Higher-Order Syntax)
P ::= 0b |
∑
i∈I
pii.Pi | !P | P|P | (νx : σb)P | X | X〈−→K 〉 | F〈−→K 〉











σb) | x[−→V ]
Definition 3.6.3 (Higher-Order Execution Contexts) Write C to rep-
resent the context created as part of a deduction. It is a partial function from
names/variables to annotations (trust expressions; that is C ⊆ V × BA); the
domain of a context is exactly the free variables of the process in the deduction
to which it pertains.
1. As usual, CV represents the context C with the name or variable V
removed from its domain.
2. The construct CT is the total function derived from C as:
CT(V ) =
{
C(V ) , V ∈ domC
T , otherwise
3. A context is compatible with another, written C1  C2, if and only
if for each name or variable V in the domain of both C1 and C2 then
C1(V ) = C2(V ).
4. Contexts may be combined using the ‘,’ operator; this creates the union
and is defined if and only if the two are compatible:
(C1,C2)(x) =
{
C1(x) , x ∈ domC1
C2(x) , x ∈ domC2
The ‘,’ operator is symmetric and transitive. As with environments
(see Section 2.3.1) union with a singleton context will frequently be
abbreviated to C, x : b. Given a sequence
−→
V = V1 . . . Vn, define
−→
V : b
as V1 : b . . . Vn : b
5. The operator ⊆ is the precise subset operator:
C1 ⊆ C2 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ domC1.C1(x) = C2(x)
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6. Multiplication on contexts is defined as follows:
b · C , {V : b · C(V ) | V ∈ domC}
This is extended to sequences of contexts in the logical way; that is
b · −→C = b · C1 . . . b · Cn if −→C = C1 . . .Cn.
7. Given an annotation b, a ternary operator on a pair of contexts may
be defined as follows (the motivation for this will become apparent later
on):
(C1 〈b〉 C2)(V ) =

b · C1(V ) + b · C2(V ) , if V ∈ domC1 ∩ domC2
b · C1(V ) + b , if V ∈ domC1 ∧
V /∈ domC2
b+ b · C2(V ) , if V ∈ domC2 ∧
V /∈ domC1
The 〈〉 operator is not symmetric. It binds tighter than ‘,’ so C1,C2 〈b〉 C3
is equivalent to C1, (C2 〈b〉 C3).
Definition 3.6.4 (External Context) Write C to represent the interface
to the host system that any process is typed under. It is a finite — possibly
empty — set of channels (that is, C ⊆ N ). A totally empty external context
corresponds to the situation of a total sandbox; the process under investigation
has no avenue of communication with the host system and is thus completely
isolated. C is constant throughout a deduction tree.
Definition 3.6.5 (Annotated Type Syntax) The type syntax must also
be extended in a higher-order system, due to the need to differentiate between
instantiation to a name and instantiation to a process (Vasconcelos 1993).
This is achieved by taking the symbol Proc, formerly just used to denote a
well-formed judgement, and admitting it as a type for well-formed processes.
Because processes now have an integrity level associated, an annotation is
also attached. Abstractions are represented in a manner reminiscent of func-
tion types using an arrow, preceded by a possibly-empty sequence of the types
of the names and variables abstracted on, enclosed in parentheses. As before,
σ ranges over base types.
The new type syntax is:
σ ::= (−→σ )b | Procb | (−→σ )→ Procb
Multiplication and related definitions are extended logically to handle process
types as well. So, b · ((−→σc) → Procd) is interpreted as ((−→σc) → Procbd. The
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same convention of usually writing the type with the outmost annotation dis-
played is also adopted here; note that the annotation displayed refers to the
last part of the term, for example the type (()c)→ Procb might be referred to
in the discussion as σb (not σc for example).
Definition 3.6.6 (Sub-Typing) The definition of sub-typing is also ex-
tended, although in a limited way. For reasons explained later, sub-typing
on processes is not admitted into the system, thus the relation below only
includes a reflexive relation on process types. Sub-Typing on channel types
remains the same (including the restriction that it only considers the outer-
most annotation due to a lack of usage information; see Definition 3.4.3 on




σd)b ≤ (−→σd)c Procb ≤ Procb (−→σb)→ Procc ≤ (−→σb)→ Procc
Definition 3.6.7 (Higher-Order Judgements) A type judgement in Sys-
tem THOpi≤ usually has one of the forms
Γ `CHO≤ K : σb;C
Γ `C(HO≤) P : Procb;C
As before, Γ is the typing environment, K the agent being typed, and σb
the resultant type of the (well-formed) agent under the assumptions Γ. For
reasons of convenience that will be elaborated later, the definition is relaxed to
allow names to appear on the right-hand side. This is purely for convenience,
and the majority of the time this form of judgement will refer to an agent.
The second form is only used for guarded, null, and summation processes as
usual. The new components are
• `CHO≤, the new ‘turn-style’ operator which also states under what exter-
nal environment (that is, C) the agent is being typed; and
• C, the context of each (free) name in the deduction (see Definition 3.6.3).
Note that it is a product of that particular deduction, rather than a set
of assumptions, so is written on the right-hand side of the deduction.
An additional form of judgement is
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb
which is identical to the first form, but missing the context information. Only
one rule in system THOpi≤ has a judgement of this form in the consequent (and
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it never appears as an antecedent); it represents the very final deduction of a
given process in a given environment, with the contextual information utilised
(to calculate the overall trustedness under C) and hence discarded.
A final form
`HO≤ σb
states that the type σb is well-formed under the rules of System THOpi≤.









to refer to the possibly-empty sequence of judgements
Γ1 `CHO≤ K1 : σb11 ;C1 . . .Γn `CHO≤ Kn : σbnn ;Cn
In addition, subscripts will occasionally be used to refer to range over judge-
ments in a sequence, for example ∀Γi,Ci . . . meaning that the statement to
follow should apply to each Γi, Ci pair from the sequence of judgements.
3.6.2 Structure Of The Rules





























For example, chans(xPyF) = {x, y}.
The higher-order sub-typing rules are referred to collectively as system
THOpi≤ and are presented in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. For ease of introduction,
the simpler rules (mostly the structural rules) are presented first, with the
notationally-complicated cases following.
While much similarity with the first-order systems remains there is also
considerable divergence so some more detailed explanation is required.
Firstly the zero rule; the main point worthy of note is the empty context:
recall that the context of a deduction contains exactly the free names of
the agent in the deduction, so this is quite natural. For the purposes of
a deduction, an inactive process may be given any trustedness level. The
weaken rule is also relatively familiar; observe that the context is unchanged
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`HO≤ Procb














Figure 3.6: Type Formation Rules for System THOpi≤
∅ `C(HO≤) 0b : Procb; ∅
(zero.)
Γ `C(HO≤) P : Proc;C
Γ `CHO≤ P : Proc;C
(conv .)
Γ `CHO≤ A : σb;C `HO≤ σ′c V /∈ domΓ
Γ, V : σ′c `CHO≤ A : σb;C
(weak .)
`HO≤ σb
x : σb `CHO≤ x : σb; ∅
(var − 1 ) `HO≤ σ
b
X : σb `CHO≤ X : σb;X : b
(var − 2 )
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C
Γ `CHO≤ !P : Procb;C
(repl .)
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1 Θ `CHO≤ Q : Procc;C2
Γ,Θ `CHO≤ P|Q : Procbc;C1,C2
(comp.)
Γx, x : σ
c `CHO≤ P : Procb;C x /∈ C
Γx `CHO≤ (νx : σc)P : Procb;Cx
(res .)
Γ `C(HO≤) P : Procb;C1 Θ `C(HO≤) Q : Procc;C2
Γ,Θ `C(HO≤) P + Q : Procbc;C1,C2
(sum.)
Figure 3.7: Type Rules Of System THOpi≤
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′ ∀V ∈ −→V .CT(V ) ≥B d, V /∈ C
Γ−→
V
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′ ≤ c · −→σd ∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B c ∀C2i, V ∈ domC2i.C2i(V ) ≤B d′i
Γ, x : (c · −→σd)b,−→Γ′ `C(HO≤) x[
−→








ΓV , V : σ
T, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P : Procc;C1 C1T(V ) ≥B c
ΘV , V : σ
U, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ Q : Procd;C2 C2T(V ) ≥B d V /∈ C
ΓV ,ΘV , x : (σ
i)e `C(HO≤) x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proci·c+i·d;
C1V 〈i〉 C2V , x : (i · c+ i · d)
(cert .)
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C




Figure 3.8: Type Rules of System THOpi≤(continued)
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in the consequent though, since it is only defined by the free variables of the
agent in the deduction, and not the environment.
Notice that there are now two variable introduction rules (var-1 and var-
2); one for names and one for variables. No such rules were present in the first-
order language, so it is worth considering the reasons for their existence in a
higher-order setting. The introduction rule for a variable (var-2) is necessary
because of a process such as x(X).X, in which case a rule to introduce X on
the right-hand side is required (formerly, all deductions would have used at
least one instance of the zero rule; now, processes may also be built up on
top of variables). Its image in the context is its own annotation, as it is a
free variable in a process (itself) with this trustedness. The inclusion of the
rule var-1 is driven mainly by convenience, as will become apparent when
the output rule is discussed (note though that it is not an agent and doesn’t
appear in any context, so the context remains empty).
The rules for replication and restriction are fairly innocuous; the only
point worthy of note is that since restriction (which may also be on a variable
as well as a name) is a binding operation the bound name/variable is removed
from both the assumption set and the associated context (which must contain
only the free variables) — a little thought reveals that this is logical since it
creates a local variable and is thus unable to communicate with the external
environment.
The first rule to be discussed in-depth is the rule Final:
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C
Γ `CHO≤ P : Proc
V
x∈CCT(x)
As its name suggests, it is always the final rule in any complete deduction:
it combines the information collected in the contexts during the deduction,
and uses it to determine the possibility of a malicious agent communicating
with the host system.
The motivation for this is briefly recapped: consider two processes, one
trusted and the other untrusted. They are isolated from each other, and
further only the trusted process can communicate with the host so this would
seem to be a safe situation. The composition rule, discussed shortly, would
type this as untrusted however, by taking the conservative approach of the
greatest-lower-bound on the combined trustedness. The rule Final rectifies
this situation by computing the overall trustedness with respect to the host.
This is what the expression ∧
x ∈ CCT(x)
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does; it computes the greatest lower bound of the context each name able to
communicate with the host (that is, all those in C) appears under.2
Some trivial examples illustrate these points and the use of the final rule.
Example 3.6.9 Assume the following deduction: Γ `CHO≤ P : ProcU; ∅. That
is, an untrusted process, that is closed or has no free variables (note the empty
context). Then by definition
V
x∈C∅T(x) = T for all C, and thus via the final
rule Γ `CHO≤ P : ProcT; that is, the final deduction states that the process is
trusted — a logical result, since it cannot interact with anyone (especially the
host) and is thus harmless.
Example 3.6.10 Now consider the following deduction of an untrusted pro-
cess: Γ `CHO≤ P : ProcU; {y : U}. Assume that the deduction has been per-
formed with respect to a host that leaves the single channel x open; that is
C = {x}. Note that the process in this example is not closed, and exposes
just a single name y (in an untrusted context). Thus it still has no means of
communication with the host, and can therefore be trusted; the final rule con-
firms this: Γ `CHO≤ P : ProcT, since if C = {x} then
V
x∈C{y : U}T(x) = T,
as expected.
Alternatively, if the deduction had been performed under C = {y} thenV
x∈C{y : U}T(x) = U and thus Γ `CHO≤ P : ProcU.
Example 3.6.11 Example 3.6.1 informally described the following program
of three processes:
x(v).z[v].P | y[w].Q | z(v).y(w).R
It can now be shown (more formally than before) how typing would proceed
for the same program, and thus why it would be rejected as it currently stands.
Assume the following three deductions have already been made:
Γ `CHO≤ P : ProcT;CP
Γ′ `CHO≤ Q : ProcU;CQ
Γ′′ `CHO≤ R : ProcT;CR
Because each process is closed with respect to the others it must be the case
that CP∩CQ∩CR = ∅, recalling that a context contains exactly the free names
2There is the possibility that C contains no names; in other words, a perfect sandbox.
In this case the expression evaluates to T, following systems such as Haskell that define
conjunction over an empty list as true.
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and variables of a process. The complete deductions for each branch may now
be formed, using applications of the input and output rules as appropriate:
Γv `CHO≤ x(v).z[v].P : ProcT;CP , x : T, z : T
Γ′ `CHO≤ y[w].Q : ProcU;CQ, w : U, y : U
Γ′′vw `CHO≤ z(v).y(w).R : ProcT;CR, y : T, z : T
Now, compose (using the composition rule, and assuming CPR = CP ,CR)
the P and R branches:
Γv,Γ
′′
vw `CHO≤ x(v).z[v].P | z(v).y(w).R : ProcT;CPR, x : T, y : T, z : T
So far so good; now — again using the composition rule — combine with the
Q branch: here however lies a problem, as this would involve the union of
the contexts CPR = {x : T, y : T, z : T} and CQ = {w : U, y : U} which is
undefined as the image of y is T in one branch and U in the other.
Thus this program may only be typed if all processes are typed as un-
trusted, as communication is transitive. (It may be checked that the order of
composition is immaterial).
Example 3.6.12 Consider Example 3.6.11 again, to see why context union
is defined as it is. An alternative definition, which at first glance appears
more flexible, might be to multiply the images of each name appearing in
both contexts: so if C1 = {x : T, y : T} and C2 = {y : U, z : U} then
C1,C2 = {x : T, y : T · U, z : U}. The case of Example 3.6.11 demonstrates
though that this would not work (per the stated intuitions): this would end
up with a context of C = {w : U, x : T, y : T · U, z : T} (since y is the
only common name) which if C = {x} would result in
V
x∈CCT(x) = T —
not what is desired. In other words, the combination must be transitive and
multiplication in the intersection only would lose this property.
The cases for combining processes (summation and composition) deserve
some thought, although the resultant rules are actually quite simple, albeit
for different motivations. Both take the combined annotation as the meet of
the two antecedent processes, in other words the lowest bound.
It is worth mentioning some of the possible alternatives for the summation
rule to see why it takes the form it does. By definition a summation construct
behaves as either P or Q, so in the absence of any knowledge as to which one
will reduce, the more conservative approach is taken. An alternative that
deserves consideration would be to require the annotations to match; that is:
Γ `CHO≤ P : []b;C1 Θ `CHO≤ Q : []b;C2
Γ,Θ `CHO≤ P + Q : []b;C1,C2
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Note that by the definition of context union (Definition 3.6.3) if any names are
common to both branches the process annotations are likely to be identical
anyway, and this choice allows more processes to be typed.
The motivations behind the rule for composition are much less straight-
forward. The two antecedent processes are not linked in any obvious manner
as is the case with summation; they may in fact be completely independent,
even closed. The question arises then, what should the annotation (trusted-
ness) on the combination be? Clearly it should have some bearing on their
potential for interaction, both with themselves and with the external environ-
ment. If they are capable of interaction it is likely that they are already of the
same trustedness, but if they are completely independent the issue is more
complex: if they are isolated, one trusted and the other untrusted, which
value is chosen for the overall result? Taking the greatest lower bound again
(that is, multiplication; giving a result of untrusted) seems overly paranoid
in the case where the untrusted process is in fact isolated from everything
(for example, running in a sandbox). This appears to lead to the conclu-
sion that the combined annotation should be calculated in a similar fashion
to the Final rule, discussed earlier, and in fact earlier versions of this work
(Hepburn and Wright 2003, 2004) mistakenly took this perspective.
The reason why this is mistaken is that it offers a means, early in a deduc-
tion, to effectively circumvent the other rules and upgrade the trustedness of
a process. As a simple example, the process x.0U is considered untrusted and
would have x in an untrusted context. However, the behaviourally-identical
process x.(0U|0T) would be trusted and have x in a trusted context under the
same rules. This situation appears too dangerous too ignore, and thus the
compromise is that the composition rule takes the conservative approach, and
the final rule will compute the trustedness of parallel processes with respect
to the host.
There is a similar rationale behind the exclusion of a sub-typing rule for
processes. It seems a reasonable intuition that a trusted process may safely
be regarded as untrusted; however this makes the derivation of a judgement
non-deterministic, and importantly makes it difficult or impossible to make
guarantees of safety under the current structure of the contexts. As an
example, with x ∈ C, for any derivation of x.P with P as trusted and
therefore placing x in a trusted context, there is a derivation with P as
untrusted, and therefore x in an untrusted context, potentially altering the
result after the final rule. For this reason such a rule is currently excluded
and left for future work. The interaction between processes and input/output
also mean that to preserve other safety results only processes of an identical
type to that received may be transmitted.
CHAPTER 3. TRUST TYPE SYSTEMS 77
Example 3.6.13 Now consider the following two deductions:
Γ1 `CHO≤ x.0T : ProcT;x : T
Γ2 `CHO≤ y.0U : ProcU; y : U
Using the composition rule yields an untrusted process, as this is the meet of
T and U:
Γ1,Γ2 `CHO≤ x.0T | y.0U : ProcU;x : T, y : U
However, assuming C = {x} (or indeed, contains neither x or y) then by
the Final rule the resulting process is trusted overall
Γ1,Γ2 `CHO≤ x.0T | y.0U : ProcT
since
V
x∈CCT(x) = T given C = {x : T, y : U}.
The most care needs to taken with regards to the communication (input
and output) rules. Begin by examining the input rule:
Γ−→
V











′ ∀V ∈ −→V .CT(V ) ≥B d, V /∈ C
Γ−→
V










, x : d
The consequent has the bound names removed from the environment and
the context as expected, and the channel x added with a context of the
base process. In the antecedent the types carried by x are required to match
those of the parameters
−→
V , modulo sub-typing. Note the direction of the sub-
typing clause; this essentially says that a trusted input may be bound to an
untrusted name (one of the core assumptions). Note that by the well-formed
type rule, the annotations of all types input are multiplied by the annotation
on x, so if x is untrusted then so are all variables that it carries (again,
modulo sub-typing). There is an additional clause, ∀V ∈ −→V .CT(V ) ≥B d
that is possibly somewhat unexpected. The purpose of this clause is related
to the definition of the final rule; to prevent a name in an untrusted context
of a trusted process becoming bound to a name capable of communication
with the host (and thus making the process untrusted). The substitution
lemma (page 111) has more detail on the need for this.
The output rule also needs careful attention:












′ ≤ c · −→σd ∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B c ∀C2i, V ∈ domC2i.C2i(V ) ≤B d′i
Γ, x : (c · −→σd)b,−→Γ′ `C(HO≤) x[
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Most of its components are expected; the types carried by the channel x
must be multiplied by the annotation of the sending process, in addition
to that of the channel itself as required by the well-formed type rule, thus
untrusted processes may only send untrusted data. Note that a process may
not appear on the left-hand side of a judgement, so separate judgements are
required for the arguments. This need for separate judgements for the objects
is the reason for allowing names to appear alone on the right-hand side of
a judgement, in order to exploit the sequence shorthand notation. Once
again the direction of the sub-type clause deserves note; it is the reverse of
that in the input rule, in other words a trusted value may be sent along a
channel that is typed as accepting untrusted inputs (note of course that at
the destination — due to the type rules and the reverse clause in the input
rule — it would be untrusted. This conforms to the requirements, stated
above).
There are two clauses regarding constraints on the contexts of the objects
that are not so transparent. The first, ∀x ∈ C.C2T(x) ≥B c, ensures an
important property that processes typed as having a certain integrity will
only have a more trusted annotation after the final rule, not a lower one.
The second, ∀C2i, V ∈ domC2i.C2i(V ) ≤B d′i concerns the nature of any
processes that may be output (note that if Ki is a name then Ci will be
the empty set). In particular, it enforces certain properties regarding agents
output by processes regarded as untrusted; they must themselves contain
untrusted names. This prevents a situation such as x.0T|0U which would
have the type ProcU, but after being transmitted over an untrusted channel
perhaps, then be able to communicate with trusted hosts. Note also that
because the annotation d′i must be multiplied by both the trustedness of P
and of x then if either are untrusted d′i also must be untrusted. Note that
the same clause does not preclude a trusted process (using a trusted channel)
from sending untrusted agents; just not those that may communicate with
the host, as guaranteed by the first clause. In other words it is a guarantee
that a process considered trustworthy will not send dangerous — with respect
to the host —agents.
The context in the consequent is relatively unsurprising, being made up
of the contexts from the base process P and the arguments (
−→
K ), the channel
x mapping to the trustedness of the base process, and the channels of the
arguments
−→
K all mapping to the trustedness of P, recalling that a judgement
for a name does not introduce a context on its own.
The rules for abstraction and application are similar to input and output
respectively; a natural result since the application of an abstraction to an
argument can be thought of as an anonymous communication: for example
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(V : σc)P〈K〉 can be imagined as being similar to
(νx : (σc)T)(x(V : σc).P | x[K].0b)
where b is also the trustedness of P, and the anonymous channel is trusted
so the type (σc)T is well-formed for all σc. In essence it is forming a compo-
sition of an input and an output-prefixed process, without the composition
explicitly involved, so the same principles apply (including the sub-typing
clause).
The certify rule by contrast — and perhaps surprisingly given its power
— is remarkably simple (at least in comparison).
ΓV , V : σ
T, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P : Procc;C1 C1T(V ) ≥B c
ΘV , V : σ
U, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ Q : Procd;C2 C2T(V ) ≥B d V /∈ C
ΓV ,ΘV , x : (σ
i)e `C(HO≤) x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proci·c+i·d;
C1V 〈i〉 C2V , x : (i · c+ i · d)
The first thing that should be noted is that it is essentially an input construct,
so is defined similarly. Secondly though, note that there is no sub-typing
clause on the bound variable involved: this is because the definition of sub-
typing (Definition 3.4.3) only considers the outermost annotation of the type,
and this annotation is here defined by the rule itself. That is, the input
parameter is bound to a trusted variable in one branch (P), and an untrusted
variable (with an identical base-type) in the other branch. Note that while
the type of the bound variable(s) differs from that received from x it is not
sub-typing: the type of the parameter bound to the appropriate variable
will match that of the variable exactly at run-time due to run-time coercion.
The bound variable (V ) is, as expected, removed from the environment and
context in the consequent. There are also similar clauses on the context of the
bound variable in each branch not being any less safe than the trustedness
of the branch.
An interesting point occurs when deciding upon the annotation of the
entire construct: two processes are being combined, as in a summation or
composition construct, however this time it is not the case that there is no
knowledge as to how they might be used. Whereas a summation construct
could reduce to either branch (much like a certify form), and a parallel com-
position might have independent or intertwined antecedents, with certify one
extra bit of information graces the deduction: the annotation on the input
variable (here represented as i)! It is thus known (thanks to the oracle-nature
of the verification procedure used) that one branch will execute if i turns out
to be trusted, and the other if its integrity is found to be lacking. Armed
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with this knowledge, the following annotation expression for the entire com-
bination may be constructed: i · c+ i · d. It is not hard to verify that if i = T
then the expression reduces to c (the trustedness of the first alternative P),
and to d if i = U. (This construct has been independently proposed else-
where in different circumstances; see Wright (1992, Section 6.1.4) and Wright
(1991, Section 6.2)). This is of course the same reasoning that was utilised
in the certify rule for System TFO′pi≤, applied to process trustedness instead
of security levels.
The final context in a certify expression is also worth examining. The
channel x appears under the context of the overall process (i · c + i · d) just
as in an input or output form. When combining the contexts of the two
branches (C1 and C2) there is again a little more flexibility than simply
requiring the images of any names in the intersection of the domains match;
see Definition 3.6.3 for the details of how the same expression is used to
construct a new context (C1V 〈i〉C2V , in a similar fashion to the annotation).
3.6.3 Typed Labelled-Transition-Semantics
The typed transition semantics are extended in the logical way. They are
more or less the same as those for the vanilla system that appeared earlier
in Section 2.3.3, with the types altered as necessary and additional cases for
certify reduction. They appear in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, with the simpler
(predominantly structural) cases presented first, followed by the significantly
more complicated cases involving the base communication cases. The num-
ber of side-conditions imposed on the base cases appears over-whelming, but
correspond directly to the corresponding conditions in the type rules. Note
that input and output (and certify, with a few extra cases dealing with co-
ercion) are nearly identical, with respect to symmetry in the consequent.
This is to be expected, as an input involves a corresponding output in the
anonymous process, and vica-versa.
The communication cases all encode the subset of names transferred be-
tween environments, and indicate (∃C′′′1 ⊆ C′′1) that the contexts transfered
may be a subset if some arguments do not bind anything (technically this is
true of the environments as well, but the weaken rule ensures that an extra
name inadvertently added to an environment doesn’t affect the typing).
3.6.4 Comparison between Security Levels and Pro-
cess Trustedness
The reader may have noticed that the form and treatment of the process
annotations in the rules of System THOpi≤ are very similar to the security levels
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〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R P ≡α Q
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
(alp.)
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P{−→K/−→V }〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1, (−→V )P〈−→K 〉〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
(app.)
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1 ∪ C′′1,P + Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
(sum.)
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R BN (µ) ∩ FN (Q) = ∅
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1 ∪ C′′1,P|Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1 ∪ C′′1,P′|R(Q)〉 certify R
(comp.)
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1, !P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1 ∪ C1,P′|R(!P)〉 certify R
(rep.)
〈Θ|C2,Γx ∪ {x : σb}|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′x ∪ {x : σb}|C′1,P′〉 certify R
x /∈ FN (µ) ∪ BN (µ) x /∈ domC2
〈Θx|C2,Γx|C1x, (νx : σb)P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′x|C′2,Γ′x|C′1x, (νx : σb)P′〉 certify R
(res .)
〈Θ|C2,Γw ∪ {w : σb}|C1,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→K ]−−−−−→
〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′w ∪ {w : σb}|C′1,P′〉 certify R




−−→z w /∈ domC2
〈Θw|C2,Γw|C1w, (νw : σb)P〉 (νw
−→z )x[−→K ]−−−−−−→
〈Θ′w|C′2,Γ′w|C′1w, (νw : σb)P′〉 certify R
(open)
Figure 3.9: Typed Labelled Transition Semantics for System THOpi≤










Γ′ ⊆ Γ dom⋃−→Γ′ = FN(−→K)
∀x ∈ C.
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Θ′ ⊆ Θ dom⋃−→Θ′ = FN(−→K)
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V }〉 certify Id
(inp.)
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→K ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify Id
〈Γ|C1,Θ|C2,Q〉 x(
−→
K)−−−→ 〈Γ′|C′1,Θ′|C′2,Q〉 certify R −→z /∈ FN (Q)
〈∆|C3,Γ ∪Θ|C1 ∪ C2P|Q〉 τ−→
〈R(∆|C3),R(Γ′ ∪Θ′|C′1 ∪ C′2),R(P′|Q′)〉 certify R
(comm.)
Γ(x) = (σi)e certify(K) = T R = Id[i := T]
Θ′ `CHO≤ K : σf ;C′2 Θ′ ⊆ Θ domΘ′ = FN (K)
∀V ∈ domC′2.C′2(V ) ≤B f ∀x ∈ C.C′2T(x) ≥B b = i · c+ i · d
σf ≤ σi C′′2 = C′2, chans(K) : b ∃C′′′2 ⊆ C′′2
〈Θ|C2 ∪ C′′2,Γ|C′1 〈i〉 C′′1 ∪ {x : b}, x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q〉
x(K)−−−→
〈R(Θ|C2),R(Γ ∪Θ′|C′1 ∪ C′′′2 ),R(P{K/V })〉 certify R
(cert − T )
Γ(x) = (σi)e certify(K) = U R = Id[i := U]
Θ′ `CHO≤ K : σf ;C′2 Θ′ ⊆ Θ domΘ′ = FN (K)
∀V ∈ domC′2.C′2(V ) ≤B f ∀x ∈ C.C′2T(x) ≥B b = i · c+ i · d
σf ≤ σi C′′2 = C′2, chans(K) : b ∃C′′′2 ⊆ C′′2
〈Θ|C2 ∪ C′′2,Γ|C′1 〈i〉 C′′1 ∪ {x : b}, x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q〉
x(K)−−−→
〈R(Θ|C2),R(Γ ∪Θ′|C′′1 ∪ C′′′2 ),R(Q{K/V })〉 certify R
(cert − U )
Figure 3.10: Typed Labelled Transition Semantics for System
THOpi≤(continued)
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in the rules of System TFO′pi≤. The differences are fairly subtle; there is no
notion of process identity in the first-order system, so assigning a trustedness
level would not make sense. The main difference is that the security levels
are channel-oriented, whereas the process annotations are process-oriented.
That is, a security level states that all channels used must be at least as safe
as the security level, and thus ensures that a process typed at a high security
level cannot be affected by channels of a lower integrity.
The process annotations have a different focus. Firstly, since processes
can be transmitted it is logical that they may become corrupted, and hence
should have an integrity level associated. They are an experiment to see if
security can be enforced on a process-level, rather than a channel level: the
intent is that processes should be able to use untrusted channels to com-
municate, but that untrusted processes should not be able to affect trusted
processes. A possible change to the rules would be to include similar con-
ditions to those in System TFO′pi≤; such that a trusted process can only use
trusted channels. This view seems overly restrictive, and would detract from
the current experiment.
3.7 Discussion
In this Chapter four related type systems were presented to implement the
ideas of this thesis:
• System TFOpi: A system of type annotations enforces the separation of
trusted and untrusted data, even in the presence of dynamic topologies.
The certify addition to the language enables safe coercion of integrity
levels, based on the results of run-time verification checks.
• System TFOpi≤: An extension of the previous system that allows a form
of sub-typing based on channel annotations. This admits the possibility
of write-down (trusted names may be written to untrusted channels),
but the type system prevents the reverse from occurring.
• System TFO′pi≤: A further extension that incorporates a security level
on a derivation, to guarantee that channels of an integrity lower than
this level cannot affect a reduction.
• System THOpi≤: A system, incorporating a similar type system and
certify construct, built on the higher-order pi-calculus to enable easier
reasoning about mobile code.
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For the remainder of this dissertation no mention will be made of Sys-
tem TFOpi≤, as it was primarily used as a development vehicle to introduce
sub-typing prior to incorporating security levels as well.
3.7.1 Relation to Existing Work
It is useful before proceeding to examine some of the work mentioned in
Chapter 1 again in light of the systems presented here.
The closest in approach to safe coercion was the work on Robust Declassi-
fication by Myers et al. (2004). This obviously has many common viewpoints
to the work presented in this thesis: the main points of difference appear to
be the implications for the programmer, and that their work is primarily
a static analysis with a reduced emphasis on run-time checks. While there
is support for run-time checks in Myers and Liskov (1997), its usage in a
secrecy setting is tricky as the failure of a check can still leak information,
in a similar manner to that of a failed password check. From a program-
mer’s perspective it is possible that an operator with explicit reference to a
verification procedure might be easier to understand than operators such as
declassify/endorse which appear to require more of an understanding of
the underlying information flow, but this is perhaps a difficult comparison to
make give the slightly different perspectives of each system.
While the systems TFOpi, TFO′pi≤, and THOpi≤ have no concept of a region
explicitly, as contained in Confined-λ (Kirli 2001), it would appear that the
execution contexts of system THOpi≤ have a similar role. If trustedness levels
of processes are seen as regions (with untrusted contained in trusted), then
contexts enforce the property that no process will communicate (modulo a
prior use of the sub-type rule) with a process of a different trustedness level.
A similar by more fine-grained approach (to that of Confined-λ) was
offered by Yoshida and Hennessy (2000), using interfaces restricting the ca-
pabilities of names, and in an extension using dependent types to type ab-
stractions. This is a very interesting, and very powerful, idea. System THOpi≤
takes a different approach, again based on the execution contexts, in which
rather than rejecting an application of a process to another based on inter-
face, the formation of the abstraction (and an input) is constrained based on
its trustedness and contextual information, and the external context. That







σc `CHO≤ P : Procb;C ∀V ∈
−→











the clause ∀V ∈ −→V .CT(V ) ≥B b requires that the context of any name
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bound is at least as safe as the trustedness of the process being abstracted;
this, together with a complementary clause ∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B b regarding
the context of names in the “argument” to the abstraction ensures that an
application will not decrease in integrity. In some regard therefore, a context
may be regarded as interface for a process, however it is not as fine-grained
as that in Yoshida and Hennessy (2000).
An extension to the work of Yoshida and Hennessy (2000) was presented
by Vivas and Yoshida (2002), using dynamic filters. The filter operator
clearly resembles a localised and dynamic version of C (or alternatively
even a simple version of certify, with predefined behaviour per name and
no branching capability), and as such this work, along with that on declas-
sification, probably bears the closest resemblance to that of this thesis. It
would be interesting to see what other comparisons may be drawn, and to
see if a union might be made between the screening operator and certify: for
example, it would be interesting to add trustedness information to the filters
(so that for example a reduction may only occur if the object of the action
exists in the filter with the correct I/O usage, and is at least as safe as the
specified trustedness). Whether coercion can fit in the framework is another
intriguing question.
Chapter 4
Safety of the Type Systems
There are two components to demonstrating the safety of the systems: a
demonstration of type soundness, in other words that types are preserved
under reduction, and a security property. The first is shown by subject
reduction, and as will be seen this is not as straight-forward as might be
expected, due to the presence of run-time coercion. The security property
for the first-order system is a guarantee of non-interference: essentially, if a
system is well-typed then no low-integrity name can interfere — by changing
the behaviour — of a process typed at a higher level. For the higher-order
systems an alternative perspective based on observability defined by the se-
curity policy is adopted. If a process is typed as trusted after the final rule, it
should never be able to evolve such that an untrusted sub-process is capable
of communication (that is, is guarded with one of the names in the external
context) with the host.
Subject reduction is presented in two stages; firstly a theorem showing
that a single-step reduction preserves typing, and secondly a corollary demon-
strating that the corresponding multi-step reduction is similarly safe.
Results are presented for only three out of the four systems presented in
Chapter 3. System TFOpi only has type-soundness demonstrated, as it is not a
security system. Results for System TFOpi≤ are not included here, as it is not
a security system and its soundness results are contained in System TFO′pi≤
(the reader is referred to Lemma 3.5.2 on Page 62). Full results for both type
soundness and security are described for Systems TFO′pi≤ and THOpi≤.
4.1 Safety of System TFOpi
As mentioned previously, soundness of the type systems is proven by a
demonstration that types are preserved under reductions. This is achieved
86
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in two parts; a substitution lemma, and the subject reduction theorem itself.
In this Section and those that follow, the result statements — and where
applicable, the proofs — will ignore the conversion type rule, as it has no
affect on any part of the environment, etc. This is purely for reasons of
clarity in the statements, to avoid having to repeat each result for the two
different forms of deduction.
4.1.1 Substitution Lemma
The substitution lemma for system TFOpi is quite standard; it states that a
well-formed process remains well-formed when a variable is replaced with
another of a similar type.
Lemma 4.1.1 (Substitution Lemma) If there is a valid deduction
Γxy, x : σ
b `FO P : Proc
in System TFOpi, then there is also a valid deduction for
Γxy, y : σ
b `FO P {y/x} : Proc
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γxy, x : σ
b `FO P : Proc.
• Zero: The axiom as it appears in the rules
∅ `(FO) 0 : Proc
is not in the form required (with the domain of the environment con-
taining x), however if the environment is extended using the weaken
rule it may be noted that by Definition 2.2.6 0{y/x} = 0 for every x
and y as required.
• Weaken: the rule has the form
Γ `FO P : Proc z /∈ domΓ ` σ′c
Γ, z : σ′c `FO P : Proc
Assuming Γ = Γ′xy, x : σ
b for some Γ′, then by the induction hypothesis
Γ′xy, y : σ
b `FO P{y/x} : Proc is valid. Hence by the weaken rule
Γ′xy, y : σ
b, z : σ′c `FO P{y/x} : Proc is also valid, noting that z 6= x, y
by the clause in the weaken rule.
• Replication: by the induction hypothesis on the antecedent and the
replication rule.
CHAPTER 4. SAFETY OF THE TYPE SYSTEMS 88
• Summation: the rule has the form
Γ `(FO) P : Proc Θ `(FO) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `(FO) P + Q : Proc
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for both the antecedents
individually, that is
Γ′xy, y : σ
b `FO P{y/x} : Proc and Θ′xy, y : σb `FO Q{y/x} : Proc
where Γ = Γ′xy, x : σ
b and Θ = Θ′xy, x : σ
b for some Γ′ and Θ′. Hence
by the summation rule and the definition of substitution,
Γ′xy,Θ
′
xy, y : σ
b `FO (P + Q) {y/x} : Proc
as required.
• Composition: similarly.
• Restriction: by the induction hypothesis, noting that due to the as-
sumption of Barendregt’s Convention (Page 21) and the statement
which has y free in the consequent the case where x or y is the re-
stricted name need not be considered.
• Conversion: trivial, by the induction hypothesis.
• Output: The rule has the form
Γ, w : (
−→
σ′d)c,−→z : −→σ′d `FO P : Proc
Γ, w : (
−→
σ′d)c,−→z : −→σ′d `(FO) w[−→z ].P : Proc
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent, in
other words assuming Γ = Γ′xy, x : σ
b then Γ′xy, y : σ
b, w : (
−→
σ′d)c,−→z :−→
σ′d `FO P{y/x} : Proc is valid. There are three cases to consider in
the consequent; x and y distinct from w and −→z , x = w, and x ∈ −→z
(note that due to the lack of recursive types the case where both x = w
and x ∈ −→z cannot occur). The first holds easily by the output rule.
The second case follows the use of induction hypothesis to give Γ′xy, y :
(
−→
σ′d)c,−→z : −→σ′d `FO y[−→z ].P{y/x} : Proc, recalling from Definition 2.2.6
that (x[−→z ].P){y/x} = y[−→z ].(P){y/x}){y/x} when x /∈ −→z . The third
case follows similarly.
• Input: Similarly (noting that by the statement x or y cannot appear
in the bound input names).
CHAPTER 4. SAFETY OF THE TYPE SYSTEMS 89
• Certify: Similarly, noting that the bound name cannot be x or y.
2




σb `FO P : Proc




σb `FO P {−→y /−→x } : Proc
is also a valid deduction.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1.1 (the Substitution Lemma). 2
4.1.2 Subject Reduction
The subject reduction theorem for system TFOpi is also moderately familiar,
with one addition. Because it is possible for coercion to occur during a
reduction (that involves certify), the environment in the consequent may
not be identical to that before the reduction (as is commonly the case in
subject reduction). This quandary is solved by making the environment
in the consequent the same, modulo a substitution on annotations. This
substitution is precisely defined by the reduction path, and represents exactly
each coercion that occurred as a result of certify. It is exactly that defined
by the typed labelled transition semantics of Figure 3.3.
The majority of the proof is contained in a lemma over this definition,
before the main result is presented.
Lemma 4.1.3 If there is a valid deduction Γ `FO P : Proc in System TFOpi,
and a reduction such that
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
then there is a valid deduction
R(Γ ∪Θ) `FO R(P′) : Proc
Note that both environments are used in the second reduction, to incorporate
any names acquired (such as via an input) from the anonymous process.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
and on the deduction Γ `FO P : Proc.
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• Output: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ∪{−→y :
−→
σb}, x[−→y ].P〉 x[





and from the statement Γ,−→y : −→σb `(FO) x[−→y ].P : Proc. This deduction
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an application of the output type rule with antecedent




σb `FO P : Proc
(where Γ′′, x : (
−→
σb)c is a subset of Γ). Then by as many applications of
the weaken rule as necessary,
Θ,Γ,−→y :
−→
σb `(FO) P : Proc
as required (observing that the substitution generated is the identity
substitution).
• Input: The rule states
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ, x(−→z : −→σb).P〉 x(
−→y )−−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},P{−→y /−→z }〉 certify Id
and from the statement, Γ `(FO) x(−→z :
−→
σb).P : Proc. This deduction
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an application of the input type rule with antecedent




σb `FO P : Proc
(where Γ′′−→z , x : (
−→
σb)c is a subset of Γ). By the corollary to the substi-
tution lemma (Corollary 4.1.2) then,




σb `FO P{−→y /−→z } : Proc
Then by as many applications of the weaken rule as necessary,
Θ,Γ,−→y :
−→
σb `(FO) P : Proc
as required (observing that the substitution generated is the identity
substitution).
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• Communication: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify Id
〈Γ,Θ,Q〉 x(
−→y )−−−→ 〈Γ′,Θ′,Q〉 certify R −→z /∈ FN (Q)
〈∆,Γ ∪Θ,P|Q〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′ ∪Θ,P′|Q′〉 certify R
From the statement, Γ,Θ `FO P|Q : Proc. This deduction must have
ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by an instance
of the composition rule with antecedents
Γ′′ `FO P : Proc
and Θ′′ `FO Q : Proc
where Γ′′ and Θ′′ are subsets of Γ and Θ respectively. Then by as many
applications of the weaken rule as necessary:
Γ `FO P : Proc
and Θ `FO Q : Proc
and so by the antecedents and the induction hypothesis (cases for out-
put and input/certify)
Γ `FO P′ : Proc
and R(Θ `FO Q′ : Proc)
(noting that the substitution in the first instance is the identity substi-
tution). Hence by the composition rule
R(Γ,Θ `FO P′|Q′ : Proc)
as required.
• Summation: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ,Γ,P + Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; that is
R(Θ,Γ `FO P′ : Proc)
Hence the result holds directly for the summation case as well.
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• Composition: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R BN (µ) ∩ FN (Q) = ∅
〈Θ,Γ,P|Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′|Q〉 certify R
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; that is
R(Θ,Γ `FO P′ : Proc)
From the statement The rule states Γ `FO P|Q : Proc, the deduction
of which much have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule,
preceded by an application of the composition rule with antecedents
Γ1 `FO P : Proc and Γ2 `FO Q : Proc, where Γ1 and Γ2 are both
subsets of Γ. Hence since Γ2 is a subset of Γ, by the composition rule
and the induction hypothesis result holds for Θ,Γ `FO P′|Q : Proc as
required.
• Replication: similarly.
• Open: By the induction hypothesis and the reduction case and type
rule for restriction.
• Certify as trusted: The rule states
certify(z) = T R = Id[i := T]
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b}, x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q〉 x(z)−−→
〈R(Θ),R(Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b, z : σT}),R(P{z/y})〉
and from the statement Γ∪{x : (σi)b} `(FO) x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc. This
deduction must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule,
preceded by an application of the certify rule with antecedents Γ1, x :
(σi)b, y : σT `FO P : Proc and Γ2, x : (σi)b, y : σU `FO Q : Proc where
Γ1 and Γ2 are subsets of Γ and y /∈ domΓ. Then by the substitution
lemma (Lemma 4.1.1) Γ1, x : (σ
i)b, z : σT `FO P{z/y} : Proc, and
hence if R = Id[i := T] then by as many applications of the weaken
rule as necessary,
R(Θ,Γ, x : (σi)b `FO P{z/y} : Proc)
as required.
• Certify as untrusted: similarly.
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2
The main result can now be stated as a refinement of this lemma to
internal reductions only:
Theorem 4.1.4 (Subject Reduction) If there is a valid deduction Γ `FO
P : Proc in System TFOpi, and an internal reduction such that
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
then there is a valid deduction
R(Γ) `FO R(P′) : Proc
Proof. By Lemma 4.1.3, observing that the reduction must contain a use of
the communication case (to construct an internal action, before any possible
uses of the structural cases). 2
A simple corollary of this states that types are preserved under multiple
reduction steps (modulo, of course, the coercions involved in the reduction
path).
Corollary 4.1.5 (Multi-Step Subject Reduction) If there is a valid de-
duction Γ `FO P : Proc in System TFOpi, and an internal reduction path such
that
〈∆,Γ,P〉
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R
then there is a valid deduction
R(Γ) `FO R(P′′) : Proc
Proof. By induction on the reduction path, using the subject reduction
Theorem (4.1.4).
Assume the reduction path is derived as follows:
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉 certify R 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R′
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R;R′
Then by Theorem 4.1.4 (subject reduction) R(Γ) `FO R(P′) : Proc, and by
the induction hypothesis the corollary holds for 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify
R′ as well; that is R′(R(Γ)) `FO R′(R(P′′)) : Proc. Hence corollary holds for
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R;R′ (recalling that R′(R(Γ)) = R;R′(Γ) as
required). 2
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4.2 Safety of System TFO′pi≤
4.2.1 Substitution Lemma
The Substitution Lemma for System TFO′pi≤ is more or less unchanged from
the base statement for System TFOpi in Section 4.1.1 with the only major
difference being a slight relaxation, in the form of a subtype constraint, on
the type of the substitute name. This causes very little difficulty in the
proofs; the construction of guarded processes are the only times at which
extra care must be taken, and in general the observation that transitivity of
≤B ensures the security constraint is satisfied by a subtype is sufficient.
Lemma 4.2.1 (Substitution Lemma) If there is a valid deduction
Γxy, x : σ
b `cFO′≤ P : Proc
in System TFO′pi≤, then there is also a valid deduction for
Γxy, y : σ
b′ `cFO′≤ P {y/x} : Proc
where σb
′ ≤ σb.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γxy, x : σ
b `cFO′≤ P : Proc.
• Zero: The axiom as it appears in the rules
∅ `c
(FO′≤) 0 : Proc
is not in the form required (with the domain of the environment con-
taining x), however if the environment is extended using the weaken
rule it may be noted that (by Definition 2.2.6) 0{y/x} = 0 for every x
and y as required.
• Weaken: The rule has the form
Γ `cFO′≤ P : Proc z /∈ domΓ ` σ′d
Γ, z : σ′d `c
FO′≤ P : Proc
Assuming Γ = Γ′xy, x : σ
b for some Γ′, then by the induction hypothesis
Γ′xy, y : σ
b `cFO′≤ P{y/x} : Proc is valid. Hence by the weaken rule
Γ′xy, y : σ
b′ , z : σ′d `cFO′≤ P{y/x} : Proc is also valid given σb
′ ≤ σb,
noting that z 6= x, y by the clause in the weaken rule.
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• Replication: By the induction hypothesis on the antecedent and the
replication rule.
• Summation: The rule has the form
Γ `c(FO′≤) P : Proc Θ `c(FO′≤) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `c
(FO′≤) P + Q : Proc
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for both the antecedents
individually, that is
Γ′xy, y : σ
b′ `cFO′≤ P{y/x} : Proc and Θ′xy, y : σb
′ `cFO′≤ Q{y/x} : Proc
where Γ = Γ′xy, x : σ
b and Θ = Θ′xy, x : σ
b for some Γ′ and Θ′, and σb
′ ≤
σb. Hence by the summation rule and the definition of substitution,
Γ′xy,Θ
′
xy, y : σ
b′ `cFO′≤ (P + Q) {y/x} : Proc
as required.
• Composition: Similarly.
• Restriction: By the induction hypothesis, noting that due to the as-
sumption of Barendregt’s Convention (Page 21) and the statement
which has y free in the consequent the case where x or y is the re-
stricted name need not be considered.
• Conversion: Trivial, by the induction hypothesis.
• Output: The rule has the form





′ `eFO′≤ P : Proc
−→
σ′c
′ ≤ −→σc e ≤B d







−→z ].P : Proc
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent, in
other words assuming Γ = Γ′xy, x : σ
b then Γ′xy, y : σ




′ `eFO′≤ P{y/x} : Proc is valid. There are three cases to consider
in the consequent; x and y distinct from w and −→z , x = w, and
x ∈ −→z (note that due to the lack of recursive types the case where
both x = w and x ∈ −→z cannot occur). The first holds easily by the
output rule, observing that by definition σb
′ ≤ σb implies b ≤B b′,
and hence by transitivity of ≤B the requirement that e ≤B b′ is main-
tained. The second case follows the use of induction hypothesis to give
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)d,−→z : −→σ′c `eFO′≤ y[−→z ].P{y/x} : Proc, recalling from Defini-
tion 2.2.6 that (x[−→z ].P){y/x} = y[−→z ].(P){y/x}){y/x} when x /∈ −→z .
The third case follows similarly, observing that transitivity of ≤ means
the subtype condition is preserved.
• Input: Similarly (noting that by the statement x or y cannot appear
in the bound input names).
• Certify: Similarly, noting that the bound name cannot be x or y.
2




σb `cFO′≤ P : Proc








′ `cFO′≤ P {−→y /−→x } : Proc
is also a valid deduction.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2.1 (the Substitution Lemma). 2
4.2.2 Subject Reduction
Like the substitution lemma, the statement of the subject reduction theorem
is similar to the corresponding result for System TFOpi, with the added need
to consider sub-typing and the security level.
The presentation is also similar; the majority of the proof is contained in
a lemma, with the main result using this lemma.
Lemma 4.2.3 If there is a valid deduction Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc in System TFO′pi≤,
and a reduction such that
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R




Note that both environments are used in the second reduction, to incorporate
any names acquired (such as via an input) from the anonymous process.
Similarly for R(Γ ∪Θ) `R(b)
(FO′≤) R(P
′) : Proc
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
and on the deduction Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc.
• Output: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ∪{−→y :
−→
σb}, x[−→y ].P〉 x[





and from the statement Γ,−→y : −→σb `b(FO′≤) x[−→y ].P : Proc. This deduc-
tion must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded
by an application of the output type rule with antecedent






σb `dFO′≤ P : Proc
(where Γ′′, x : (
−→






). Then by as
many applications of the weaken rule as necessary,
Θ,Γ,−→y :
−→
σb `d(FO′≤) P : Proc
as required (observing that the substitution generated is the identity
substitution).
• Input: The rule states
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ, x(−→z : −→σb).P〉 x(
−→y )−−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σb},P{−→y /−→z }〉 certify Id
and from the statement, Γ `d(FO′≤) x(−→z :
−→
σb).P : Proc. This deduction
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an application of the input type rule with antecedent





′ `dFO′≤ P : Proc
(where Γ′′−→z , x : (
−→






, and d ≤B c). By
the corollary to the substitution lemma (Corollary 4.2.2) then, given−→
σb
′′ ≤ −→σb,





′′ `bFO′≤ P{−→y /−→z } : Proc
Then by as many applications of the weaken rule as necessary,
Θ,Γ,−→y :
−→
σb `b(FO′≤) P{−→y /−→z } : Proc
as required (observing that the substitution generated is the identity
substitution).
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• Communication: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 (ν
−→z )x[−→y ]−−−−−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify Id
〈Γ,Θ,Q〉 x(
−→y )−−−→ 〈Γ′,Θ′,Q〉 certify R −→z /∈ FN (Q)
〈∆,Γ ∪Θ,P|Q〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′ ∪Θ,P′|Q′〉 certify R
From the statement, Γ,Θ `bFO′≤ P|Q : Proc. This deduction must have
ended in zero or more uses of the weaken and sub-typing rules, preceded
by an instance of the composition rule with antecedents
Γ′′ `c′FO′≤ P : Proc
and Θ′′ `d′FO′≤ Q : Proc
where Γ′′ and Θ′′ are subsets of Γ and Θ respectively, and c′·d′ = b′ ≥B b.
Then by as many applications of the weaken and sub-typing rules as
necessary:
Γ `cFO′≤ P : Proc
and Θ `dFO′≤ Q : Proc
and so by the antecedents and the induction hypothesis (cases for out-
put and input/certify)
Γ `cFO′≤ P′ : Proc
and R(Θ `dFO′≤ Q′ : Proc)
(noting that the substitution in the first instance is the identity substi-
tution). Hence by the composition rule
R(Γ,Θ `bFO′≤ P′|Q′ : Proc)
where b = c · d as required.
• Summation: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ,Γ,P + Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; that is
R(Θ,Γ `bFO′≤ P′ : Proc)
Hence the result holds directly for the summation case as well.
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• Composition: The rule states
〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R BN (µ) ∩ FN (Q) = ∅
〈Θ,Γ,P|Q〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′|Q〉 certify R
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; that is
R(Θ,Γ `bFO′≤ P′ : Proc)
From the statement Γ `bcFO′≤ P|Q : Proc, the deduction of which much
have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by an
application of the composition rule with antecedents Γ1 `bFO′≤ P : Proc
and Γ2 `cFO′≤ Q : Proc, where Γ1 and Γ2 are both subsets of Γ. Hence
since Γ2 is a subset of Γ, by the composition rule and the induction
hypothesis result holds for Θ,Γ `bcFO′≤ P′|Q : Proc as required.
• Replication: Similarly.
• Open: By the induction hypothesis, the case for output, and the type
rule for restriction.
• Certify as trusted: The rule states
certify(z) = T R = Id[i := T]
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b}, x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q〉 x(z)−−→
〈R(Θ),R(Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b, z : σT}),R(P{z/y})〉
and from the statement Γ ∪ {x : (σi)b} `ic+id
(FO′≤) x(y) ?certifyP ⊕ Q : Proc.
This deduction must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken
rule, followed by an application of the certify rule with antecedents
Γ1, x : (σ
i)b, y : σT `cFO′≤ P : Proc and Γ2, x : (σi)b, y : σU `dFO′≤
Q : Proc where Γ1 and Γ2 are subsets of Γ, y /∈ domΓ, and c ≤B b,
d ≤B b. Then by the substitution lemma (Lemma 4.2.1) Γ1, x : (σi)b, z :
σT `bFO′≤ P{z/y} : Proc, and hence if R = Id[i := T] then by as many
applications of the weaken rule as necessary,
R(Θ,Γ, x : (σi)b `cFO′≤ P{z/y} : Proc)
as required.
• Certify as untrusted: Similarly.
2
The main result can now be stated as a refinement of this lemma to
internal reductions only:
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Theorem 4.2.4 (Subject Reduction) If there is a valid deduction
Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc
in System TFO′pi≤, and an internal reduction such that
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉 certify R




Proof. By Lemma 4.2.3, observing that the reduction must contain a use of
the communication case (to construct an internal action, before any possible
uses of the structural cases). 2
A simple corollary of this states that types are preserved under multiple
reduction steps (modulo, of course, the coercions involved in the reduction
path).
Corollary 4.2.5 (Multi-Step Subject Reduction) If there is a valid de-
duction Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc in System TFO′pi≤, and an internal reduction path
such that
〈∆,Γ,P〉
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R
then there is a valid deduction
R(Γ) `bFO′≤ R(P′′) : Proc
Proof. By induction on the reduction path, using the subject reduction
Theorem (4.2.4).
Assume the reduction path is derived as follows:
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ−→ 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉 certify R 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R′
〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R;R′
Then by Theorem 4.2.4 (subject reduction) R(Γ) `bFO′≤ R(P′) : Proc, and by
the induction hypothesis the corollary holds for 〈∆,Γ′,P′〉
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify
R′ as well; that is R′(R(Γ)) `bFO′≤ R′(R(P′′)) : Proc. Hence corollary holds
for 〈∆,Γ,P〉 τ
−→τ− 〈∆,Γ′′,P′′〉 certify R;R′ (recalling that R′(R(Γ)) = R;R′(Γ)
as required). 2
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4.2.3 Security Properties
The security property presented here is a form of non-interference; that low-
integrity channels cannot disrupt (for example, by blocking) a process typed
at a higher integrity level. The precise formation of the property is Strong
Non-deterministic Non-Interference or SNNI (Focardi and Gorrieri 1995).
Essentially, it states that for every trace derivable for a process typed at a
certain level, the trace obtained by removing all labels with a lower integrity
is also a valid trace.
For example, consider the process x.x.0|y.0, where x is trusted and y is
untrusted. Traces possible for this process include xyx and yxx. Note that
for each of these the trace obtained by removing the untrusted label y, giving
xx in both cases, is also a valid trace. Conversely the process x.y.x.0 does
not satisfy this property, as the trace xx (derived by deleting y from xyx
again) is not valid.
There are three steps in the proof of this property for System TFO′pi≤:
the proof of a stronger single-step property that no labels with a trustedness
lower than the security level of the process in question can exist in any trace,
followed by the corresponding multi-step proof, and lastly the proof of SNNI
which is a simple consequence of the stronger result.
Firstly, the single-step result. Note the formation of the final clause in the
statement, which combines both environments and incorporates the coercion
substitution. An alternative presentation such as Γ′(‖µ‖) might be just as
accurate, but more cumbersome to prove. It is also unnecessary in the single
step result to combine the environments as the channel used must be present
in Γ for the action to take place, but it is presented this way for consistency
with the multi-step result which does require the combination.
Theorem 4.2.6 For any valid deduction Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc in System TFO′pi≤,
for each action µ 6= τ such that 〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R there is
some σc with c ≥B b such that R(Γ ∪Θ)(‖µ‖) = σc.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈Θ,Γ,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R,
and by cases on the derivation of Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc.
There are four main cases that need to be considered; those for input,
output, and coercion as trusted and untrusted. The remaining structural
induction rules of alpha-congruence, summation, composition, restriction,
replication, and open largely follow by the induction hypothesis. The rule
for communication need not be considered as it generates an anonymous
action of τ .
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• Input: by definition,
〈Θ ∪ {−→z : −→σd},Γ, x(−→y : −→σd).P〉 x(
−→z )−−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→z : −→σd},Γ ∪ {−→z : −→σd},P{−→z /−→y }〉 certify Id
From the statement,
Γ `bFO′≤ x(−→y ).P : Proc
This deduction must have ended in a use of the input rule, followed
by zero or more uses of the relaxation and weaken rules. Since weaken
doesn’t affect the types, and transitivity of ≤B ensures that the relax-
ation rule doesn’t affect the requirements on the guard annotations, the
most pertinent is the input rule, which must have had the antecedent












, and importantly b′ ≤B c. Hence (Γ ∪ Θ)(x) = (
−→
σd)c,
and since any use of the relaxation rule means b ≤B b′, transitivity
implies b ≤B c as required.
• Output: by definition,
〈Θ,Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σd}, x[−→y ].P〉 x[
−→y ]−−→
〈Θ ∪ {−→y : −→σd},Γ ∪ {−→y : −→σd},P〉 certify Id
From the statement,
Γ `bFO′≤ x[−→y ].P : Proc
This deduction must have ended in a use of the output rule, followed
by zero or more uses of the relaxation and weaken rules. Since weaken
doesn’t affect the types, and transitivity of ≤B ensures that the relax-
ation rule doesn’t affect the requirements on the guard annotations, the
most pertinent is the output rule, which must have had the antecedent









′ ≤ −→σb, and importantly b′ ≤B c. Hence (Γ ∪ Θ)(x) = (
−→
σd)c,
and since any use of the relaxation rule means b ≤B b′, transitivity
implies b ≤B c as required.
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• Certify as trusted: by definition,
Γ(x) = (σi)b certify(z) = T R = Id[i := T]
〈Θ,Γ, x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q〉 x(z)−−→
〈R(Θ),R(Γ ∪ {z : σT}),R(P{z/y})〉
From the statement,
Γ `bFO′≤ x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
This deduction must have ended in a use of the certify rule, followed
by zero or more uses of the relaxation and weaken rules. Since weaken
doesn’t affect the types, and transitivity of ≤B ensures that the relax-
ation rule doesn’t affect the requirements on the guard annotations,
the most pertinent is the certify rule, which has the form
Γ1y, x : (σ
i)c, y : σT `dFO′≤ P : Proc d ≤B c
Γ2y, x : (σ
i)c, y : σU `eFO′≤ Q : Proc e ≤B c
Γ1y,Γ2y, x : (σ
i)c `id+ie
(FO′≤) x(y : σ
i) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
where b′ = id + ie and Γ = Γ1y,Γ2y, x : (σi)c. Then R(Γ ∪ Θ)(x) =
R((σi)c), so applying the substitution through, R(b) = R(id + ie) =
R(d) and by the type rule above, R(d) ≤B R(c) as required.
• Certify as untrusted: by definition,
Γ(x) = (σi)b certify(z) = U R = Id[i := U]
〈Θ,Γ, x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q〉 x(z)−−→
〈R(Θ),R(Γ ∪ {z : σT}),R(Q{z/y})〉
From the statement,
Γ `bFO′≤ x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
This deduction must have ended in a use of the certify rule, followed
by zero or more uses of the relaxation and weaken rules. Since weaken
doesn’t affect the types, and transitivity of ≤B ensures that the relax-
ation rule doesn’t affect the requirements on the guard annotations,
the most pertinent is the certify rule, which has the form
Γ1y, x : (σ
i)c, y : σT `dFO′≤ P : Proc d ≤B c
Γ2y, x : (σ
i)c, y : σU `eFO′≤ Q : Proc e ≤B c
Γ1y,Γ2y, x : (σ
i)c `id+ie
(FO′≤) x(y : σ
i) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
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where b′ = id + ie and Γ = Γ1y,Γ2y, x : (σi)c. Then R(Γ ∪ Θ)(x) =
R((σi)c), so applying the substitution through, R(b) = R(id + ie) =
R(e) and by the type rule above, R(e) ≤B R(c) as required.
The cases for alpha congruence, summation, replication, restriction, and open
follow directly from the induction hypothesis. The case for composition fol-
lows similarly, noting that the meet (multiplication) condition on the security
levels means the relevant level (of the deduction of the process directly in-
volved in the reduction) may only be relaxed, and hence transitivity of ≤B
again means the result holds. 2
The multi-step extension of this result holds as a trivial extension:
Corollary 4.2.7 For any valid deduction Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc in System TFO′pi≤,
then for each trace 〈Θ,Γ,P〉
−→µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R there is some σc with
c ≥B b such that R(Γ ∪Θ)(‖µ‖) = σc for each label µ ∈ −→µ , µ 6= τ .
Proof. By Theorem 4.2.6 and the induction hypothesis. 2
Finally, the result for Strong Non-deterministic Non-Interference can be
stated. The proof is trivial, as the property is a subset of Corollary 4.2.7.
First, define a refinement of the ordering over annotations:
Definition 4.2.8 For annotations, write b <B c if and only if b ≤B c and
b 6= c. Likewise, define c >B b if and only if b <B c.
Theorem 4.2.9 (Strong Non-deterministic Non-Interference) For any
valid deduction Γ `bFO′≤ P : Proc in System TFO′pi≤, then for each trace
〈Θ,Γ,P〉
−→µ−→ 〈Θ′,Γ′,P′〉 certify R the trace obtained from −→µ by deleting all
labels with integrity c, for c <B b, is also a valid trace.
Proof. By Corollary 4.2.7. 2
4.3 Safety of System THOpi≤
Reflecting the extra complexity of the rules of system THOpi≤, the proofs of
type soundness are also rather more complicated (this is primarily due to the
extra side-conditions required).
Before tackling even the substitution lemma, some additional results con-
cerning contexts will be required.
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4.3.1 Properties of Contexts
The following lemmata are (mostly) trivial properties of contexts that facil-
itate proofs of properties such as subject reduction.
Lemma 4.3.1 (Context Subset)
∀C,C′ ⊆ C.
∧





Proof. Let −→y be the sequence of names given by C ∩ domC. Then since
















b′ , corresponding to
the mappings of −→y and −→y′ in C and C′ respectively). 2
Corollary 4.3.2 (Context Expansion)
∀C, b, y /∈ domC.b ≤B
∧





where C′ = C, y : b.
Proof. Let
V
x∈CCT(x) = c (and from the statement, b ≤B c). Then given





c , if y /∈ C
b · c , if y ∈ C




T(x) as required. 2
The next corollary follows straight-forwardly from the previous result:
Corollary 4.3.3
∀b, c ≥B b,C, y /∈ domC.b =
∧





where C′ = C, y : c.
Lemma 4.3.4 (Context Join)
∀C1  C2.
∧
x ∈ CC1T(x) = b∧
∧
x ∈ CC2T(x) = c⇒
∧
x ∈ C(C1,C2)T(x) = b·c
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Proof. By definition of the comma operator and straightforward induction
on the contents of C1, C2. 2
Corollary 4.3.5 ∀C1  C2.
b1 ≤B
∧
x ∈ CC1T(x) ∧ b2 ≤B
∧
x ∈ CC2T(x)⇒ b1 · b2 ≤B
∧
x ∈ C(C1,C2)T(x)
Proof. Note that by Lemma 4.3.4 this is equivalent to showing that given
b1 ≤B c1 and b2 ≤B c2 then b1 · b2 ≤B c1 · c2 is true, and by Definition 3.4.2
b ≤B c ⇐⇒ b · c = b, so:
b1 · b2 · c1 · c2 = b1 · c1 · b2 · c2
= (b1 · c1) · (b2 · c2)
= b1 · b2
as required. 2
Lemma 4.3.6 If c ≤B c′ and d ≤B d′, then b · c+ b · d ≤B b · c′ + b · d′.
Proof. By Definition 3.4.2, to show b · c+ b · d ≤B b · c′+ b · d′ it is sufficient
to show that (b · c+ b · d) · (b · c′ + b · d′) = b · c+ b · d:
(b · c+ b · d) · (b · c′ + b · d′)
= b · c · (b · c′ + b · d′) + b · d · (b · c′ + b · d′)
= b · c · b · c′ + b · c · b · d′ + b · d · b · c′ + b · d · b · d′
= b · b · c · c′ + b · b · c · d′ + b · b · d · c′ + b · b · d · d′
= b · c · c′ + b · d · d′
= b · c+ b · d
as required (recalling that c · c′ = c and d · d′ = d by the statement). 2









T(x) then b · c′+ b · c′′ ≤BV
x∈C(C
′ 〈b〉 C′′)T(x).
Proof. First note that by simple manipulation
(b · c1 + b · d1) · (b · c2 + b · d2) = b · c1 · c2 + b · d1 · d2
and thus by extension
(b · c1 + b · d1) . . . (b · cn + b · dn) = b · c1 . . . cn + b · d1 . . . dn
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From this observation and Definition 3.6.3 it can be observed that
V
x∈C(C1 〈b〉 C2)T(x) =
b ·
V
x∈CC1T(x) + b ·
V
x∈CC2T(x). Now, by definition of ≤B to show that the





x∈CC2T(x)) = (b · c′ + b · c′′), so:
(b · c′ + b · c′′) · (b ·
∧
x ∈ CC1T(x) + b ·
∧
x ∈ CC2T(x))
= b · c′ · (b ·
∧
x ∈ CC1T(x) + b ·
∧
x ∈ CC2T(x)) +
b · c′′ · (b ·
∧
x ∈ CC1T(x) + b ·
∧
x ∈ CC2T(x))
= b · c′ ·
∧




= b · c′ + b · c′′
as required. 2
Lemma 4.3.8 If Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C and Γ `CHO≤ x[
−→
K ].P : Procb;C′ then
C ⊆ C′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C and by the
output rule. 2
Proposition 4.3.9 (Context Annotation)
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C⇒ b ≤B
∧
x ∈ CCT(x)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C (note that no
case is needed for the Final rule).
• Zero: Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was the zero axiom,
with a consequent
∅ `CHO≤ 0b : Procb; ∅
Then clearly by definition C = ∅ and hence
V
x∈C∅T(x) = T, and b ≤B T
for all b as required.
• Judgement Conversion: Trivial, by the induction hypothesis.
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• Weaken: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the weaken rule:
Γ `CHO≤ A : σb;C `HO≤ σ′c V /∈ domΓ
Γ, V : σ′c `CHO≤ A : σb;C
By the induction hypothesis the result holds in the antecedent, that is
b ≤B
V
x∈CCT(x). Hence noting that the context is unchanged the result
holds in the consequent as well.
• Name Introduction: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the
var-1 axiom:
x : σb `CHO≤ x : σb; ∅
Then the result holds trivially as
V
x∈C∅T(x) = T and b ≤B T for all b
as required.
• Variable Introduction: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of
the var-2 axiom:
X : σb `CHO≤ X : σb;X : b
Then C = {X : b}, so either
V
x∈CCT(x) = T ifX /∈ C, or
V
x∈CCT(x) = b
otherwise, so either b ≤B T or b ≤B b (by reflexivity of ≤B) for all b as
required.
• Replication: Suppose the deduction ended in a use of the replication
rule:
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C
Γ `CHO≤ !P : Procb;C
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent, and
hence noting the context doesn’t change the result holds in the conse-
quent as well.
• Restriction: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the restriction
rule:
Γx, x : σ
c `CHO≤ P : Procb;C x /∈ C
Γx `CHO≤ (νx : σc)P : Procb;Cx
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent, and
hence by the Context Subset Lemma (Lemma 4.3.1) the result holds
for the consequent as well by transitivity of ≤B. (Alternatively, note
the requirement that x /∈ C so from the perspective of C the context
is unchanged, and result holds trivially).
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• Composition: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the com-
position rule:
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1 Θ `CHO≤ Q : Procc;C2
Γ,Θ `CHO≤ P|Q : Procbc;C1,C2
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for each antecedent in-
dividually, that is b ≤B
V
x∈CC1T(x) and c ≤B
V
x∈CC2T(x). Then by




• Abstraction: Suppose the last rule used in the deduction was an in-







σc `CHO≤ P : Procb;C ∀V ∈
−→









By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; b ≤BV
x∈CCT(x). Hence by the Context Subset Lemma (Lemma 4.3.1) and
transitivity of ≤B the result holds for the consequent as well.
• Application: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the appli-
cation rule:























By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the first antecedent,
b ≤B
V
x∈CC1T(x). Then, noting the clause
∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B b
the Context Expansion Corollary (4.3.3) applies so result holds in the
consequent as well.
• Input: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the input rule:
Γ−→
V











′ ∀V ∈ −→V .CT(V ) ≥B d, V /∈ C
Γ−→
V










, x : d
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Then, noting that the context in the consequent is a subset of that
in the antecedent with an additional name at trustedness d, by the
Context Subset Lemma (4.3.1) and the Context Expansion Corollary
(4.3.3) the result holds in the consequent as required.
• Output: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the output rule:












′ ≤ c · −→σd ∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B c ∀C2i, V ∈ domC2i.C2i(V ) ≤B d′i
Γ, x : (c · −→σd)b,−→Γ′ `C(HO≤) x[
−→







By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the first antecedent;
that is c ≤B
V
x∈CC1T(x). Then, noting the clause in the output rule
∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B c (for when K ∈ −→K is an agent) and the context
expansion lemma (4.3.3, for when it is a name), the result holds in the
consequent as well.
• Certify: Suppose the last rule used was an instance of the certify rule:
ΓV , V : σ
T, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P : Procc;C1 C1T(V ) ≥B c
ΘV , V : σ
U, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ Q : Procd;C2 C2T(V ) ≥B d V /∈ C
ΓV ,ΘV , x : (σ
i)e `C(HO≤) x(V ) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proci·c+i·d;
C1V 〈i〉 C2V , x : (i · c+ i · d)
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for both antecedents; that
is c ≤B
V
x∈CC1T(x) and d ≤B
V
x∈CC2T(x). Then by the Context Subset




The substitution lemma may now be presented, and is considerably more
complicated than those of systems TFOpi or TFOpi≤. Most of the side conditions,
however, simply reflect the conditions imposed by the input and output rules
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and the subject reduction theorem will guarantee that all such clauses do in
fact hold.
The general intent of the statement is naturally similar; modulo sub-
typing, a variable may be replaced with one of a similar type whilst preserving
well-formedness of the process. Note that because a variable may be replaced
with a process as well as a name, a separate clause is necessary to introduce
the new object. The portion of the statement C′2 ⊆ C2 in general states that
if no substitution occurs (that is, V /∈ FN (P)), then the statement still holds.
By Lemma 4.3.1 this only affects the overall annotation on the process in a
positive manner.
The various other clauses perhaps appear intimidating, but merely exist
to preserve the well-formedness of the result (taking into account the exter-
nal context and final rule, and associated factors). The subject reduction
theorem will guarantee that any instance of a substitution will in fact satisfy
these constraints as a natural consequence of the input and output rules.
The reason for the clause C′2chans(K) ⊆ C2 is that if K is an agent then
C′2 ⊆ C2, but if K is a name then C2 is empty yet C′2 may contain K if it
appears in the new term, but did not exist prior to substitution.
Lemma 4.3.10 (Substitution Lemma) If there exist valid deductions
ΓV , V : σ




′ ≤ σb, C1  C2, Γ  Θ, and the following conditions all hold:
• ∀x ∈ chans(K) .C1T(x) ≥B c
• ∀x ∈ C.C2T(x) ≥B c
• ∀V ∈ domC2.C2(V ) ≤B b′
• C1T(V ) ≥B c
then for some C′2 such that C′2chans(K) ⊆ C2 there is also a valid deduction
ΓV ,Θ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procc;C1V ,C′2
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ΓV , V : σ
b `CHO≤ P : Procc;C1. As
before, explicit reference to the conversion rule is ignored, and the statement
assumed to implicitly refer to the appropriate form of deduction.
• Null Process: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was the
null axiom:
∅ `C(HO≤) 0b : Procb; ∅
The result follows trivially, noting that C′2 = ∅.
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• Weakening: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an
instance of the weaken rule:
Γ `CHO≤ A : σb;C1 `HO≤ σ′c W /∈ domΓ
Γ,W : σ′c `CHO≤ A : σb;C
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; that is
ΓV ,Θ `CHO≤ A{K/V } : σb;C1V ,C′2
Hence by the weaken rule
ΓV ,W : σ
′cΘ `CHO≤ A{K/V } : σb;C1V ,C′2
as required.
• Variable Introduction: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction
was an instance of the var-2 rule:
`HO≤ σb
X : σb `CHO≤ X : σb;X : b
There are then two possibilities to consider; V = X and V 6= X. The
latter holds trivially, noting that C′2 = ∅. For the former, the following
then holds
Θ `CHO≤ K : Procc;C2
where σb
′
= Procc by the statement and definition of subtyping as
required, noting that Γx = ∅ and C2 ⊆ C2.
Note that the var-1 rule doesn’t apply in this case, as P is a process by
the statement.
• Replication: By the induction hypothesis on the antecedent to the
replication rule, then a use of the replication rule.
• Restriction: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an
instance of the restriction rule:
Γx, x : σ
c `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1 x /∈ C
Γx `CHO≤ (νx : σc)P : Procb;C1x
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent:
Γx, x : σ
c,Θ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procb;C1V ,C′2
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Then by the restriction rule
Γx,Θ `CHO≤ (νx : σc)P{K/V } : Procb;C1xV ,C′2
as required, noting that x 6= K,V by the statement and assumption of
Barendregt’s convention.
• Composition: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an
instance of the composition rule:
Γ1 `CHO≤ P : Procb;C′1 Γ2 `CHO≤ Q : Procc;C′′1
Γ1,Γ2 `CHO≤ P|Q : Procbc;C′1,C′′1
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedents indi-
vidually; that is
Γ1V ,Θ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procb;C′1V ,C′2
and Γ2V ,Θ `CHO≤ Q{K/V } : Procc;C′′1V ,C′′2
Hence by the composition rule and the definition of substitution
Γ1V ,Γ2V ,Θ `CHO≤ (P|Q){K/V } : Procbc;C′1V ,C′′1V ,C′2,C′′2
noting that C′2 ⊆ C2 and C′′2 ⊆ C2 imply C′2,C′′2 ⊆ C2 as required.
• Summation: Similarly.
• Abstraction: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an







σc `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1 ∀W ∈
−→




















σc,Θ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procb;C1V ,C′2














as required, noting that V /∈ −→W and ∀W ∈ −→W.W /∈ FN (K) by the
statement and the assumption of Barendregt’s convention.
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• Application: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an
instance of the application rule:



























By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the first antecedent:
ΓV ,Θ `CHO≤ A{K/V } : (
−→
σc)→ Procb;C′1V ,C′2
Similarly, by the induction hypothesis the result also holds for the sec-









Then by the application type rule and the definition of substitution,
the result holds for the consequent as well:
ΓV ,
−→
Γ′V ,Θ `CHO≤ (F〈
−→
J 〉){K/V } : Procb;







Note that all conditions for the application rule are satisfied:
– C′2 ⊆ C2 and C′′2 ⊆ C2 implies C′2 ∪ C′′2 ⊆ C2
– ∀x ∈ C.(
−−−−−→
C′′1V ,C′′2)T(x) ≥B b and
∀C′′1i, V ∈ domC′′1i.(C′′1i,C′′2)(V ) ≤B di both hold by the statement.
• Input: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an instance
of the input rule:
Γ−→
W











′ ∀W ∈ −→W.C1(W ) ≥B d,W /∈ C
Γ−→
W












, x : d













,Θ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procd;C1V ,C′2
There are two cases to consider; V = x and V 6= x (note that V /∈−→
W by the statement and the assumption of Barendregt’s convention).
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, x : d,C′2
In the former case the result also follows reasonably easily by the input




















, y : d,C′2
Note that by the definition of subtyping, only the outer-most annota-




• Output: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an in-
stance of the output rule:












′ ≤ c · −→σd ∀x ∈ C.
−−→
C′′1T(x) ≥B c ∀C′′1i, V ∈ domC′′1i.C′′1i(V ) ≤B d′i
Γ, x : (c · −→σd)b,−→Γ′ `C(HO≤) x[
−→







By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the first antecedent:
ΓV , x : (c ·
−→
σd)b,Θ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procc;C′1V ,C′2
where C′2chans(K) ⊆ C2. Again by the induction hypothesis it also holds











where C′′2chans(K) ⊆ C2 and by the statement ∀x ∈ C.(
−−−−→
C′′1,C′′2)T(x) ≥B c
and ∀C′′1i, V ∈ dom(C′′1i,C′′2).(C′′1i,C′′2)(V ) ≤B d′i. There are now two
cases to consider before the output rule can be applied; V = x and
V 6= x. The latter follows trivially by the output rule:




Γ′V ,Θ `CHO≤ (x[
−→
J ].P){K/V } : Procc;







If V = x, and K = y for some y, the result follows similarly:








J ].P){y/x} : Procc;







where (c · −→σd)b′ ≤ (c · −→σd)b by the statement, and recalling from the
definition of subtyping that only the outermost annotation may differ.
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• Certify: Suppose that the last rule used in the deduction was an in-
stance of the certify rule:
Γ′W ,W : σ
T, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P : Procc;C′1 C1T(W ) ≥B c
Γ′′W ,W : σ
U, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ Q : Procd;C′′1 C1T(W ) ≥B d W /∈ C
Γ′W ,Θ
′′
W , x : (σ
i)e `C(HO≤) x(W : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proci·c+i·d;
C′1W 〈i〉 C′′1W , x : (i · c+ i · d)
By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedents indi-
vidually; that is
Γ′VW ,W : σ
T, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procc;C′1,C′2
and Γ′′VW ,W : σ
U, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ Q{K/V } : Procd;C′′1,C′′2
There are then two cases to consider when applying the certify rule;




VW , x : (σ
i)e `C(HO≤) (x(W : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q){K/V } : Proci·c+i·d;
(C′1VW ,C′2) 〈i〉 (C′′1VW ,C′′2), x : (i · c+ i · d)
Otherwise, if V = x, then assuming K = y for some y, then
Γ′xW ,Γ
′′
xW , y : (σ
i)e
′ `C(HO≤) (x(W : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q){y/x} : Proci·c+i·d;
(C′1xW ,C′2) 〈i〉 (C′′1xW ,C′′2), y : (i · c+ i · d)
where (σi)e
′ ≤ (σi)e by the statement, recalling that by the definition
of subtyping only the outermost annotation is different.
2























′ ≤ −→σb, C1  −→C2, Γ ∪ −→Θ is defined, and the
following conditions all hold:






C2)T(W ) ≥B c
• ∀x ∈ C.−→C 2T(x) ≥B c














V } : Procc;C1V ,
−→
C′2
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.10 (the Substitution Lemma) above. 2
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4.3.3 Subject Reduction
The development of the subject reduction result is done in three steps:
• A general Lemma over the typed labelled transition semantics and ac-
companying generated substitution;
• A theorem as a specialisation of this Lemma to internal reductions only,
with a multi-step reductions corollary; and
• A result specialising this further to deductions after application of the
Final rule (that is, no contexts are present in the deduction).
As usual, in the statements the corresponding identical cases for judgements
concerning guarded and sum processes are ignored, and the judgement as-
sumed to be of the correct form for the process in question.
Lemma 4.3.12 (Subject Reduction) If there is a valid deduction in Sys-
tem THOpi≤for
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1
and a reduction
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
then there is also a valid deduction for
R(Γ′ `CHO≤ P′ : Procb;C′1)
where C′1  C1 and ∀x ∈ FN (µ)∩C.x ∈ domC′1 implies R(C′1(x)) ≥B R(b).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
The cases for alpha-congruence, application, summation, composition, repli-
cation, restriction, and communication follow directly from the induction
hypothesis, and the case for open follows from the cases for output and
restriction. As an outline of a representative case, consider the case for repli-
cation:
Suppose the derivation of reduction ended in a use of the replication case:
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1, !P〉 µ−→ 〈Θ′|C′2,Γ′|C′1 ∪ C1,P′|R(!P)〉 certify R
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By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the antecedent; that is there
is a valid deduction
R(Γ′ `CHO≤ P′ : Procb;C′1)
From the statement it is also the case that
R(Γ `CHO≤!P : Procb;C1)
and hence by the composition rule
R(Γ′ `CHO≤ P′|!P : Procb;C′1,C1)
as required, where Γ ⊆ Γ′ (note that it is not necessarily the case that
C1 ⊆ C′1, as the action may have involved transference of names in either
direction). Recall that multiplication is idempotent so b · b = b as required.
The remaining cases for input, output, and certify require more work,
but essentially stem from observing the correspondence between the pre-
conditions and the associated type rules, applying the Substitution Corollary
(4.3.11) where appropriate.













Θ′ ⊆ Θ dom⋃−→Θ′ = FN(−→K)
∀x ∈ C.
−−→
C′2T(x) ≥B b ∀C′2i, V ∈ domC′2i.C′2i(V ) ≤B d′i−→
σd






: b ∃C′′′2 ⊆ C′′2













V }〉 certify Id





σd).P : Procb;C1, x : b
This deduction must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken













σd `CHO≤ P : Procb
′
;C′1
















)c ⊆ Γ (by the weaken rule).
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′ ≤ −→σd, ∀x ∈ C.
−−→







: b. Hence by Corollary 4.3.11 (Substitution)







V } : Procb;C1,C′′′2
as required, noting that the substitution generated is the identity sub-
stitution and C′′′2 ⊆ C′′2 is the subset of names and variables actually
bound in the substitution. Note that by the transition rule, all names
in
−→
K that are also in C are in a context at least as safe as b, as required
by the statement.











Γ′ ⊆ Γ dom⋃−→Γ′ = FN(−→K)
∀x ∈ C.
−−→







: b ∃C′′′1 ⊆ C′′1





〈Θ ∪ −→Γ′ |C2 ∪ C′′′1 ,Γ|C1,P〉 certify Id
From the statement then there is a derivation for
Γ `C(HO≤) x[
−→











Γ′ ⊆ Γ and dom⋃−→Γ′ = FN(−→K)),
∀x ∈ C.
−−→






: b. This deduction
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an instance of the output rule with antecedents





















, and ∀x ∈ C.−−→C2T(x) ≥B b
and ∀C2i, V ∈ C2i.C2i(V ) ≤B di. The by as many applications of the
weaken rule as necessary,
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1
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as required, noting that the substitution generated is the identity sub-
stitution.
• Certify (as trusted): Suppose the last rule in the derivation was an
instance of the certify-as-trusted case:
Γ(x) = (σi)e certify(K) = T R = Id[i := T]
Θ′ `CHO≤ K : σf ;C′2 Θ′ ⊆ Θ domΘ′ = FN (K)
∀V ∈ domC′2.C′2(V ) ≤B f ∀x ∈ C.C′2T(x) ≥B b = i · c+ i · d
σf ≤ σi C′′2 = C′2, chans(K) : b ∃C′′′2 ⊆ C′′2
〈Θ|C2 ∪ C′′2,Γ|C′1 〈i〉 C′′1 ∪ {x : b}, x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q〉
x(K)−−−→
〈R(Θ|C2),R(Γ ∪Θ′|C′1 ∪ C′′′2 ),R(P{K/V })〉 certify R
From the statement there is a derivation for
Γ `C(HO≤) x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Procb;C′1V 〈i〉 C′′1V , x : b
This deduction must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken
rule, preceded by an instance of the certify rule with antecedents
Γ′, V : σT, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P : Procc;C′1
and Γ′′, V : σU, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ Q : Procd;C′′1
where b = i · c + i · d, C′1T (V ) ≥B c, and C′′1T (V ) ≥B d, and Γ′,Γ′′, x :
(σi)e,⊆ Γ (and assuming that V is not in the domain of either Γ′ or
Γ′′). Then, given R = Id[i := T], by the Substitution Lemma (4.3.10)
R(Γ′,Θ′, x : (σi)e `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procc;C′1V ,C′′′2 )
and thus by as many applications of the weaken and subtyping rules
as necessary,
R(Γ,Θ′ `CHO≤ P{K/V } : Procb;C′1V ,C′′′2 )
noting that R(b) = R(c) and that every name in C that is also in the
free names of K is in a context at least as trusted as b as required by
the statement.
• Certify (as untrusted): Similarly.
2
The next result specialises this to internal reductions:
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Theorem 4.3.13 (Internal Subject Reduction) For all Θ, C2, if there
is a valid deduction
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1
and a reduction
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 τ−→ 〈Θ|C2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
then there is a valid derivation for
R(Γ′ `CHO≤ P′ : Procb;C′1)
where domC′1 ⊆ C1 and ∀x ∈ C.R(C′1T)(x) ≥B R(b).
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.12. Only one case from the rules in Figures 3.9
and 3.10 introduces a τ (internal) reduction; the case for communication.
This combines two reductions, one for output, and one for input. The input
action can be generated either by the case for input processes, or by either
of the certify cases.
Examination of the two complimentary actions, together with the com-
position type rule, shows that the resultant context must have a domain no
larger than the initial context. The remainder of the cases follow by the
induction hypothesis. 2
The final related reduction safety result is perhaps the most important
(or at least, most pertinent to hosts); it states that the trustedness derived
from a use of the rule Final is the least (or most conservative) level of the
process, and it will only become more safe through execution. This is a
natural consequence of expiry of names; if a process is considered (after final)
untrusted due to a single name shared with the host being in an untrusted
context, and that name expires during reduction, then the program may be
considered trusted after that reduction. The converse is never true.
As a simple example, consider the process x.0U|x.0U with C = {x}. This
process would have a type of ProcU after the Final rule, as x appears in an
untrusted context. However, after a single internal reduction, it has reduced
to 0U|0U which is now trusted by the Final rule, as no name in the external
context appears in an untrusted context (or at all) any more.
Theorem 4.3.14 (Final Subject Reduction) ∃c ≥B b. If there is a valid
deduction
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb
and for some Θ, C2, and C1 a reduction
〈Θ|C2,Γ|C1,P〉 τ−→ 〈Θ|C2,Γ′|C′1,P′〉 certify R
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Then there is a valid deduction
R(Γ `CHO≤ P′ : Procc)
such that b ≤B c, and further it holds that b ≤B c for every valid deduction.
Proof. By reverse application of the final rule, Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb
′
;C1 where
b′ ≤B b by Proposition 4.3.9. Then by Theorem 4.3.13, R(Γ `CHO≤ P′ :
Procb
′
;C′1) where C′ ⊆ C, and hence by the final rule





T(x) ≥B b by Proposition 4.3.9 as required. 2
4.3.4 Security Properties
A security property for system THOpi≤ effectively provides the semantics for
the type system. That is, it establishes exactly what is guaranteed by the
final annotation on a program.
The key idea is the preservation of the intuition introduced at the begin-
ning; that a collection of processes be considered untrusted in total if any of
the sub-processes contained within are both untrusted and capable of com-
munication with the host, through the pre-defined set of channels specified
by C. The same should apply if this situation might develop at any point
during a reduction. So, the security property states that a process considered
trusted may never evolve such that an untrusted sub process occurs guarded
by one of the names in C.
This is accomplished in two steps; firstly a lemma stating that any sub-
process guarded by a name in C must have a trustedness at least as safe
as the trustedness of the whole process, and secondly a theorem building on
this result and subject reduction to guarantee that this will always be the
case for any reduction.
Two simple pieces of notation are needed first. Both definitions are due
to Milner (1993).
Definition 4.3.15 (Unguardedness) A process P is said to occur unguarded
in Q if it is a sub-term of Q and not under a guard. Inductively:
• P is unguarded in P
• If P is unguarded in Q then P is also unguarded in !Q
• If P is unguarded in Q then P is also unguarded in Q|R
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• If P is unguarded in Q then P is also unguarded in Q+R
Definition 4.3.16 (Observability) A process P is observable at x, written
P↓x, if there is some process µ.Q such that µ.Q occurs unguarded in P, and
x is the subject of the guard µ. Inductively:
• (x(−→V : −→σb).P)↓x
• (x[−→V ].P)↓x




– (P + Q)↓x
– ((νy : σb)P)↓x, if y 6= x
The inverse of the relation, “not observable at”, is written P 6↓x. A weaker
form, P⇓x is defined if there is some P′ such that P reduces to P′, and P′↓x.
Now the main lemma can be stated using these definitions; note that it relies
on the deduction being deterministic (that is, modulo order of composition
and summation, and the use of weakening, there is a single derivation for a
given term and environment).
Lemma 4.3.17 ∀Γ,P, b. If there is a valid deduction in System THOpi≤ for
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb
then for all x ∈ C if P↓x then for every Q such that µ.Q occurs unguarded
in P and x is the subject of µ, there is a deduction
Γ `CHO≤ µ.Q : Procc;C
where c ≥B b.
Proof. By cases on the definition of observability and then by induction on
the derivation of Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb. By Definition 4.3.16 there are three
base cases to account for, and four structural cases. The base cases of input,
output, and certify are trivial by the statement, and the structural cases
follow by the appropriate type rules and the induction hypothesis.
CHAPTER 4. SAFETY OF THE TYPE SYSTEMS 124














, x : b′
where b′ ≤B b by Lemma 4.3.9. However, noting that since x ∈ C and
the context of x is b′, it must be the case that b = b′, and hence result
holds for in this case.
• (x[−→V ].P)↓x: Similarly.
• (x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q)↓x: Similarly.
• P↓x implies (!P)↓x, and x ∈ C: By the induction hypothesis.
• P ↓x implies ((νy : σb)P) ↓x, provided y 6= x, and x ∈ C: By the
induction hypothesis.
• P↓x implies (P|Q)↓x, and x ∈ C: By the statement, there is a deduction
for
Γ `CHO≤ P|Q : Procb
This deduction must have ended in a use of the Final rule, with an-
tecedent
Γ `CHO≤ P|Q : Procb
′
;C
for some C, where b′ ≤B b by Lemma 4.3.9. This deduction itself must
have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by an
instance of the composition rule with antecedents




Γ′′ `CHO≤ Q : Procb
′
2 ;C2
where Γ′∪Γ′′ ⊆ Γ by the weaken rule, C = C1∪C2, and b′ = b′1 · b′2. By
the induction hypothesis the result holds for P; that is, applying the
Final rule to this deduction produces
Γ′ `CHO≤ P : Procb1
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where b1 =
V
x∈CC1T(x) and b1 ≥B b′1 by Lemma 4.3.9. Then for all
x ∈ C, for all R such that µ.R occurs unguarded in P where x is the
subject of µ, there is a deduction
Γ′ `CHO≤ R : Procd;CR
for some d ≥B b2. Hence, noting by transitivity of ≤B that d ≥B b2 ≥B
b, result holds for P|Q as well.
• P↓x implies (P + Q)↓x, and x ∈ C: similarly.
2
The main security theorem is an extension of Lemma 4.3.17, and states that
the same result holds after an arbitrary number of reductions: that is, if a
process is judged to be trusted (with respect to that host) then it will never
evolve such that an untrusted process may communicate with the host.
Theorem 4.3.18 ∀Γ,P, b. If there is a valid deduction in System THOpi≤ for
Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb
then for every P′, C, C′, and R such that (for every Θ, C′′)
〈Θ|C′′,Γ|C,P〉
−→τ− 〈Θ|C′′,Γ′|C′,P′〉 certify R
then for all x ∈ C if P′↓x (that is, P⇓x) then for every Q such that µ.Q
occurs unguarded in P and x is the subject of µ, there is a deduction
Γ `CHO≤ µ.Q : Procc;CQ
where c ≥B b.
Proof. By subject reduction (Theorem 4.3.14) and Lemma 4.3.17. 2
4.4 Discussion
This Chapter demonstrated the safety of the systems of the previous chapter
from two perspectives: a proof of subject reduction, and security. Only
three of the four systems; Systems TFOpi, TFO′pi≤, and THOpi≤, were examined,
since System TFOpi≤ was presented mainly as an intermediate step in the
development of System TFO′pi≤.
Subject reduction is a guarantee that types are preserved under reduction,
so the user may be assured that whatever properties they have enforced
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via the type system in their original program will continue to hold as the
program executes. The proof consists of a preliminary substitution lemma
to guarantee that a name or sub-term may be replaced by another of a similar
type without affecting the type of the overall term, then the subject reduction
result itself, which relies on the substitution lemma during the base cases of
communication reduction.
The situation is complicated in the systems of this thesis due to the pos-
sible presence of run-time coercion during a reduction. This is factored in
by including the annotation substitution, generated by the typed labelled
transition semantics, in the consequent of the statement. (That is, the de-
duction is the same before and after reduction, modulo the substitutions on
type annotations generated by the reduction).
Security results were presented for Systems TFO′pi≤ and THOpi≤ only, as
System TFOpi is not a security-based system (other than that provided by a
guarantee of Subject Reduction). The Security Property of System TFO′pi≤
was established as an instance of Strong Non-deterministic Non-Interference:
a guarantee that the execution of a process typed at a certain security level
will not be affected by channels of a lower integrity. This was established by
examining the traces generated by the typed labelled transition semantics,
and determining that the traces obtained by removing all names of a lower
integrity than the process’ security level were also valid traces.
Security for System THOpi≤ instead focuses on observability of processes,
from a predetermined perspective (the external context C). A statement is
proven that if a process is typed as trusted after the rule Final then it will
never reduce such an untrusted process is observable at any of the names in
the external context. This allows a collection of processes of different levels of
trustedness to be typed at a level that reflects their ability to communicate
with the host, so a collection containing untrusted processes may still be
typed as trusted, providing none of the untrusted components are ever in a




This chapter describes type inference1 algorithms for the three systems pre-
sented in Chapter 3, and demonstrates their correctness by showing that they
are all both sound and complete, and always terminate.
5.2 Preliminaries
The basic mode of operation of all the inference algorithms in this chapter
is to assign new arbitrary types to names and variables when encountered,
then when two branches are merged to reconcile (make equivalent) the types
assigned to the names and variables present in both branches.
This is accomplished by introducing type variables (Definition 5.2.1), so
that each new name encountered can be assigned a fresh type variable. Then,
appropriate algorithms return substitutions (Definition 5.2.2) that equate the
types.
Definition 5.2.1 (Type Variables) Extend the syntax of types with type
variables, ranged over by α. Thus, αi is a variable base type with a variable
annotation. The set of all type variables is represented by TV , where TV ⊂ T .
1Some presentations refer to verifying the well-formedness — and possibly assigning
a type, if appropriate — of an explicitly-typed term as ‘type inference’. Here the term
‘inference’ is used to refer to the problem of assigning types to all free variables in a term
(with no initial assumptions) such that the term is well typed. This task is sometimes
referred to as “type reconstruction”; see for example Pierce (2002). The difference is
actually less clear-cut here, as bound names are explicitly typed.
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Definition 5.2.2 (Substitutions) (This largely follows Wright (1992, Def-
inition 5.1.2)) A substitution is a pair
(ST ∈ TV → T ,RB ∈ BV → BA)
A few conventions and notational shorthands will be employed throughout the
remainder of this thesis (let S = (ST ,RB) in the following):
1. Substitutions will usually be written just as S; the substitution that oper-
ates only on annotations will be written R as before, to denote (Id,RB).
2. The notation Id will denote (Id, Id).
3. When combining substitutions, the preference is to use the in-order
composition S1;S2 (that is, apply S1, then S2) in place of the more
common S2 ◦ S1.
4. Application:
• S(σb) = ST ;RB(σb)
• S((σb1 . . . σcn)d) = (S(σb1) . . . S(σcn))S(d)
5. Write S[αi := σb] for (ST [α := σ],RB[i := b]) and S[i := b] for
(ST ,RB[i := b]). Similarly, write S;R for (ST ,RB;R).
6. Define the ordering ≤ as S ≤ S′ ⇐⇒ ∃S′′.S;S′′ = S′.
Definition 5.2.3 Write Γ ≤ Γ′ if and only if there is some substitution S
such that S(Γ) ⊆ Γ′.
Definition 5.2.4 Write C ≤ C′ if and only if there is some substitution R
such that R(C) ⊆ C′.
5.2.1 Unification
A fundamental operation in most inference algorithms is that of unification.
Intuitively, the reason for this is easy to see: inference algorithms generally
proceed recursively along all branches of the deduction tree, assigning fresh
variables as types for all names not previously encountered. When two or
more branches of a deduction must be combined (for example, using the
composition rule to combine two processes) all this accumulated information
about the types assigned to names must be reconciled (so that a name has
the same type in both branches, that they may correctly be combined); this
reconciliation is achieved via unification.
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Unification then is the process of deriving a substitution such that the
image of any pair of types thus unified under the substitution is identical.
Several algorithms for achieving this, corresponding to the different situations
in which substitution is required, are presented here before proceeding with
the inference algorithms themselves commencing in Section 5.3. The unifi-
cation algorithms are displayed first, followed by proofs of their correctness
(soundness and completeness) in Section 5.2.2
Definition 5.2.5 The algorithm BUNIFY returns the most general substi-
tution (if one exists) unifying its two annotation arguments. It is simply
the boolean unification algorithm from, for example, Boole (1847); although
any such algorithm would suffice. It is sound and complete; see Martin and
Nipkow (1990). It terminates for all finite inputs.
Definition 5.2.6 The algorithm U returns the most general substitution (if
one exists) unifying its two type arguments. To avoid repeating the algorithm,
process types (that is, of the form (
−→
σb) → Procc) are included, as the algo-
rithm is otherwise unchanged for the higher-order system. It is sound and






















































U(σb, αc) = U(αc, σb)
U(αc, σb) = let R = BUNIFY(b, c)
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Definition 5.2.7 The algorithm Unify is used to unify environments. It re-
turns the most general substitution, if one exists, that unifies the images
(which are types) of all names in the domain of both its arguments.
Unify(Γ,Θ) = Id (domΓ ∩ domΘ = ∅)
Unify
({x : σb1} ∪ Γ, {x : σc2} ∪Θ) = S;Unify(S(Γ),S(Θ))
where S = U(σb1, σc2)
It is sound and complete; see Theorems 5.2.13 and 5.2.14 respectively.
Definition 5.2.8 The algorithm CUnify is used to unify contexts. It cre-
ates a substitution unifying the images, which are annotations, of all names
appearing in the domain of both its arguments.
CUnify(C1,C2) = Id (domC1 ∩ domC2 = ∅)
CUnify({x : b} ∪ C1, {x : c} ∪ C2) = R;CUnify(R(C1),R(C2))
where R = BUNIFY(b, c)
It is sound and complete; see Theorems 5.2.16 and 5.2.17 respectively.
Definition 5.2.9 The algorithm M returns a substitution such that, if R =
M(b, σc), then R(c) = R(b · c). This is used to ensure the well-formedness of
channel types, recalling that for all systems the carried type annotations must


























Note that if the type annotation is T then the “multiplying” annotation b
must be equivalent (that is, unified) to T since b ·T = b. Alternatively, since
∀b.b ·U = U then if the annotation is U the identity substitution suffices. For
all other cases, the annotation is unified with the multiplication of a fresh
variable and b.
It is sound and complete; see Theorems 5.2.19 and 5.2.20 respectively.
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5.2.2 Correctness of the Unification Procedures
Theorem 5.2.10 (Soundness of U)






=⇒ S(σb1) = S(σc2)















: From the algorithm definition and the soundness of
BUNIFY, R = BUNIFY(b, c) =⇒ R(b) = R(c). By the induction hy-




















2 ), hence sound-














• U(Procb,Procc): By soundness of BUNIFY.
• U(αb, σc): By the algorithm this is defined as R; Id[R(α) := R(σ)]
(where R = BUNIFY(b, c)), so by inspection if S = U(αb, σc) then
S(αb) = R(σc) and S(σc) = R(σc) so soundness holds.
• U(σb, αc): By definition of the algorithm this is defined as U(αc, σb),
































where S = U(σb1, σc2). By the induction hypothesis S is sound, and by










is also sound, as required.
2
Theorem 5.2.11 (Completeness of U) ∀σb1, σc2. If ∃S′.S′(σb1) = S′(σc2) then
S = U(σb1, σc2) is defined, and S ≤ S′.






























where R = BUNIFY(b, c). By completeness
of BUNIFY, R is defined and R ≤ S′. By the induction hypothesis













≤ S′ (also implying U is defined in this instance),









2 are identical; according to the statement S′ is














• U(Procb,Procc): By completeness of BUNIFY.
• U(αb, σc): By definition of the algorithm this is defined — given R =
BUNIFY(b, c) — as R; Id[R(αb) := R(σc)], so by inspection S is defined
and S ≤ S′ so completeness holds.
• U(σb, αc): By definition of the algorithm this is defined as U(αc, σb),











: By the statement since S′ is defined then it must










. By inspection the algo-










where S = U(σb1, σc2). Hence











is also complete, as required.
2
Theorem 5.2.12 (Termination of U) The algorithm U terminates for all
finite inputs.
Proof. By induction on the inputs. Each step either terminates (for exam-
ple, with a call to BUNIFY which also terminates), or results in a recursive
call on a subset of the inputs. As each step operates on a successively smaller
input, the algorithm eventually terminates.










: by examination of the algo-
rithm, if the lengths of the tail sequences are not equal the algorithm termi-
nates. Otherwise, there are two recursive calls; by the induction hypothesis
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Theorem 5.2.13 (Soundness of Unify)
∀Γ,Θ.S = Unify(Γ,Θ) =⇒ S(Γ)  S(Θ)
Proof. By induction on the length of the intersection domΓ ∩ domΘ.
• If domΓ∩domΘ = ∅ then S = Unify(Γ,Θ) = Id, and S(Γ)  S(Θ) = Γ 
Θ is trivially defined (see Definition 2.3.1 on page 33 for the definition
of ).
• If ∃x.Γ = Γ′, x : σb1 and Θ = Θ′, x : σc2 then by inspection of the algo-
rithm S = S′;Unify(S′(Γ′),S′(Θ′)) where S′ = U(σb1, σc2). By soundness
of U (Theorem 5.2.10, above) S′(σb1) = S′(σc2), and by the induction
hypothesis if S′′ = Unify(S′(Γ′),S′(Θ′)) is defined then S′′(S′(Γ′)) 
S′′(S′(Θ′)) is defined. Hence S(Γ)  S(Θ) as required, where S = S′;S′′.
2
Theorem 5.2.14 (Completeness of Unify) ∀Γ,Θ. If ∃S′.S′(Γ)  S′(Θ) then
S = Unify(Γ,Θ) is defined, and S ≤ S′.
Proof. By induction on the length of the intersection domΓ ∩ domΘ.
• If domΓ ∩ domΘ = ∅ then S = Unify(Γ,Θ) = Id (by definition of the
algorithm), and Id ≤ S′ for all S′.
• If ∃x.Γ = Γ′1, x : σb1 and Θ = Θ′, x : σc2 then by inspection of the
algorithm S = S′′;Unify(S′′(Γ′),S′(Θ′)) where S′′ = U(σb1, σc2). By com-
pleteness of U (Theorem 5.2.11, above) S′′ is defined and most general
(i.e. S′′ ≤ S′), and by the induction hypothesis Unify(S′′(Γ′),S′′(Θ′)) is
also defined and produces a most general unifier. Then S = Unify(Γ,Θ)
is defined, and S ≤ S′ as required.
2
Theorem 5.2.15 (Termination of Unify) The algorithm Unify terminates
for every finite set of inputs.
Proof. By induction on the length of intersection of the domain of the in-
puts. There are two cases to consider; if the intersection is empty then the
algorithm terminates. If there is at least one pair in the intersection, the
algorithm calls U which terminates by Theorem 5.2.12, then makes a recur-
sive call on the remainder of the inputs. Since each step either terminates or
reduces the size of the inputs, the algorithm eventually terminates.
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For example, consider the case of Unify
({x : σb1} ∪ Γ, {x : σc2} ∪Θ): There
are two steps involved; by Theorem 5.2.12 S = U(σb1, σc2) terminates, and
hence by the induction hypothesis the recursive call on the remainder of the
input Unify(S(Γ),S(Θ)) also terminates. 2
Theorem 5.2.16 (Soundness of CUnify)
∀C1,C2.R = CUnify(C1,C2) =⇒ R(C1)  R(C2)
Proof. By induction on the length of the intersection domC1 ∩ domC2.
• If domC1 ∩ domC2 = ∅ then R = CUnify(C1,C2) = Id, and R(C1) 
R(C2) = C1  C2 is trivially defined (see page 67 for the definition of
).
• If ∃x.C1 = C′1, x : b and C2 = C′2, x : c then by inspection of the al-
gorithm R = R′;CUnify(R′(C′1),R′(C′2)) where R′ = BUNIFY(b, c). By
soundness of BUNIFY R′(b) = R′(c), and by the induction hypothesis if
R′′ = CUnify(R′(C′1),R′(C′2)) is defined then R′′(R′(C′1))  R′′(R′(C′2))
is defined. Hence R(C1)  R(C2) is defined as required, where R =
R′′;R′.
2
Theorem 5.2.17 (Completeness of CUnify) ∀C1,C2. If ∃R′.R′(C1)  R′(C2)
then R = CUnify(C1,C2) is defined, and R ≤ R′.
Proof. By induction on the length of the intersection domC1 ∩ domC2.
• If domC1 ∩ domC2 = ∅ then R = CUnify(C1,C2) = Id, and Id ≤ R′ for
all R′.
• If ∃x.C1 = C′1, x : b and C2 = C′2, x : c then by inspection of the
algorithm R = R′′;CUnify(R′′(C′1),R′(C′2)) where R′′ = BUNIFY(b, c).
By completeness of BUNIFY R′′ is defined and most general (i.e. R′′ ≤
R′), and by the induction hypothesis CUnify(R′′(C′1),R′′(C′2)) is also
defined and produces a most general unifier. Then R = CUnify(C1,C2)
is defined, and R ≤ R′ as required.
2
Theorem 5.2.18 (Termination of CUnify) The algorithm CUnify termi-
nates for all finite inputs.
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Proof. By induction on the length of the intersection of the domains of the
inputs. There are two cases to consider; if the intersection is empty then
the algorithm terminates. If there is at least one pair in the intersection the
algorithm calls BUNIFY which terminates, then makes a recursive call on the
remainder of the inputs. Since each step either terminates or reduces the size
of the inputs, the algorithm eventually terminates.
For example, consider the case of CUnify({x : b} ∪ C1, {x : c} ∪ C2): two
steps are involved; R = BUNIFY(b, c) terminates, and hence the recursive
call on the remainder of the input CUnify(R(C1),R(C2)) also terminates by
the induction hypothesis. 2
Theorem 5.2.19 (Soundness of M)
R =M(b, σc) =⇒ ∃d.R(c) = R(b · d)
Proof. By definition of the algorithm and by cases on its inputs.
• c = T: By definitionM(b, σT) = BUNIFY(b,T) which by the statement
is defined. Then by soundness of BUNIFY R(c) = R(T) = T = R(b) =
R(b · d), where d = T.
• c = U: Then R = M(b, σU) = Id. Hence R(U) = U = R(b · d) = b · d,
where d = U.
• c 6= T, c 6= U: Then R = M(b, σc) = BUNIFY(c, b · i) (where i is fresh)
which from the statement is defined. Hence by soundness of BUNIFY




























Theorem 5.2.20 (Completeness of M) ∀b, c, σ. if ∃d,R′ such that R′(c) =
R′(b · d) then R =M(b, σc) is defined, and R ≤ R′.
Proof. By cases on the input and the definition of the algorithm.
• c = T: By definition of the algorithm M(b, σT) = BUNIFY(b,T); then
by completeness of BUNIFY R is defined and R ≤ R′. Note that since
c = T, R′(c) = T = R′(b · d) (where d = T).
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• c = U: By definition of the algorithm R = M(b, σU) = Id which is
defined, and Id ≤ R′ for all R′.
• c 6= T, c 6= U: Then R =M(b, σc) = BUNIFY(c, b · i) (where i is fresh).
If this is defined then by soundness of BUNIFY R(c) = R(b · i); since
R′(c) = R′(b · d) for some R′ and d then M(b, σc) = BUNIFY(c, b · i) is
defined by completeness of BUNIFY (noting that if necessary R(i) = d).













where R′′ = M(b, σc). By the induction hypothesis, the result holds
for R′′ (that is, it is defined and R′′ ≤ R′) and also by the induction






; thus the result








Theorem 5.2.21 (Termination of M) The algorithm M terminates for
all finite inputs.
Proof. By induction on the length of the inputs. Each step either termi-
nates (explicitly, with value Id, or with a call to BUNIFY which terminates),
or makes two recursive calls on subsets of the inputs. Since each step ei-
ther terminates or reduces the size of the inputs, if the inputs are finite the
algorithm must eventually terminate. 2
5.3 Type Inference For System TFOpi
5.3.1 Implementation
Type inference for the plain first-order system is a relatively straight-forward
matter of reading the rules of Figure 3.4 (page 57) in a bottom-up fashion
(that is, recursively walking back up the deduction tree), using substitutions
from the unification algorithms of Section 5.2 above to ensure that the results
may be correctly combined.
The algorithm is shown in Figures 5.1. It takes as input a valid term in
System TFOpi, and returns a pair of an environment assigning types to all free
variables in the term such that the term is well-typed, and an accompanying
substitution for all declared types in the term. Note that in the syntax, on
Page 47, annotation variables are admitted but type variables are not, and
the term is expected to conform to this.
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The substitution is required for the cases where a declared type contains
an annotation variable which is assigned a new value during unification. For
example, consider the (useless) term
(νx : (()i)T)x[y].0
Typing would proceed by assigning y the type αj and x the type (αj)k, for
fresh α, j, k. Next, to form the restriction the declared type of x is unified
with the deduced type; that is a substitution must be found to equate (αj)k
with (()i)T, which reduces to assigning T to k, () to α, and equating i and
j. Should the unification algorithm resolve that i := j, then the above term
would no-longer be typed under the deduced environment of y : ()j unless i
is replaced by j in the term. Hence a substitution to be applied to the term
is also returned.2
In the algorithm, α is a fresh type variable, and i, j, k are fresh annota-
tions.
5.3.2 Correctness of TypeTFOpi
Correctness is demonstrated via two separate results; a soundness result stat-
ing that every successful execution of the algorithm produces a valid type in
system TFOpi, and a completeness result stating that if a valid typing exists
for a term in system TFOpi then the algorithm is defined, and furthermore
produces a most-general typing (see Definition 5.2.3). Note that the combi-
nation, including the most-general result, implies the existence of principle
types in the system.
Soundness
Theorem 5.3.1 (Soundness of TypeTFOpi)
∀P. 〈Γ,S〉 = TypeTFOpi(P) =⇒ Γ `FO S(P) : Proc
Proof. By induction on the structure of P.
• P ≡ 0: By inspection, TypeTFOpi(0) = 〈∅, Id〉 and by the zero type rule∅ `(FO) 0 : Proc as required.
2This is a similar procedure to that often seen in polymorphic type inference, although
for slightly different reasons. An alternative approach would be to thread an environment
through the algorithm, with the typed binders added in the recursive calls on the body.
The difference in complexity of the algorithm and proofs is minimal and it seems a matter
of taste, with the stand-alone feel of the chosen scheme preferred.
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= let 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(P)
S2 = Unify
(
Γ, {x : σb})
in 〈S2(Γx),S2〉









−→y ].P) = let 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(P)
S2 = Unify
(
























= let 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(P)
S2 = Unify
(






















x(y : σb) ?certifyP⊕Q
)
= let 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(P)
〈Θ,S2〉 = TypeTFOpi(S1(Q))
S3 = S1;S2;Unify(S2(Γ),




















Figure 5.1: Type Inference for System TFOpi
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• P ≡!Q: By inspection, TypeTFOpi(!Q) = TypeTFOpi(Q). By the induction
hypothesis, if 〈Γ,S〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) then Γ `FO S(Q) : Proc; hence by
the replication type rule 〈Γ,S〉 = TypeTFOpi(!Q) =⇒ Γ `FO S(!Q) : Proc
as required.
• P ≡ (νx : σb)Q: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for Q;
that is if 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) then Γ `FO S1(Q) : Proc. By the
soundness of Unify, S2 = Unify
(
Γ, {x : σb}) implies S2(Γ(x)) = S2(σb)





= 〈S2(Γx),S2〉 and S2(Γx) `FO S2((νx :
σb)Q) : Proc as required.
• P ≡ Q|R: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for Q and R
individually; that is 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) =⇒ Γ `FO S1(Q) : Proc
and 〈Θ,S2〉 = TypeTFOpi(S1(R)) =⇒ Θ `FO S1;S2(R) : Proc. Then by
soundness of Unify if S3 = Unify(S2(Γ),Θ) then S2;S3(Γ)  S3(Θ) and
hence S3(S2(Γ),Θ) `FO S1;S2;S3(P|Q) : Proc as required.
• P ≡ Q+R: Similarly.
• P ≡ x[−→y ].Q: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for Q indi-
vidually; that is 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) =⇒ Γ `FO S1(Q) : Proc. By the
soundness of Unify the following holds:
S2 = Unify
(
Γ, {x : (−→αi)j,−→y : −→αi}
)
=⇒
∀y : αi ∈ domΓ ∩ {x : (−→αi)j,−→y : −→αi}.S2(Γ(y)) = S2(αi)
(where
−→
αi and j are all fresh variables). Note that this also unifies
the object of the type of x with the types of −→y . Lastly, it must be
ensured that
−→
αi has the form c · −→σb as required by the well-formed type







for all αi in
−→
αi then S3(i) = S3(j · k) for some k as required. Hence
S3(Γ, x : (αi)j,−→y :
−→
αi `(FO) x[−→y ].Q : Proc) as required.
• P ≡ x(−→y : −→σb).Q: The case for input proceeds similarly to the case for
output, with the exception that the types of the argument names are
specified in the term. By the induction hypothesis soundness holds for
Q individually; that is 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) =⇒ Γ `FO S1(Q) : Proc.
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By the soundness of Unify the following holds:
S2 = Unify
(







S2(Γ(x)) = S2(x : (
−→
σb)j) and
∀yi : σbii ∈ −→y :
−→
σb.S2(Γ(yi)) = S2(σbii )
(where j is a fresh variable, and assuming in each case that the name is
in the domain of Γ — the statement is obviously redundant otherwise).
Lastly, to ensure the well-formed type rule holds: by the soundness






implies that for all σb in
−→
σb then
S3(b) = S3(j · c) for some c as required. Hence
S3(Γ−→y , x : (σb)j `(FO) x(−→y : σb).Q : Proc)
as required.
• P ≡ x(y : σi) ?certifyQ⊕ R: By the induction hypothesis soundness holds
for Q and R individually; that is
〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) =⇒ Γ `FO S1(Q) : Proc
and 〈Θ,S2〉 = TypeTFOpi(S1(R)) =⇒ Θ `FO S1;S2(R) : Proc
Then by soundness of Unify,
S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(
S2(Γ),S1;S2({x : (σb)j, y : σT})
)
=⇒




S3(Θ),S3({x : (σb)j, y : σU})
)
=⇒
S4(Θ)  S4({x : (σb)j, y : σU})
Similarly, S5 = S4;Unify(S4(Γy),S4(Θy)) implies S5(Γy)  S5(Θy) (note
that this unification must be performed in the absence of y, owing to the
conflicting types in each environment). Note that by the well-formed
type rule b = i · j for some i and j. This is ensured by the soundness of




(for some fresh variable j) implies
S6(b) = S6(j · k) for some k. Hence by the certify rule
S6(Γy,Θy, x : (σb)j `(FO) x(y : σb) ?certifyQ⊕ R : Proc)
as required.
2
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Completeness
The reader is referred back to page 128 for the definition of Γ ≤ Γ′ if neces-
sary.
Theorem 5.3.2 (Completeness of TypeTFOpi) ∀Γ′, P. If there is a valid
deduction in System TFOpi for Γ′ `FO P : Proc then 〈Γ,S〉 = TypeTFOpi(P) is
defined, and Γ ≤ Γ′
Proof. By cases on the structure of P, then by inference on the derivation
of Γ′ `FO P : Proc and by inspection of the algorithm.
• Γ′ `FO 0 : Proc: By the zero type rule (and as many applications of
the weaken rule as necessary) this is valid for any Γ′. By inspection,
TypeTFOpi(0) is defined and 〈∅, Id〉 = TypeTFOpi(0). Then clearly ∅ ≤ Γ as∅ ⊆ Γ′ for all Γ′, as required.
• Γ′ `FO!P : Proc: By inspection, 〈Γ,S〉 = TypeTFOpi(!P) = TypeTFOpi(P)
and by the induction hypothesis completeness holds for P: that is,
given a valid deduction Γ′ `FO P : Proc then 〈Γ,S〉 = TypeTFOpi(P) is
defined and Γ ≤ Γ′. Hence by the replication rule completeness holds
for !P.
• Γ′,Θ′,∆ `FO P|Q : Proc: This deduction must have ended in zero or
more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by an instance of the compo-
sition rule with antecedents Γ′ `FO P : Proc and Θ′ `FO Q : Proc
(where the domain of ∆ contains all names introduced through the
final uses of the weaken rule). By the induction hypothesis complete-
ness holds for P and Q individually; that is 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(P)
and 〈Θ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(S1(Q)) are both defined, with Γ ≤ Γ′ and
Θ ≤ Θ′. Then by completeness of Unify, if S3 = Unify(S2(Γ),Θ) then
S3(S2(Γ),Θ) ≤ Γ′,Θ′ as required.
• Γ′ `(FO) P + Q : Proc: Similarly.
• Γ′ `(FO) x(−→y :
−→
σb).P : Proc: The deduction must have ended in zero




σb, x : (
−→
σb)c `FO P : Proc
(where Γ′′, x : (
−→
σb)c ⊆ Γ′; assuming for notational convenience that−→y /∈ domΓ′). By the induction hypothesis completeness holds for P
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individually: 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(Q) is defined, and Γ ≤ Γ′, x : (
−→
σb)c,−→y :−→
σb. Then by Theorem 5.2.14 S2 = Unify
(
Γ, {x : (−→σb)j,−→y : −→σb}
)
is com-
plete (implying that S2(Γ, x : (
−→








is also complete; implying S3(b) = j · k for some k and each σb ∈
−→
σb.
Hence (noting that the weaken rule increases the domain of Γ′, so the
requirement that domΓ ⊆ Γ′ is not affected):




• Γ′ `(FO) x[−→y ].P : Proc: Similarly; without the need to remove −→y from
the environment of the consequent, and using fresh variables for the
types of −→y .
• Γ′,Θ′, x : (σi)c,∆ `(FO) x(y : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc: This deduction must
have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by an
instance of the certify rule with antecedents
Γ′, x : (σi)c, y : σT `FO P : Proc
and Θ′, x : (σi)c, y : σU `FO Q : Proc
where the domain of ∆ is all the names introduced through the weaken
rule, and assuming for notational convenience that y /∈ domΓ′∩Θ′. By
the induction hypothesis, completeness holds for P and Q individually;
that is 〈Γ,S1〉 = TypeTFOpi(P) and 〈Θ,S2〉 = TypeTFOpi(S1(Q)) are both
defined, with Γ ≤ Γ′, x : (σbc)c, y : σT and Θ ≤ Θ′, x : (σbc)c, y : σU. By
completeness of Unify, S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(
S2(Γ),S1;S2({x : (σb)j, y : σT})
)
is complete, and similarly so is S4 = S3;Unify
(
S3(Θ),S3({x : (σb)j, y : σU})
)
.
Again by completeness of Unify, S5 = S4;Unify(S4(Γy),S4(Θy)) is com-
plete (note that the unification must be performed with y removed
from each domain, due to the conflicting types in each branch). By








Γy,Θy, x : (σ
b)j
) ≤ Γ′y,Θ′y, x : (σcb)c
as required.
2
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5.3.3 Termination of TypeTFOpi
As an additional stage in analysing the algorithm, it is desirable to show that
it always terminates (lack of termination in all cases does not imply lack of
correctness, none the less it is a useful result to establish).
Theorem 5.3.3 (Termination of TypeTFOpi) The algorithm TypeTFOpi termi-
nates for all valid finite inputs.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the input. Each step either: ter-
minates immediately (returning a result); calls one of the algorithms Unify
or M which terminates by Theorems 5.2.15 and 5.2.21; or makes a recursive
call on a subset of the input. Since each stage either terminates explicitly
or recurses on a subset of the input, if the input is finite then the algorithm
must eventually terminate.





three stages involved, all of which can be shown to terminate. Firstly, x(−→y :−→
σb).P is finite from the statement, so the recursive call TypeTFOpi(P) must also
have finite input, and thus terminates by the induction hypothesis. Likewise,
the sequence −→y is also finite according to the statement, so the call S2 =
Unify
(
Γ, {x : (−→σb)j,−→y : −→σb}
)
must terminate by Theorem 5.2.15. Finally, by






also terminates, and as





5.4 Type Inference For System TFO′pi≤
Analogously to Igarashi and Kobayashi (2000) the rules of Figure 3.4 (page 57)
alone are insufficient for type inference as it is also necessary to encode infor-
mation about the relationships between annotation expressions, in the form
of constraints (Definition 5.4.1). An inferred type can then take the form of
an environment and substitution as before, and a set of constraints on the
annotations in that environment.
Definition 5.4.1 (Annotation Constraints) (This material largely fol-
lows Igarashi and Kobayashi (2000)).
1. Constraints are represented by C, and are a set of expressions of the
form b ≤B c.
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2. A substitution S (or R, since constraints are composed solely from an-
notations) is said to solve C if and only if ∀(b ≤B c) ∈ C.S(b) ≤B S(c),
and S(b) is a constant expression and/or S(c) is a constant expres-
sion. For example, if C = {i ≤B j} then S1 = Id[i := U][j := T],
S2 = Id[j := T], and S3 = Id[i := U][j := k · T + k · U] are all solutions
of C; while S4 = Id[j := k] and S5 = Id[i := T][j := U] are not.
3. The operator ’,’ is defined as shorthand for the union operator as usual.
4. Constraint sets are only distinguished up to non-trivial constraints; for
example C1 = {i ≤B j} is not distinguished from C2 = {i ≤B j,U ≤B
T, j ≤B T}.
5. Write C ≤ C ′ if and only if every solution of C is also a solution of
C ′. For example, {i ≤B j, j ≤B k} ≤ {i ≤B k} (for instance, the
substitution Id[i := T][j := T] solves both, but Id[k := T] only solves the
second).
5.4.1 Implementation
The algorithm itself is shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. It takes as input a
valid term in System TFO′pi≤ and returns a four-tuple consisting of an envi-
ronment, a security level (annotation), a set of constraints on annotations,
and a substitution to be applied to the term.
This particular form of algorithm is based on the work of Igarashi and
Kobayashi (2000), who first described type reconstruction algorithms for lin-
ear type systems of the pi-calculus (with input/output sub-typing).
5.4.2 Correctness of TypeTFO′pi≤
As with TypeTFOpi , correctness of the algorithm TypeTFO′pi≤ is demonstrated
over two stages: a soundness result stating that all results returned by the
algorithm produce a valid typing in the inference rules for system TFO′pi≤, and
a completeness result stating that if a valid deduction exists in System TFO′pi≤
for a given term then TypeTFO′pi≤ is defined and the result returned is most
general. Additionally, it must be shown that all constraints generated are
consistent with the deduction; this is expressed in the second consequent
of Theorem 5.4.2. To verify the validity of the constraints returned the
function Constraints is defined over a deduction tree (the argument is written
as a judgement rather than, say, a pair of an environment and a term, to
emphasise the fact that it refers to a single node in a tree, with all the
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TypeTFO′pi≤(P + Q) = let 〈Γ, b, C1,S1〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(P)
〈Θ, c, C2,S2〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(Q))
S3 = S2;Unify(S2(Γ),Θ)
in 〈S3(Γ,Θ),S3(b · c),S(C1, C2),S3〉
TypeTFO′pi≤(P|Q) = let 〈Γ, b, C1,S1〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(P)
〈Θ, c, C2,S2〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(Q))
S3 = S2;Unify(S2(Γ),Θ)
in 〈S3(Γ,Θ),S3(b · c),S(C1, C2),S3〉
Figure 5.2: Type Inference Algorithm for System TFO′pi≤

























S3(Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σj)i), k,




let 〈Γ, c, C,S1〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(P)
S2 = S1;Unify
(





















x(y : σb) ?certifyP⊕Q
)
=
let 〈Γ, c, C1,S1〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(P)
〈Θ, d, C2,S2〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(Q))
S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(













S6(Γy,Θy, x : (σb)i), bj + bk,
S6(C1, C2, j ≤B c, j ≤B i, k ≤B d, k ≤B i),S6〉
Figure 5.3: Type Inference Algorithm for System TFO′pi≤(continued)
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tree known); it simply recursively walks the tree, collecting all constraints
together. The definition is in Figure 5.4.
Soundness
Theorem 5.4.2 (Soundness of TypeTFO′pi≤) For any valid term P in Sys-
tem TFO′pi≤,
〈Γ, b, C,S〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(P)
implies that there is a derivation for




Γ `bFO′≤ S(P) : Proc
)
= C
Proof. By deduction on the structure of P and examination of the algorithm.
• P ≡ 0: From the algorithm, TypeTFO′pi≤(0) = 〈∅, i, ∅, Id〉, and by the zero
type rule ∅ `i(FO′≤) 0 : Proc for all i, and Constraints
(




• P ≡!Q: From the algorithm, TypeTFO′pi≤(!Q) = TypeTFO′pi≤(Q), and by
the induction hypothesis soundness holds for Q and hence !Q by the
replication type rule as required.
• P ≡ (νx)Q: By the induction hypothesis, 〈Γ, c, C,S1〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(Q)
implies Γ `cFO′≤ S1(Q) : Proc and Constraints
(
Γ `cFO′≤ Q : Proc
)
=





S2(Γ)  S2({x : σb}) so by the restriction rule
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Constraints
(

















Γx, x : σ
































Γ−→y , x : (
−→







{−→b′ ≤B −→b , d ≤B d′, d ≤B c} ∪
Constraints
(



















b′ , d ≤B d′, d ≤B c} ∪
Constraints
(









Γy,Θy, x : (σ
i)b `ic+id
FO′≤ x(y) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
)
=
{c ≤B c′, c ≤B b, d ≤B d′, d ≤B b}
Constraints
(
Γy, x : (σ





Γy, x : (σ
i)b, y : σU `d′FO′≤ Q : Proc
)
Figure 5.4: Collecting Constraints for System TFO′pi≤
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• P ≡ Q|R: By the induction hypothesis, the result holds for the an-
tecedents Q and R individually; that is
TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, b, C1,S1〉 =⇒
Γ `bFO′≤ S1(Q) : Proc ∧ Constraints
(




TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(R)) = 〈Θ, c, C2,S2〉 =⇒
Θ `cFO′≤ S1;S2(R) : Proc ∧
Constraints
(
Θ `cFO′≤ S1;S2(R) : Proc
)
= C2
By the soundness of Unify, S3 = S2;Unify(S2(Γ),Θ) implies S3(Γ) 
S3(Θ), hence by the composition rule








• P ≡ Q+R: Similarly.
• P ≡ x(−→y : −→σb).Q: By the induction hypothesis the result holds for the
antecedent individually; that is
TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, c, C,S1〉 =⇒
Γ `cFO′≤ S1(Q) : Proc ∧ Constraints
(
Γ `cFO′≤ S1(Q) : Proc
)
= C






implies S2(Γ)  S2({x : (
−→
σj)i,−→y : −→σb}); note that the same base types is
used for both the types of −→y and the argument types of x, but fresh an-
notations variables are used — these are used to impose the sub-typing







plies S3(j) = S3(i · j′) for every annotation j in
−→
σj and some j′. Then
by the input type rule,
S3(Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σj)i `k(FO′≤) x(−→y :
−→
σb).Q : Proc)




S3(Γ−→y , x : (
−→





S3(C ∪ {−→b ≤B −→j , k ≤B c, k ≤B i})
by the input type rule and definition of Constraints as required, noting
that the relaxation rule may be used before the input rule, hence the
fresh variable and corresponding constraint.
• P ≡ x[−→y ].Q: Similarly, using fresh variables for the types of the argu-
ment names −→y .
• P ≡ x(y : σb) ?certifyQ⊕ R: By the induction hypothesis the result holds
for the antecedents Q and R individually; that is
TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, c, C1, S1〉 =⇒
Γ `cFO′≤ S1(Q) : Proc ∧ Constraints
(




TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(R)) = 〈Θ, d, C2,S2〉 =⇒
Θ `dFO′≤ S1;S2(R) : Proc ∧
Constraints
(
Θ `dFO′≤ S1;S2(R) : Proc
)
= C2
Then, by the soundness of Unify:
– S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(
S2(Γ),S1;S2({x : (σb)i, y : σT})
)
implies
S3(Γ)  S3({x : (σb)i, y : σT})
– S4 = S3;Unify
(
S3(Θ),S3({x : (σb)i, y : σU})
)
implies
S4(Θ)  S4({x : (σb)i, y : αU})
– S5 = S4;Unify(S4(Γy),S4(Θy)) implies S5(Γy)  S5(Θy) (noting
that the unification is performed in the absence of y due to the
conflicting types).





S6(i · i′) for some i′. Then
S6(Γy,Θy, x : (σb)i `bj+bk(FO′≤) x(y : σb) ?certifyQ⊕ R : Proc)




S6(Γy,Θy, x : (σb)i `bj+bk(FO′≤) x(y : σb) ?certifyQ⊕ R : Proc)
)
=
S6(C1, C2, j ≤B c, j ≤B i, k ≤B d, k ≤B i)
by the certify type rule and definition of Constraints as required, not-
ing that the relaxation rule may be used on both antecedents prior




Theorem 5.4.3 (Completeness of TFO′pi≤) ∀Γ′, C ′,P, b′ such that
Γ′ `b′FO′≤ P : Proc
is a valid deduction in System TFO′pi≤, and
Constraints
(




〈Γ, b, C,S〉 = TypeTFO′pi≤(P)
is defined, with both Γ ≤ Γ′ and C ≤ C ′.
Proof. By cases on the structure of P, then by inference on the derivation
of Γ′ `b′FO′≤ P : Proc and by examination of the algorithm.
• P ≡ 0: The deduction Γ′ `b(FO′≤) 0 : Proc must have ended in a use of
the zero inference rule, followed by zero or more instances of the weaken
and relaxation rules. By examination of the algorithm TypeTFO′pi≤(0) =
〈∅, i, ∅, Id〉, and since Constraints
(
Γ′ `b(FO′≤) 0 : Proc
)
= ∅ for all Γ′, by
definition ∅ ≤ Γ′ and ∅ ≤ ∅ as required.
• P ≡ !Q: The deduction Γ′ `bFO′≤!Q : Proc must have ended in zero
or more uses of the weaken and relaxation rules, preceded by an in-
stance of the replication inference rule, with antecedent Γ′′ `b′FO′≤ Q :
Proc (where Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′ and b ≤B b′). By examination of the algo-
rithm, TypeTFO′pi≤(!Q) = TypeTFO′pi≤(Q), and by the induction hypoth-
esis if TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, c, C,S〉 then Γ ≤ Γ′′ and C ≤ C ′ where
C ′ = Constraints
(
Γ′′ `b′FO′≤ Q : Proc
)
, hence by the replication rule and
definition of Constraints result holds for !Q as well.
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• P ≡ (νx : σd)Q: The deduction Γ′x `bFO′≤ (νx : σd)Q : Proc must have
ended in zero or more instances of the weaken and relaxation rules, pre-
ceded by a use of the restriction rule with antecedent Γ′′x, x : σ
d `b′FO′≤
Q : Proc where Γ′′x ⊆ Γ′x and b ≤B b′. By the induction hypothesis and
inspection of the algorithm, TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, c, C,S1〉 implies Γ ≤
Γ′′, x : σd and C ≤ C ′, where C ′ = Constraints
(
Γ′′x, x : σ
d `b′FO′≤ Q : Proc
)
.





complete. Hence S2(Γx) ≤ Γ′x and S2(C) ≤ C ′ by the restriction rule
and definition of Constraints as required.
• P ≡ Q|R: The deduction Γ′,Θ′,∆ `b′FO′≤ Q|R : Proc must have ended
in zero or more uses of the relaxation and weaken rules, preceded by
a use of the composition rule with antecedents Γ′ `b1
FO′≤ Q : Proc and
Θ′ `b2
FO′≤ R : Proc where the domain of ∆ contains all names introduced
by weakening, and b1 · b2 = b ≤B b′. By the induction hypothesis
completeness holds for both individually; that is
TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, c1, C1,S1〉 =⇒ Γ ≤ Γ′ ∧
C1 ≤ C′1
given C ′1 = Constraints
(
Γ′ `bFO′≤ Q : Proc
)
, and
TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(R)) = 〈Θ, c, C2,S2〉 =⇒ Θ ≤ Θ′ ∧
C2 ≤ C′2
given C ′2 = Constraints
(
Θ′ `bFO′≤ R : Proc
)
. By completeness of Unify,
since Γ ≤ Γ′ and Θ ≤ Θ′ (and Γ′  Θ′), then S3 = S2;Unify(S2(Γ),Θ) is
defined and most general. Hence by the composition rule and the defi-
nitions of TypeTFO′pi≤ and Constraints, S3(Γ,Θ) ≤ Γ′,Θ′ and S3(C1, C2) ≤
C ′1, C ′2 as required.
• P ≡ Q+R: Similarly.





Γ′−→y , x : (
−→





must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken and relaxation
rules, preceded by a use of the input rule with antecedent





′ `d′FO′≤ Q : Proc
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, and the domain of ∆ is all the names intro-
duced via the final uses of the weaken rule. By the induction hypothesis






and C ≤ C ′ given
Constraints
(





′ `bFO′≤ Q : Proc
)
= C ′


















also defined and most general. Hence by the input rule and definition
of Constraints,
S3(Γ−→y , x : (
−→




S3(C ∪{−→b ≤B −→j , k ≤B c, k ≤B i}) ≤
(C ′∪{−→b′ ≤B −→b , d ≤B d′, d ≤B c})
as required.
• P ≡ x[−→y ].Q: Similarly, with the algorithm using a fresh type variables
for −→y , and the sub-typing relation between the types carried by x and
those of −→y (and thus the constraints generated) the reverse of the input
case as required.
• P ≡ x(y : σi) ?certifyQ⊕ R: The deduction
Γ′,Θ′,∆x : (σi)b `ic+id
(FO′≤) x(y : σ
i) ?certifyQ⊕ R : Proc
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken and relaxation
rules, preceded by a use of the certify rule with antecedents
Γ′, x : (σi)b, y : σT `c′FO′≤ Q : Proc
and Θ′, x : (σi)b, y : σU `d′FO′≤ R : Proc
where the domain of ∆ is all the free names introduced via the weaken-
ing rule, d ≤B d′ and c ≤B c′, and assuming for notational convenience
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that y /∈ domΓ′ ∪ Θ′. By the induction hypothesis completeness holds
for the antecedents individually; that is
TypeTFO′pi≤(Q) = 〈Γ, e, C1,S1〉 =⇒ Γ ≤ Γ′, x : (σi)b, y : σT ∧
C1 ≤ C′1
where C ′1 = Constraints
(
Γ′, x : (σi)b, y : σT `c′FO′≤ Q : Proc
)
, and
TypeTFO′pi≤(S1(R)) = 〈Θ, f, C2,S2〉 =⇒ Θ ≤ Θ′, x : (σi)b, y : σU ∧
C2 ≤ C′2
where C ′2 = Constraints
(
Θ′, x : (σi)b, y : σU `d′FO′≤ R : Proc
)
. By the
completeness of Unify the following are all defined and most general:
– S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(
S2(Γ),S1;S2({x : (σi)j, y : σT})
)
;
– S4 = S3;Unify
(
S3(Θ),S3({x : (σi)j, y : σU})
)
; and
– S5 = S4;Unify(S4(Γy),S4(Θy));
Similarly, by completeness of M, S6 = S5;M(S5(j),S5(σi)) is also de-
fined and most general. Hence by the definition of Constraints and the
algorithm, the algorithm is defined, with
S6(Γy,Θy, x : (σb)i) ≤ Γ′,Θ′, x : (σi)b
and
S6(C1, C2, j ≤B e, j ≤B i, k ≤B f, k ≤B i) ≤
C ′1, C ′2, d ≤B d′, c ≤B c′, c ≤B b, d ≤B b
as required.
2
5.4.3 Termination of TypeTFO′pi≤
As for the algorithm TypeTFOpi (see Theorem 5.3.3), it may be shown that the
algorithm TypeTFO′pi≤ also terminates.
Theorem 5.4.4 (Termination of TypeTFO′pi≤) The algorithm TypeTFO′pi≤ ter-
minates for all finite inputs.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of the input. Each step either: ter-
minates immediately (returning a result); calls one of the algorithms Unify
or M which terminates by Theorems 5.2.15 and 5.2.21; or makes a recursive
call on a subset of the input. Since each stage either terminates explicitly
or recurses on a subset of the input, if the input is finite then the algorithm
must eventually terminate.
As an example, consider the case of TypeTFO′pi≤(x[
−→y ].P): there are three
steps involved, all of which can be shown to terminate. Firstly, since accord-
ing to the statement the input is finite, then a subset of the input is also finite
and thus TypeTFO′pi≤(P) terminates by the induction hypothesis. Secondly, by
the statement the sequence −→y must be finite so by Theorem 5.2.15 the call to
Unify
(
Γ, {x : (−→αj)i,−→y : −→αk}
)






terminates by Theorem 5.2.21. Hence, since all sub-steps terminate, the
algorithm for TypeTFO′pi≤(x[
−→y ].P) must also terminate. 2
5.5 Type Inference For System THOpi≤
Type inference for system THOpi≤ is only slightly more problematic than the
previous two systems. It is the treatment of sub-typing that requires the
most care, due to the current definition of sub-typing which only applies to
the outer-most annotations on channel types.
This situation is handled with the definition of an auxiliary function (Def-
inition 5.5.1) that takes a set of type constraints, and returns the correspond-
ing set of annotation constraints.
Definition 5.5.1 The function [[·]] returns the set of annotation constraints
corresponding to the argument set of sub-type constraints. By definition, the
number of constraints returns is less-than or equal to the number of sub-type
















[[ ≤ ]] , ∅
A companion function takes a similar set of constraints, and returns an anno-
tation unifier for those (process and abstraction) types that require matching
annotations (Definition 5.5.2).
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Definition 5.5.2 The function {[·]} takes a set of sub-type constraints, and
returns an annotation unifier which unifies all top-level annotations on pro-
cess and abstraction types.
{[]} , Id
{[Procb ≤ Procc]} , BUNIFY(b, c)
{[(
−→
σd1)→ Procb ≤ (
−→





]} , let R = {[σb ≤ σb′ ]}





{[ ≤ ]} , ∅
The two functions are separate as both are used in the implementation, but
only the former is of use in the definition of constraints in a deduction.
5.5.1 Implementation
The algorithm proceeds in essentially the same manner as before; the main
difference is the additional constraints mentioned above. Note the need to
also carry C throughout the inference process, although it is written as part
of the algorithm rather than an argument as it is constant throughout the
entire deduction. The algorithm itself is presented across Figures 5.5, 5.6,
5.7, and 5.8. It takes as input a valid term in THOpi≤, and returns a tuple
consisting of a type environment, a set of constraints (see Definition 5.4.1),
the type assigned to the term (note that this is now not restricted to just
the well-formed process type Proc due to the annotation on the type and the
possibility of abstractions), the contextual information (C) of the term, and
a substitution. An auxiliary algorithm (Figure 5.9) is also needed to handle
the sequences of terms encountered in the output and application constructs,
as they may contain both names and processes.
5.5.2 Correctness of TypeCTHOpi≤
Soundness
First some auxiliary definitions and results are required.
The constraints generated by a deduction in THOpi≤ are defined in a similar
manner to system TFOpi≤ by the algorithm Constraints; shown in Figures 5.10
and 5.11. As with system TFOpi≤, note that the definition is over a deduction
tree (in which all antecedents are known) not a term in isolation.






〈∅, ∅,Procb, ∅, Id〉
TypeCTHOpi≤(X) =

































































































σ′d ≤ −→αi ]],
∀x ∈ C.c ≤B −−→C2T(x),









Figure 5.5: Type Inference Algorithm for System THOpi≤






















































S4 = S3;CUnify(S3(C),S3({x : b}))










∀V ∈ −→V .b ≤B CT(V )),S5(Procb),S5(C−→V , x : b)
〉
Figure 5.6: Type Inference Algorithm for System THOpi≤ (cont.)


























































: b, x : b)
)







Θ , x : (
−→
σj)i),
S9(C1, C2, [[−→σc ≤
−→
σj ]],∀x ∈ C.b ≤B −−→C2T(x),
∀C2k, V ∈ domC2j.C2k(V ) ≤B ck),
S9(Procc),S9(C1,
−→






Figure 5.7: Type Inference Algorithm for System THOpi≤ (cont.)
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TypeCTHOpi≤
(








〈Θ, C2,Procc,C2,S2〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(S1(Q))
S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(




S3(Θ),S3({x : (σi)j, V : σU})
)







S6(C1V 〈i〉 C2V ),




S7(ΓV ,ΘV , x : (σi)j),
S7(C1, C2, b ≤B C1T(V ), c ≤B C2T(V )),
S7(Proci·b+i·c),
S7(C1V 〈i〉 C2V , x : i · b+ i · c),S7
〉
Figure 5.8: Type Inference Algorithm for System THOpi≤ (cont.)
Type′CTHOpi≤(x) =












Γ, C, σb,C, S1
〉
= TypeCTHOpi≤(K)〈−→




























Figure 5.9: Type Inference Algorithm for System THOpi≤ Sequences
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Constraints
(


























Γ1 `CHO≤ K1 : σb11 ;C1
) ∪ . . .∪
Constraints
(

















Γx, x : σ

















































σc `CHO≤ P : Procb;C
)
Figure 5.10: Constraints Generated by a Deduction in THOpi≤














{[[−→σd ≤ −→σc]],∀x ∈ C.b ≤B
−−→
C′2T(x),
∀C2i, V ∈ domC2i.C2i(V ) ≤B di} ∪
Constraints
(





















V ).P : Procd;C−→
V























Γ, x : (c · −→σd)b,−→Γ′ `CHO≤ x[
−→
K ].P : Procc;












′ ≤ c · −→σd]],∀x ∈ C.c ≤B
−−→
C′2T(x),
∀C2i, V ∈ domC2i.C2i(V ) ≤B d′i} ∪
Constraints
(

















Γ,Θ, x : (σb)e `CHO≤ x(V : σb) ?certifyP⊕Q : Procb·c+b·d;
C1V 〈b〉 C2V , x : (b · c+ b · d)
)
=
{c ≤B C1T(V ), d ≤B C2T(V )} ∪
Constraints
(
ΓV , V : σ




ΘV , V : σ
U, x : (σb)e `CHO≤ Q : Procd;C2
)
Figure 5.11: Constraints Generated by a Deduction in THOpi≤ (continued)
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σc2]} is defined, then
• For each Procb ≤ Procc in −→σb1 ≤
−→
σc2, S(b) = S(c)






σc2, S(c) = S(e)
Proof. By soundness of BUNIFY and inspection of the algorithm. 2
Theorem 5.5.4 (Soundness of Type′CTHOpi≤) For any finite sequence of valid
terms
−→































Proof. By cases on the structure of
−→
K and examination of the algorithm,
appealing to the soundness of the algorithm TypeCTHOpi≤ .
• −→K ≡ x: From the algorithm Type′CTHOpi≤(x) = 〈{x : αi}, ∅, αi, ∅, Id〉, and
hence by the first variable type rule, x : αi `CHO≤ x : αi; ∅ and
Constraints
(




• −→K ≡ A: From the algorithm Type′CTHOpi≤(A) = TypeCTHOpi≤(A), and by
Theorem 5.5.5 this is sound so soundness also holds for Type′CTHOpi≤ .
• −→K ≡ K ′−→K ′′: By Theorem 5.5.5, 〈Γ, C, σb,C,S1〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(K ′) im-
plies Γ `CHO≤ S1(K ′) : σb;C and Constraints
(
Γ `CHO≤ S1(K ′) : σb;C
)
=
C. Then by the induction hypothesis,〈−→













































implies S4(C)  S4(
⋃−→
C′). Hence by definition,
S4(Γ
−→
Γ′ ) `CHO≤ S4(K ′
−→










Γ′ ) `CHO≤ S4(K ′
−→






= S4(C, C ′)
as required.
2
Theorem 5.5.5 (Soundness of TypeCTHOpi≤) For every valid term A in Sys-
tem THOpi≤, 〈
Γ, C, σb,C,S〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(A)
implies




Γ `CHO≤ S(A) : σb;C
)
= C
Proof. By induction on the structure of A and examination of the algorithm.





〈∅, ∅,Procb, ∅, Id〉. By
the zero type rule,




∅ `C(HO≤) 0b : Procb; ∅
)
= ∅
by the definition of Constraints as required.
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• A ≡ X: From the algorithm, TypeCTHOpi≤(X) = 〈{X : αi}, ∅, αi, {X : i}, Id〉.
By the second variable introduction rule,




X : αi `CHO≤ X : αi;X : i
)
= ∅
by the definition of Constraints as required.
• A ≡ !P: From the algorithm, TypeCTHOpi≤(!P) = TypeCTHOpi≤(P), and by the
induction hypothesis TypeCTHOpi≤(P) =
〈
Γ, C,Procb,C,S〉 implies




Γ `CHO≤ S(P) : Procb;C
)
= C
Hence by the replication rule and the definition of Constraints, sound-
ness holds for !P as required.










Γ `CHO≤ S1(P) : Procb;C
)
= C
By soundness of Unify, S2 = S1;Unify(Γ,S1({x : σc})) implies S2(Γ) 
S2({x : σc}), hence by the restriction rule and the definitions of the
algorithm and Constraints,
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〈Θ, C2,Procc,C2,S2〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(S1(Q))
implies




Θ `C(HO≤) S2(Q) : Procc;C2
)
= C2
Then, by soundness of Unify, S3 = S1;S2;Unify(S2(Γ),Θ) implies S3(Γ) 
S3(Θ), and similarly by soundness of CUnify, S4 = S3;CUnify(S3(C1),S3(C2))
implies S4(C1)  S4(C2). Hence by the summation type rule and defi-
nition of Constraints,








• A ≡ Q|R: Similarly.









Γ `CHO≤ S1(P) : Procb;C
)
= C
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S2(C,∀V ∈ −→V .b ≤B CT(V ))
as required.
• A′ ≡ A〈−→K 〉: By the induction hypothesis:
〈Γ, C1, σc,C1,S1〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(A)
implies




Γ `CHO≤ S1(A) : σc;C1
)
= C1







































implies S3(Γ)  S3(
⋃−→
Θ) by






implies S4(σc) = S4((
−→
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is also sound, and similarly for S7 = S6; {[S6(
−→
σ′d ≤ −→αi)]} by soundness of
{[·]} (noting that the base types are in the correct form by the previous


















σ′d ≤ −→αi ]],
∀x ∈ C.c ≤B −−→C2T(x),
∀C2j, V ∈ domC2j.C2j ≤B dj)
as required.









Γ `CHO≤ S1(P) : Procb;C
)
= C























is sound (as required by the well-formed type
rule). By the soundness of CUnify, S4 = S3;CUnify(S3(C),S3({x : b}))
implies S4(C)  S4({x : b}) as required. Similarly, by soundness of
{[·]}, S5 = S4; {[S4(
−→
σj ≤ −→σc)]} is sound, noting that the base types are
in the correct form due to the explicit typing and the requirement that
the term is valid. Then by the input type rule and the definition of
Constraints,








, x : b)












, x : b)
)
=
C, [[−→σj ≤ −→σc]],∀V ∈ −→V .b ≤B CT(V )
as required.









Γ `CHO≤ P : Procb;C1
)
= C1












































Θ , x : (
−→
σj)i) is defined as re-












ensures the types carried by x are mul-
tiplied by both the annotation of x and the process integrity of P
as required by the type rule. In a similar fashion, the soundness of
























b, x : b) is defined. Likewise, by soundness of {[·]} S9 = S8; {[S8(−→σc ≤−→














: b, x : b)

















: b, x : b)
)
=
S9(C1, C2, [[−→σc ≤
−→
σj ]],∀x ∈ C.b ≤B −−→C2T(x),
∀C2k, V ∈ domC2j.C2k(V ) ≤B ck)
as required.








Γ `CHO≤ S1(P) : Procb;C1
)
= C1
Similarly, 〈Θ, C2,Procc,C2,S2〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(S1(Q)) implies




Θ `CHO≤ S2(Q) : Procc;C2
)
= C2
Then by soundness of Unify,
S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(
Γ,S1;S2({x : (σi)j, V : σT})
)
implies S3(Γ, x : (σi)j, V : σT) is defined, and likewise
S4 = S3;Unify
(
S3(Θ),S3({x : (σi)j, V : σU})
)
implies S4(Θ, x : (σi)j, V : σU) is defined and
S5 = S4;Unify(S4(ΓV ),S4(ΘV ))
implies S5(ΓV ,ΘV ) is defined (noting that the bound variable V is
removed during the unification as it has a different type in each). By the
soundness of CUnify, S6 = S5;M(S5(j),S5(σi)) means S6(i) = S6(i · j)
as required by the well-formed type rule. Similarly,
S7 = S6;CUnify
(
S6(C1V 〈i〉 C2V ),S6({x : i · b+ i · c})
)
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is sound. Hence by the certify type rule and the definition of Constraints,
S7(ΓV ,ΘV , x : (σi)j `C(HO≤) x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Procib+ic;




S7(ΓV ,ΘV , x : (σi)j `C(HO≤) x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Procib+ic;
C1V 〈i〉 C2V , x : i · b+ i · c)
)
=




Definition 5.5.6 For notational convenience, define the relation on tuples
〈Γ, C, σc,C〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, C ′, σ′b,C′〉
if and only if there is some substitution S such that the following all hold:
1. ∀V ∈ domΓ.S(Γ(V )) = Γ′(V ) (that is, Γ ≤ Γ′)
2. S(C) ≤ C′
3. S(σb) = σ′c
4. ∀V ∈ domC.S(C(V )) = C′(V ) (that is, C ≤ C′)





σc2, if there is some substitution S′ such that
• For each Procb ≤ Procc in −→σb1 ≤
−→
σc2, S′(b) = S′(c)






σc2, S′(c) = S′(e)
Then S = {[−→σb1 ≤
−→
σc2]} is defined, and S ≤ S′.
Proof. By completeness of BUNIFY. 2
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Theorem 5.5.8 (Completeness of Type′CTHOpi≤)









































Γ′ , C ′,−→σ′c,−→C′
〉







C′ and by examination of the algorithm, appealing to Theorem 5.5.9.
• Γ′ `CHO≤ x : σ′c; ∅: By definition of the algorithm, Type′CTHOpi≤(x) =
〈x : αi, ∅, αi, ∅〉 which is defined, and 〈x : αi, ∅, αi, ∅〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, ∅, σ′c, ∅〉 for
all values of Γ′ and σ′c (noting that Constraints
(
Γ′ `CHO≤ x : σ′c; ∅
)
= ∅).
• Γ′ `CHO≤ A : σ′c;C′: By definition of the algorithm, Type′CTHOpi≤(A) =











C′2: By Theorem 5.5.9,
Constraints
(






Γ1, C1, σb11 ,C1,S1
〉
is defined, and 〈
Γ1, C1, σb11 ,C1
〉 ≤ 〈Γ′1, C ′1, σ′c11 ,C′1〉
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Theorem 5.5.9 (Completeness of TypeCTHOpi≤)
∀Γ′,P, σ′c,C′, C ′. If there is a valid deduction in System THOpi≤ for








Γ, C, σb,C,S〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(A)
is defined, and 〈
Γ, C, σb,C〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, C ′, σ′c,C′〉
Proof. By cases on the structure of A then by induction on the derivation
of Γ′ `CHO≤ A : σb;C′ and examination of the algorithm.
• A ≡ 0b: The deduction Γ′ `C(HO≤) 0b : Procb; ∅ must have ended in a
use of the zero type rule followed by zero or more uses of the weaken






〈∅, ∅,Procb, ∅, Id〉
Since Constraints
(
Γ′ `CHO≤ 0b : Procb; ∅
)
= ∅ for all Γ′, by definition〈∅, ∅,Procb, ∅〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, ∅,Procb, ∅〉
as required.
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• A ≡ X: The deduction Γ′ `CHO≤ X : σc;X : c must have ended in
a use of the second variable rule, possibly followed by zero or more
applications of the weaken rule; by examination of the algorithm,
TypeCTHOpi≤(X) =
〈{X : αi}, ∅, αi, {X : i}, Id〉
Since Constraints
(
Γ′ `CHO≤ X : σc;X : c
)
= ∅, by definition〈{X : αi}, ∅, αi, {X : i}〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, ∅, σc, {X : c}〉
as required (since by the second variable rule Γ′(X) = σc, and trivially
∃S.S(αi) = σc).
• A ≡ !P: The deduction Γ′,∆ `CHO≤ !P : Procc;C′ must have ended in
zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by a use of the replication
rule with antecedent Γ′ `CHO≤ P : Procc;C′ (where the domain of ∆ is
all the names and variables introduced via weakening after the final use
of the replication rule). By the induction hypothesis,
Constraints
(









Γ, C,Procb,C〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, C ′,Procc,C′〉. Hence by the
definitions of the algorithm, the replication rule, and Constraints, the
result also holds for !P (noting that Γ ≤ Γ′ implies Γ ≤ Γ′,∆ trivially).
• A ≡ (νx : σb)P: The deduction
Γ′, x : σb,∆ `CHO≤ (νx : σb)P : Procc
′
;C′x
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule followed by
an instance of the restriction rule with antecedent
Γ′, x : σb `CHO≤ P : Procc
′
;C′
where the domain of ∆ contains all names introduced via weakening,
and assuming that x /∈ domΓ′. By the induction hypothesis,
Constraints
(






TypeCTHOpi≤(P) = 〈Γ, C,Procc,C,S〉
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where
〈Γ, C,Procc,C〉 ≤ 〈Γ′ ∪ {x : σb}, C ′,Procc,C′〉
Hence by the definitions of the algorithm, the replication rule, and
Constraints, the result also holds for
〈Γx, C,Procc,Cx〉 ≤
〈
Γ′, C ′,Procc′ ,C′x
〉
as required.
• A ≡ P + Q: The deduction
Γ′,Θ′,∆ `C(HO≤) P + Q : Procc1·c2 ;C′1,C′2
must have ended in a zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded
by an instance of the summation rule with antecedents
Γ′ `CHO≤ P : Procc1 ;C′1
and Θ′ `CHO≤ Q : Procc2 ;C′2
where the domain of ∆ is all the names and variables introduced via















〉 ≤ 〈Γ′, C ′1,Procc1 ,C′1〉, and
Constraints
(











〉 ≤ 〈Θ′, C ′2,Procc2 ,C′2〉.
By the completeness of Unify, since Γ ≤ Γ′ and Θ ≤ Θ′ (and Γ′  Θ′),
then S3 = S1;S2;Unify(S2(Γ),Θ) is defined and most general; similarly,
S4 = S3;CUnify(S3(C1),S3(C2)) is also defined and most general by
the completeness of CUnify. Hence by the summation rule and the
definition of the algorithm,
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is defined, and furthermore by definition of Constraints
Constraints
(
Γ′,Θ′,∆ `CHO≤ P + Q : Procc1·c2 ;C′1,C′2
)




≤ 〈(Γ′,Θ′,∆), (C ′1, C ′2),Procc1·c2 , (C′1,C′2)〉
as required.
• A ≡ P|Q: Similarly.









must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by





σb `CHO≤ P : Procc
′
;C′
where the domain of ∆ is all the names and variables introduced via
weakening after the application of the abstraction rule, and assuming
that
−→






















′}, C ′,Procc′ ,C′
〉







is defined and most general. Hence by the abstraction rule and the
definitions of the algorithm and Constraints,〈
S2(Γ−→V ),S2(C,∀V ∈
−→
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must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an instance of the application rule with antecedents


























1 , and the domain of ∆ is all the names and variables














〈Γ, C1, σc,C1,S1〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(A)
is defined, and
〈Γ, C1, σc,C1〉 ≤
〈


































































is defined and most general, and by
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is defined and most general. By completeness of U again, the state-








is also defined and most general, not-
ing that only the base types are unified, to preserve the constraints.





αi)]} is defined and most-general by completeness of {[·]}.





σ′d ≤ −→αi ]],∀x ∈ C.c ≤B −−→C2T(x),
















d′ ,∀x ∈ C.
−−→
C′2T(x) ≥B c′,












• A ≡ x(−→V : −→σb).P: The deduction










, x : c′
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an instance of the input rule with antecedent











σd ≤ −→σb and the domain of ∆ is all names and variables in-
troduced via weakening after the application of the input rule, and
assuming
−→
V /∈ domΓ′. By the induction hypothesis, given
Constraints
(











then 〈Γ, C,Procc,C,S1〉 = TypeCTHOpi≤(P) is defined and
〈Γ, C,Procc,C〉 ≤
〈






σb}, C ′,Procc′ ,C′
〉
Hence, by completeness of Unify, M, and CUnify respectively the fol-
lowing statements are all defined and most-general:
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– S4 = S3;CUnify(S3(C),S3({x : c}))
Therefore, since the base types are in the correct form, by completeness
of {[·]} S5 = S4; {[S4(
−→
σj ≤ −→σb)]} is defined and most-general. Then by
the input rule and the definition of Constraints,〈




σj ≤ −→σb]],∀V ∈ −→V .c ≤B CT(V )),
S5(Procc),S5(C−→V , x : c)
〉
≤〈
(Γ′, x : (
−→





, x : c′)
〉
as required.
• A ≡ x[−→K ].P: The deduction










K ].P : Procc
′
;







must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
a use of the output rule with antecedents


























and the domain of ∆ is all the names and variables
introduced via weakening after the last application of the output rule.
By the induction hypothesis, given
Constraints
(
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Θ), {x : (−→σj)i}
)













are defined and most general (noting that the combination of the well-
formed type rule with the output rule requires the object types to be
multiplied by both the channel annotation and the process annotation).
















: c, x : c)
)
are defined and most general. By completeness of {[·]}, S9 = S8; {[S8(
−→
σd ≤−→
σj)]} is also defined and most general. Then by the output rule and
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the definitions of Constraints and the algorithm,〈







σi ]],∀x ∈ C.c ≤B −−→C2T(x)
∀C2k, V ∈ domC2k.C2k(V ) ≤B dk),
S9(Procc),S9(C1,
⋃−→
















(C ′1, C ′2, [[
−−→
σ′d




]],∀x ∈ C.c′ ≤B C′2T(x),
∀C′2k, V ∈ domC′2k.C′2k ≤B d′′k)
Procc
′









• A ≡ x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q: The deduction
Γ′,Θ′, x : (σi)d,∆ `C(HO≤) x(V : σi) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proci·c1+i·c2 ;
C′1V 〈i〉 C′2V , x : (i · c1 + i · c2)
must have ended in zero or more uses of the weaken rule, preceded by
an instance of the certify rule with antecedents
Γ′, x : (σi)d, V : σT `CHO≤ P : Procc1 ;C′1
and Θ′, x : (σi)d, V : σU `CHO≤ Q : Procc2 ;C′2
where the domain of ∆ is all the names and variables introduced via
weakening subsequent to the application of the certify rule (and assum-

















Θ′, x : (σi)d, V : σU `CHO≤ Q : Procc2 ;C′2
)
= C ′2







〉 ≤ 〈Θ′ ∪ {x : (σi)d, V : σU}, C ′2,Procc2 ,C′2〉
Now, by completeness of Unify, the following are all defined and most
general:
– S3 = S1;S2;Unify
(
Γ,S1;S2({x : (σi)j, V : σT})
)
– S4 = S3;Unify
(
S3(Θ),S3({x : (σi)j, V : σU})
)
– S5 = S4;Unify(S4(ΓV ),S4(ΘV ))
(Noting that the unification is performed in the absence of V in the
final step, due to the conflicting types). Similarly, by completeness of
M, S6 = S5;M(S5(j),S5(σi)) is also defined and most general. Finally,
by completeness of CUnify,
S7 = S6;CUnify
(
S6(C1V 〈i〉 C2V ),S6({x : i · b1 + i · b2})
)
is defined and most general, and thus ensures that the type of x is
well-formed. Hence by the certify rule and the definition of Constraints,〈
S6(ΓV ,ΘV , x : (αi)j),S6(C1, C2, b1 ≤B C1T(V ), b2 ≤B C2T(V ))
S6(Proci·b1+i·b2),S6(C1V 〈j〉 C2V , x : i · b1 + i · b2)
〉
≤〈
(Γ′,Θ′, x : (σi)d,∆), (C ′1, C ′2, c1 ≤B C′1T(V ), c2 ≤B C′2T(V ))




5.5.3 Termination of TypeCTHOpi≤
Theorem 5.5.10 The algorithm Type′CTHOpi≤ terminates for all finite inputs.
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Proof. By induction on the length of the input. For unary input, the algo-
rithm is defined as a call to TypeCTHOpi≤ which terminates by Theorem 5.5.11.
For a sequence, the algorithm is defined as a call to TypeCTHOpi≤ which termi-
nates as above, and a recursive call on a subset of the input, which terminates
by the induction hypothesis. The respective outputs are unified with calls to
Unify and CUnify, which terminate via Theorems 5.2.15 and 5.2.18. Hence
since each stage either terminates or makes a recursive call on a subset of
the input, if the input is finite the algorithm must eventually terminate. 2
Theorem 5.5.11 The algorithm TypeCTHOpi≤ terminates for all finite inputs.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the input. Each step either: ter-
minates immediately (returning a result); calls one of the algorithms Unify
or M which terminates by Theorems 5.2.15 and 5.2.21; or makes a recursive
call on a subset of the input. Since each stage either terminates explicitly
or recurses on a subset of the input, if the input is finite then the algorithm
must eventually terminate.
For instance; the case for a certify construct begins with a recursive call to
each branch, and by the induction hypothesis these both terminate. This is
followed by three separate calls to Unify and one each toM and CUnify, which
all terminate by Theorems 5.2.15, 5.2.18, and 5.2.21 respectively. Thus the
algorithm terminates for all certify constructs containing finite sub-terms. 2
5.6 Discussion
This Chapter discussed implementations, in the form of type inference algo-
rithms, for Systems TFOpi, TFO′pi≤, and THOpi≤. Correctness was demonstrated
by proofs of soundness (that a valid deduction could be formed from the
information returned by the algorithm) and completeness (that for any valid
derivation, the algorithm was defined for the corresponding term and pro-
duced a most-general result).
For all systems, a substitution was returned in addition to a derived envi-
ronment and other relevant information. This was to handle the possibility
of variable annotations in declarations being unified and not matching types
in the environment. Proofs of soundness were then couched in terms of this
substitution.
For the latter two systems involving sub-typing, a set of constraints on
annotations was also returned, as there is by definition a range of possible
solutions for a term. These constraint sets were also considered in the most-
general determination, by comparing against a set of of constraints derived
from a derivation tree.
Chapter 6
Future Work and Conclusions
This chapter summarises the results of the thesis, and considers future direc-
tions for enhancement.
6.1 Future Work
6.1.1 A More Powerful Subtyping Discipline
In Section 3.4.1 it was observed that complete structural sub-typing (that is,
considering more than just the annotation on the bare type, as in the systems
introduced here) by necessity requires a further notion of the input/output
usage of that channel; as first introduced in Pierce and Sangiorgi (1993)
and further analysed (with the initial work on inference algorithms for such
systems) in Igarashi and Kobayashi (2000).
In that context, a natural extension of the work presented in this the-
sis would be including such information, to enable a deeper (and, it would
appear, more useful) notion of sub-typing. The logical method of incorpo-
rating I/O information would appear to be to simply add an additional tag
representing I/O usage; so an annotation now becomes a pair of an integrity
expression and a I/O usage tag, for example b/o (where o is either +, −, or ±
to indicate output only, input only, or both respectively). This is consistent
with the scheme in Pierce and Sangiorgi (1993) — which is concerned solely
with sub-typing based on I/O information — but may appear unusual in
comparison with systems such as those detailed in (for example) Kobayashi
et al. (1996): many similar systems utilise a pair of tags, one expression
describing properties when the name is used for input, and the other when
used for output.
There are two reasons for rejecting such a scheme in this context:
184
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• It is highly unlikely that the integrity of a channel changes dependent
on the direction of its use.
• The schemes mentioned above are concerned with usage analysis of
channels, in particular on those cited with linearity properties; in that
setting it is natural to track input and output usage, as the semantics
of reduction in the pi-calculus necessitate that a channel must be used
at least once in both an input and output setting. No such constraint
exists in the scenarios examined here.
With these assumptions, a tentative type system — extending that of Fig-
ure 3.4 on page 57 — may be proposed.
Definition 6.1.1 (Input/Output Annotations) Let o, p, q range over
I/O annotations, with constants +, −, and ±, where + represents output
only, − input only, and ± both input and output (see Pierce and Sangiorgi
1993). The relation ≤I is the least transitive and reflexive relation closed
under
± ≤I + ± ≤I −





where b is a trust expression as before (see Definition 3.1.1), and o is an
I/O annotation as in Definition 6.1.1. Where convenient, the symbols m,
n will range over the combined annotations b/o. Multiplication of types by
a trust expression is as before, applying only to the trust expression part of
the annotation: b · σc/o = σbc/o (also extended point-wise to multiplication of
sequences as before).
Definition 6.1.3 (Subtype Relation) The relation ≤ is the least transi-
tive and reflexive relation containing












Note the contravariant ordering in the output sub-type case on the right; this
expresses the same idea as in the output rule of Figures 3.4 and 3.7.








Γ `b(pi) P : Proc
Γ `bpi P : Proc
(conv .)
∅ `b(pi) 0 : Proc
(zero)
Γ `bpi P : Proc c ≤B b
Γ `cpi P : Proc
(rel .)
Γ `bpi P : Proc
Γ `bpi !P : Proc
(rep.)
Γx, x : σ
m `cpi P : Proc
Γx `cpi (νx : σm)P : Proc
(res .)
Γ `bpi P : Proc x /∈ domΓ `pi σm
Γ, x : σm `bpi P : Proc
(weak .)
Γ `b(pi) P : Proc Θ `c(pi) Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `bc(pi) P + Q : Proc
(sum.)
Γ `bpi P : Proc Θ `cpi Q : Proc
Γ,Θ `bcpi P|Q : Proc
(comp.)
Γ−→y , x : (
−→
σm)c/o,−→y : −→σ′n `dpi P : Proc
−→
σm ≤ −→σ′n d ≤B c
Γ−→y , x : (
−→




Γ, x : (
−→
σm)c/o,−→y : −→σ′n `dpi P : Proc
−→
σ′n ≤ −→σm d ≤B c
Γ, x : (
−→
σm)c/o,−→y : −→σ′n `d(pi) x[−→y ].P : Proc
(out .)
Γy, x : (σ
i/p)b/o, y : σT/p `cpi P : Proc c ≤B b
Θy, x : (σ
i/p)b/o, y : σU/p `dpi Q : Proc d ≤B b
Γy,Θy, x : (σ
i/p)b/o `ic+id(pi) x(y : σi/p) ?certifyP⊕Q : Proc
(cert .)
Figure 6.1: Proposed Extended First-Order I/O Sub-Type Rules
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The (proposed) new rules for the first-order calculus are displayed in
Figure 6.1.
There is scope for incorporating aspects of I/O information in the higher-
order system as well, by considering the direction of the ports in the external
context. As an example, consider the process (assumed untrusted)
x.P
where the external context contains just x. In this example, the process
clearly shares a name with the host; however if the host only uses x for
outward communication then calling the above process untrusted (after the
final rule) is perhaps unjust.
To fine tune this, perhaps let the external context be a set of names
and I/O tags; for example C = {x−}. A context is defined similarly; for
example C = {x+ : U}. Also define x− = x+ and x+ = x−, then the final
rule annotation could be adjusted to be
V
xo∈CCT(x
o), and the above example
would thus be trusted after the final rule (this in fact resembles the filters of
Vivas and Yoshida (2002)).
6.1.2 A Deeper Structure for Contexts
The system THOpi≤ used contexts which had an essentially flat structure. This
served to implement the observability-based security property beind the intu-
itions, but also proved a little limiting in some circumstances, notable agent
subtyping. It would seem that in order to use similar ideas in conjunction
with subtyping a more flexible or powerful structure is needed.
Some preliminary investigations have been done in to a system of context
combinators that reflect the structure of the term they relate to. For example,
in a composition rather than just set union they might be combined as C1|C2,
for some definition of ’|’ that is at least associative and symmetric. This is a
rather complicated direction, but the notion of graph types (Yoshida 1996)
may offer some useful insights.
6.1.3 Static Optimisation
There may well be situations in which the certify input has statically deter-
minable integrity — for instance, if it is received on an untrusted channel
then it must itself be untrusted, and hence the second branch of a certify
expression will always be taken (the semantics of coercion only permit coer-
cion of variable trustedness; it is illegal for a trusted value to be coerced to
untrusted, and vice-versa) and the first branch is redundant. This opens up
a trivial set of optimisations along the lines of dead code removal.
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6.1.4 Extending the Properties of Certify
One of the novel contributions presented in this thesis has been the concept
of certify; an oracle-nature verification procedure capable of determining in-
tegrity at run-time. This is not an unrealistic concept; many examples of
such a procedure were proffered, such as digital signature verification, check-
sums (up to a certain level of noise), proof-carrying code, and so on. It does,
however, introduce a certain representational gap; most “real world” systems
utilising such procedures most likely use a combination of many.
This introduces the possibility of extending the system with different
classes of certify procedures, each capable of handling different types of re-
quest. Aside from being a more accurate model of many situations, it opens
the possibility of a finer-grained type system: types may be tagged not just
with an integrity expression, but with a value describing perhaps the checks
already passed. For example, in a two-tiered authentication system — in
which the first test must be passed before the second is considered — any
data path inadvertently leading to entry into the second class of certify by-
passing the first would be detected as not carrying the correct tag.
The second possibility for extending certify would be to introduce a range
of values it can classify data at (for example, untrusted/not-sure/trusted).
This is similar to a lattice-based approach, but could conceivably be more
easily adapted to the systems here using a fuzzy logic instead of the current
crisp system. See Section 6.1.6 for further ideas in this direction.
6.1.5 Generalising the rules of THOpi≤
A weakness of the rules of THOpi≤ is the need to know the execution envi-
ronment in advance; that is, the rules are with respect to C and if a client
wishes to check the program with respect to a different environment they
must perform the entire deduction from scratch. It would be desirable if this
restriction could be factored out in some manner, so the final result is an
expression dependent on C (rather than derived from it) and the result may
be checked for different environments simply by plugging in different values
of C.
It is presently unclear how this might proceed, however systems based on
proof-carrying code (Necula 1998; Necula and Lee 1998) would appear to be
a good starting point for analysis.
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6.1.6 Generalising Annotation Semantics
The flexibility and power of boolean-style type annotations has seen a rapid
adoption of their use in a variety of analyses. In fact it would appear possible
that a general framework could be constructed around that presented here,
capable of handling a much wider range of analyses than just integrity, simply
by changing the interpretation of the constant symbols. This idea was first
presented in Wright (1996) using logics as the basis (with examples showing
how the same rules could express several usage analyses), and similar work
has since been attempted using the pi-calculus as the modelling tool (for
example Igarashi and Kobayashi 2001).
6.1.7 A Different Modelling Language
The pi-calculus is a powerful tool for reasoning about concurrency, and served
this purpose well in this thesis, however it also exposed several short-comings.
Its main drawback (which is also, it should be noted, a desirable feature in
many circumstances, such as when only the minimal abstraction of concur-
rency is of concern) is the lack of any notion of locality. Attempts have been
made to extend the pi-calculus with locality primitives (for example Sewell
1998), however it is proposed that a cleaner syntax and corresponding analy-
sis may be obtained by using a modelling language designed for that purpose
from the start.
One such calculus seemingly ideally suited for such a task is the ambient
calculus (Cardelli and Gordon 1998). In this calculus, locality is primitive
and easily syntactically expressed; locations may be nested (representing,
for example, different levels of firewall protection within an organisation),
and boundaries may be opened or closed. Work on security properties for
ambients has naturally already been undertaken (for example Bugliesi and
Castagna 2000; Bodei and Levi 2000), and it would be intriguing to see if
the same analyses described in this thesis (including boolean annotations to
express integrity properties and a certify-like run-time verification procedure)
can be easily applied to the ambient calculus. Several variants on the ambient
calculus also exist, many designed with security in mind, such as for example
the Seal calculus (Castagna, Vitek and Nardelli 2003).
An alternative language is the box-pi calculus (Sewell and Vitek 1999);
an aesthetically-pleasing combination of ambient-style boundaries and pi-
calculus channels for communication, which may even provide a closer map-
ping of the concepts here.
Lastly, the join-calculus (Fournet and Gonthier 1996) is another promising
language, offering both a powerful set of abstractions such as those provided
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by the pi-calculus and a close mapping with an ML-like language (Fournet
and Gonthier 1996; Fournet, Laneve, Maranget and Re´my 1997).
6.1.8 Protocol Analysis
Abadi and Gordon (1997) and Abadi, Fournet and Gonthier (1998) described
a variant of the pi-calculus (enriched with operators for describing crypto-
graphic primitives, such as keys and encryption) that was useful for reason-
ing about cryptographic protocols in a formal manner. Gordon and Jeffrey
(2001) extend this notion and present a practical tool implementing the anal-
ysis. It would be interesting to see if the analyses and methods of this thesis
can perform a similar function, and what role certify can play.
6.2 Conclusions
This thesis has described a system and analysis for statically determining
the safety of certain types of run-time coercion. The pi-calculus was used
as the modelling language, and a minimal syntactic extension introduced to
facilitate the analysis. Analysis was done via type systems, using an algebra
of boolean annotations to represent the integrity of each variable.
Chapter 3 presented four such systems:
• System TFOpi, an annotated type system for the first-order pi-calculus.
• System TFOpi≤, an annotated type system for the first-order pi-calculus
with sub-typing. Sub-Typing allowed more programs to be typed, by
allowing trusted data to be written to untrusted channels.
• System TFO′pi≤, an extension of the previous system that annotates each
derivation with a security level, in order to guarantee that untrusted
channels cannot affect the reduction of a process typed at a trusted
level.
• System THOpi≤, an annotated type system for the higher-order pi-calculus
with channel sub-typing. This allowed the analysis of systems incor-
porating mobile code. As processes themselves now become first-class
data objects, it is natural that they are also assigned integrity levels.
This led to a conundrum as to how to assign a trustedness level to a
group of processes. The solution was to perform the deduction from
the perspective of the environment hosting the processes, and the indi-
vidual process’ ability to interact with it. A novel concept of execution
context was introduced in order to perform this analysis.
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The cornerstone of all three systems was a novel construct called certify.
This is a minimalist syntactic addition to the language that makes it possible
to perform coercion, including from a lower level to trusted, in an implicit
fashion that may be statically verified for safety. It functions by unifying
the operations of verification and branching based on the result; it is thus
known at compile-time that one branch will always be taken if the verifica-
tion procedure succeeds, and the other if it fails. It is therefore possible to
parameterise the branches, one on a trusted variable and the other on an un-
trusted variable, and in this manner coercion is available to the programmer
but its incorrect or indiscriminate usage is not. In the higher-order calculus
the use of boolean constraints enables a precise annotation to be formed for
the construct, using the results of verification. The verification procedure
itself is kept abstract, that the analysis may become a framework capable of
utilising any suitable procedure.
Chapter 4 examined the safety of three of the four the systems (Sys-
tem TFOpi≤ was excluded as it was essentially developed as an intermediate
step to presenting System TFO′pi≤). This was achieved in two steps: a demon-
stration of type soundness, that typing is preserved under reduction (that
is, subject reduction), and a security property. Subject reduction is compli-
cated by the possibility of coercion: this was solved by stating that types are
preserved, modulo a substitution on annotations that is precisely defined by
the reduction path (that is, it encapsulates exactly each instance of coercion
occurring). The security property for the second first-order system was pre-
sented as a form of Secure Non-deterministic Non-Interference, such that no
channel of an integrity lower than the deduction is typed at can affect a re-
duction. In the higher order calculus it was stated that if a group of processes
is typed as being trusted, then it would never be the case that a sub-process
typed as untrusted be able to communicate with the external environment,
in other words as a property based on observability. No security property
was presented for System TFOpi as it is not a security system.
Chapter 5 described implementations for each system. This was expressed
in terms of type inference algorithms that returned principle types for each
valid term. Correctness of each algorithm was additionally shown, in terms of
their soundness (each algorithm produces a valid typing), and completeness
(for each valid term, the algorithm is defined and further returns a most-
general typing).
Bibliography
Abadi (1997). Secrecy by typing in security protocols, TACS: 3rd Interna-
tional Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software.
Abadi (1999). Security protocols and specifications, FOSSACS: Interna-
tional Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation
Structures, LNCS.
Abadi, M., Banerjee, A., Heintze, N. and Riecke, J. G. (1999). A core calculus
of dependency, The 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Programming Languages (POPL ’99), Association for Computing
Machinery, New York, pp. 147–160.
Abadi, M., Fournet, C. and Gonthier, G. (1998). Secure implementation of
channel abstractions, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual IEEE Sympo-
sium on Logic in Computer Science, pp. 105–116.
Abadi, M. and Gordon, A. D. (1997). A calculus for cryptographic protocols:
The spi calculus, Fourth ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, ACM Press, pp. 36–47.
Barendregt, H. (1981). The Lambda Calculus, Its Syntax and Semantics,
Vol. 103 of Studies in Logics and the Foundations of Mathematics, North
Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Biba, K. (1977). Integrity considerations for secure computer systems, Tech-
nical Report TR-3153, Mitre, Bedford, MA.
Bodei, C., Degano, P., Nielson, F. and Nielson, H. R. (2001). Static analysis
for the pi-calculus with applications to security, Information and Compu-
tation 168.
Bodei, C. and Levi, F. (2000). Security analysis for mobile ambients.
Boole, G. (1847). The Mathematical Analysis of Logic: Being an Essay
Toward a Calculus of Deductive Reasoning, Macmillan, Cambridge.
192
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193
Bugliesi, M. and Castagna, G. (2000). Secure safe ambients and jvm security.
Cardelli, L. (1996). Type systems, ACM Computing Surveys 28(1): 263–264.
Cardelli, L. and Gordon, A. D. (1998). Mobile ambients, in M. Nivat (ed.),
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Foundations of Soft-
ware Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS ’98), Held as Part
of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software
(ETAPS’98), (Lisbon, Portugal, March/April 1998), Vol. 1378 of lncs, sv,
pp. 140–155.
Castagna, G., Vitek, J. and Nardelli, F. (2003). The seal calculus, Techni-
cal report, De´partement d’Informatique, E´cole Normale Supe´rieure, Paris,
France.
Cryptyc: Cryptographic Protocol Type Checker (2006). Accessed: 3rd Jan-
uary, 2006.
URL: http://www.cryptyc.org/
Denning, D. E. (1976). A lattice model of information flow, Communications
of the ACM 19(5): 236–243.
Denning, D. E. (1999). The limits of formal security models. National Com-
puter Systems Security Award Acceptance Speech.
Distributed.net (2003). Accessed: 27th May, 2004.
URL: http://www.distributed.net/
Focardi, R. and Gorrieri, R. (1995). A classification of security properties,
Journal of Computer Security 3(1).
URL: ftp://ftp.cs.unibo.it/pub/TR/UBLCS/ClassificationOfSecurity.ps.gz
Fournet, C. and Gonthier, G. (1996). The reflexive CHAM and the join-
calculus, Conference Record of POPL ’96: The 23rd ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, St. Pe-
tersburg Beach, Florida, pp. 372–385.
Fournet, C., Laneve, C., Maranget, L. and Re´my, D. (1997). Implict typing a`
la ML for the join-calculus, Proc. of the 1997 8th International Conference
on Concurrency Theory, Springer-Verlag.
Gordon, A. and Jeffrey, A. (2001). Authenticity by typing for security proto-
cols, 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW ’01),
IEEE, Washington - Brussels - Tokyo, pp. 145–159.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 194
Gosling, J., Joy, B., Steele, G. and Bracha, G. (2000). The Java Language
Specification Second Edition, Addison-Wesley, Boston, Mass.
Heintze, N. and Riecke, J. G. (1998). The SLam calculus: Programming with
secrecy and integrity, Conference Record of POPL 98: The 25TH ACM
SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
San Diego, California, ACM, pp. 365–377.
Hennessy, M. and Riely, J. (2000). Information flow vs. resource access in
the asynchronous pi-calculus, 27th International Colloquium on Automata,
Languages and Programming (ICALP ’2000), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany. A longer version appeared as
Computer Science Technical Report 2000:03, School of Cognitive and Com-
puting Sciences, University of Sussex.
Hepburn, M. and Wright, D. (2001). Trust in the pi-calculus, Third Interna-
tional Conference on Principles and Practice of Declarative Programming
(PPDP’01).
Hepburn, M. and Wright, D. (2003). Execution contexts for determining
trust in a higher-order pi-calculus, Technical report, School of Computing,
University of Tasmania.
Hepburn, M. and Wright, D. (2004). Determining trust in cooperating agent-
based systems, in M. Negnevitsky (ed.), Artificial Intelligence in Science
and Technology 2004.
Honda, K., Vasconcelos, V. and Yoshida, N. (2000). Secure information flow
as typed process behaviour, in G. Smolka (ed.), Programming Languages
and Systems: Proceedings of the 9th European Symposium on Programming
(ESOP 2000), Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory
and Practice of Software (ETAPS 2000), (Berlin, Germany, March/April
2000), Vol. 1782 of lncs, sv, pp. 180–199.
Honda, K. and Yoshida, N. (2002). A uniform type structure for secure infor-
mation flow, Conference Record of POPL’02: The 29th ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, Portland,
Oregon, pp. 81–92.
Igarashi, A. and Kobayashi, N. (2000). Type reconstruction for linear pi-
calculus with I/O subtyping, Journal of Information and Computation
161(1): 1–44. An extended abstract appeared in the Proceedings of SAS
’97, LNCS 1302.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 195
Igarashi, A. and Kobayashi, N. (2001). A generic type system for the
pi-calculus, 28th Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Lan-
guages (POPL) (London, UK), ACM.
Jif: Java + information flow (2005). Accessed: 20th November, 2005.
URL: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/
Kirli, Z. (2001). Confined mobile functions, 14th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop (CSFW ’01), IEEE, Washington - Brussels - Tokyo,
pp. 283–294.
Kobayashi, N., Pierce, B. and Turner, D. (1996). Linearity and the pi-
calculus.
Martin, U. and Nipkow, T. (1990). Boolean unification — the story so far,
in C. Kirchner (ed.), Unification, Academic Press, pp. 437–456.
Milner, R. (1980). A Calculus for Communicating Systems, Vol. 92 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Milner, R. (1992). Functions as processes, Mathematical Structures in Com-
puter Science 2(2): 119–141.
Milner, R. (1993). The polyadic pi-calculus: A tutorial, in F. L. Hamer,
W. Brauer and H. Schwichtenberg (eds), Logic and Algebra of Specification,
Springer-Verlag.
Milner, R., Parrow, J. andWalker, D. (1992a). A calculus of mobile processes,
I, Information and Computation 100(1): 1–40.
Milner, R., Parrow, J. andWalker, D. (1992b). A calculus of mobile processes,
II, Information and Computation 100(1): 41–77.
Myers, A. C. (1999). Jflow: practical mostly-static information flow control,
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Princi-
ples of programming languages, ACM Press, pp. 228–241.
Myers, A. C. and Liskov, B. (1997). A decentralized model for information
flow control, Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles (SOSP-97), Vol. 31,5 of Operating Systems Review, ACM Press,
New York, pp. 129–142.
Myers, A. C., Sabelfeld, A. and Zdancewic, S. (2004). Enforcing robust
declassification, CSFW, pp. 172–186.
URL: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSFW.2004.9
BIBLIOGRAPHY 196
Necula, G. C. (1998). Compiling with proofs, Technical report, Carnegie
Mellon University.
Necula, G. C. and Lee, P. (1998). Safe, untrusted agents using proof-carrying
code, in G. Vigna (ed.), Mobile Agents and Security, Vol. 1419 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag.
Ørbæk, P. (1995). Can you Trust your Data?, in M. I. S. P. D. Mosses and
M. Nielsen (eds), Proceedings of the TAPSOFT/FASE’95 Conference, Vol.
915 of LNCS of Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-
Verlag, Aarhus, Denmark, pp. 575–590.
Palsberg, J. and Ørbæk, P. (1995). Trust in the λ-calculus, in A. Mycroft
(ed.), SAS’95: Static Analysis, Vol. 983 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 314–330.
Pierce, B. C. (2002). Types and Programming Languages, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Pierce, B. and Sangiorgi, D. (1993). Typing and subtyping for mobile pro-
cesses, Proceedings, Eighth Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer
Science, pp. 376–385.
Pottier, F. (2001). A simple view of type-secure information flow in the
pi-calculus.
Pottier, F. and Conchon, S. (2000). Information flow inference for free, Pro-
ceedings of the Fifth ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Func-
tional Programming (ICFP’00), Montral, Canada, pp. 46–57.
Sangiorgi, D. (1993a). Expressing Mobility in Process Algebra, PhD thesis,
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
Sangiorgi, D. (1993b). From pi-calculus to Higher-Order pi-calculus — and
back, in M.-C. Gaudel and J.-P. Jouannaud (eds), Proc. TAPSOFT’93,
Vol. 668 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Verlag, pp. 151–
166.
Schneier, B. (1993). Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and
Source Code in C, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
SETI@home: Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence at home (2003). Ac-
cessed: 27th May, 2004.
URL: http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
Sewell, P. (1998). Global/local subtyping and capability inference for a dis-
tributed pi-calculus, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1443: 695–706.
Sewell, P. and Vitek, J. (1999). Secure composition of insecure components,
Trusted objects, Centre Universitaire d’Informatique, University of Geneva.
Smith, G. and Volpano, D. (1998). Secure information flow in a multi-
threaded imperative language, in ACM (ed.), Conference record of POPL
’98: the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Pro-
gramming Languages: papers presented at the Symposium, San Diego, Cal-
ifornia, 19–21 January 1998, ACM Press, pp. 355–364.
Vasconcelos, V. T. (1993). A note on a typing system for the higher-order
pi-calculus.
Vivas, J. L. and Yoshida, N. (2002). Dynamic channel screening in the
higher order pi-calculus, Proceedings of F-WAN, Foundations of Wide Area
Network Computing, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science,
Elsevier Science.
Volpano, D., Smith, G. and Irvine, C. (1996). A sound type system for secure
flow analysis, Journal of Computer Security 4(3): 167–187.
Wright, D. A. (1991). A new technique for strictness analysis, in S. Abramsky
and T. S. E. Maibaum (eds), TAPSOFT ’91: Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Theory and Practice of Software Development,
Volume 2: Advances in Distributed Computing (ADC) and Colloquium on
Combining Paradigms for Software Developmemnt (CCPSD), Vol. 494 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 235–258.
Wright, D. A. (1992). Reduction Types and Intensionality in the Lambda-
Calculus, PhD thesis, University of Tasmania.
Wright, D. A. (1996). Linear, strictness and usage logics, in M. E. Houle
and P. Eades (eds), Proceedings of Conference on Computing: The Aus-
tralian Theory Symposium, Australian Computer Science Communica-
tions, Townsville, pp. 73–80.
Yellin, F. (1995). Low level security in Java, Fourth International Conference
on the World-Wide Web, MIT, Boston.
Yoshida, N. (1996). Graph types for monadic mobile processes, in
V. Chandru and V. Vinay (eds), Proceedings of the 16th Conference on
Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
BIBLIOGRAPHY 198
(Hyderabad, India, December 18–20, 1996), Vol. 1180 of LNCS, Springer,




Yoshida, N. and Hennessy, M. (2000). Assigning types to processes, 15th
Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS’ 00), IEEE, Washington
- Brussels - Tokyo, pp. 334–348.
Zdancewic, S. and Myers, A. (2001). Robust declassification, 14th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW ’01), IEEE, Washing-
ton - Brussels - Tokyo, pp. 15–26.
Zdancewic, S., Zheng, L., Nystrom, N. and Myers, A. C. (2001). Untrusted
hosts and confidentiality: Secure program partitioning, SOSP, pp. 1–14.
URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/502034.502036
